

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 115-

23

OFFERED BY MR. YOUNG OF ALASKA

Add at the end of title XVI the following new subtitle:

1 **Subtitle H—Advancing America’s**
2 **Missile Defense Act of 2017**

3 **SEC. 1699D. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This subtitle may be cited as the “Advancing Amer-
5 ica’s Missile Defense Act of 2017”.

6 **SEC. 1699E. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CURRENT STATE OF**
7 **UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE, FUTURE**
8 **INVESTMENT, AND ACCELERATING CAPABILI-**
9 **TIES TO OUTPACE CURRENT THREATS.**

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
11 ings:

12 (1) According to the Commander of United
13 States Northern Command, General Lori Robinson,
14 the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element
15 of the ballistic missile defense system “defend[s] the
16 homeland against a limited long-range ballistic mis-
17 sile attack” and “is designed to intercept incoming
18 threats in the midcourse phase of flight.”.

1 (2) Spanning 15 time zones, the ground-based
2 midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile de-
3 fense system and its associated elements represents
4 the only system currently capable of defeating an
5 adversary's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
6 in the midcourse segment of flight.

7 (3) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
8 (THAAD) is a United States Army weapon system
9 that is transportable, globally deployable, and capa-
10 ble of defeating ballistic missiles inside or outside
11 the atmosphere during a missile's terminal phase of
12 flight.

13 (4) In response to the aggressive behavior of
14 North Korea, the United States initially deployed a
15 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to the
16 United States territory of Guam in April of 2013,
17 made that deployment permanent in July of 2015,
18 and began to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area
19 Defense battery to South Korea in March of 2017.

20 (5) Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the naval
21 component of the ballistic missile defense system ca-
22 pable of defeating short- to intermediate-range, mid-
23 course-phase, ballistic missile threats and short-
24 range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase.

1 (6) The Navy currently has 33 Aegis Ballistic
2 Missile Defense combatants, 5 cruisers (CGs) and
3 28 destroyers (DDGs), and will add an additional
4 ballistic missile defense-capable destroyer by the end
5 of fiscal year 2017.

6 (7) Aegis Ashore is the land-based component
7 of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system and is
8 currently capable of defeating short- to intermediate-
9 range ballistic missile threats.

10 (8) In 2015, the United States deployed the
11 first Aegis Ashore unit to Romania, and in 2018,
12 the United States plans to deploy an Aegis Ashore
13 unit to Poland.

14 (9) The current leader of North Korea, Kim
15 Jong-un, has threatened a “preemptive nuclear
16 strike” against the United States and has publicly
17 stated that North Korea “can tip new-type inter-
18 continental ballistic rockets with more powerful nu-
19 clear warheads” capable of ranging the United
20 States mainland.

21 (10) Kim Jong-un has rapidly increased the ca-
22 dence of nuclear and ballistic missile testing.

23 (11) North Korea’s testing is steadily pro-
24 gressing toward their stated goal and has achieved
25 some notable successes, including its first sub-

1 marine-launched ballistic missile in 2016 and its
2 first solid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile in
3 early 2017.

4 (12) According to General John E. Hyten,
5 Commander of United States Strategic Command,
6 during a hearing of the Committee on Armed Serv-
7 ices of the Senate on February 11, 2017, “the North
8 Koreans launched a new solid, medium-range bal-
9 listic missile . . . A solid rocket [that] can be rolled
10 out and launched at a moment’s notice.”.

11 (13) General Hyten further testified that the
12 February 11th test also “showed a new technology
13 [and] a new North Korean capability . . . [The
14 North Koreans] moved what was demonstrated at
15 sea onto land, onto a new launcher, and did it in a
16 very quick way.”.

17 (14) On May 14, 2017, North Korea launched
18 a new missile, reported as a Hwasong-12, that re-
19 portedly flew a highly lofted trajectory reaching an
20 altitude of over 2,000 kilometers and traveling more
21 than 700 kilometers in distance before falling into
22 the East Sea.

23 (15) Several senior officials at the Department
24 of Defense have publicly stated their belief that, due
25 to the new pace of North Korean missile testing, it

1 is no longer a matter of if North Korea gets the ca-
2 pability to threaten the contiguous United States
3 with a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile, but
4 when North Korea will achieve that capability.

5 (16) During the past six years, under the re-
6 gime of Kim Jong-un, North Korea has conducted
7 approximately 80 ballistic missile and three nuclear
8 tests.

9 (17) During the same span of six years, the
10 Missile Defense Agency, due to funding reductions,
11 budget uncertainty, and a risk-averse testing cul-
12 ture, has only conducted four flight tests of the
13 ground-based midcourse defense element of the bal-
14 listic missile defense system.

15 (18) Since 2006 and adjusted for inflation,
16 funding for the Missile Defense Agency's budget has
17 decreased 23.4 percent, from \$11,000,000,000 to
18 \$8,400,000,000.

19 (19) Meanwhile, Iran continues to develop bal-
20 listic missiles in violation of United Nations Security
21 Council Resolution 2231 (2015), has developed me-
22 dium-range ballistic missiles to target Israel and
23 other allies of the United States, and is working to-
24 wards an intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

1 (20) In March 2013, in response to a nuclear
2 detonation by North Korea, Secretary of Defense
3 Chuck Hagel, citing “irresponsible and reckless
4 provocations”, announced plans to restore the num-
5 ber of deployed ground-based interceptors from 30
6 to 44 by the end of 2017.

7 (21) The Missile Defense Agency will soon fin-
8 ish the expansion to 44 ground-based interceptors
9 and begin the construction of a new S-band radar,
10 the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), at
11 Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, starting in 2018.

12 (22) The Missile Defense Agency is currently
13 researching, testing, and developing the Configura-
14 tion-3 (C3) booster, a selectable two- or three-stage
15 booster, and has plans to field this capability by
16 September 30, 2023.

17 (23) Section 1682 of the National Defense Au-
18 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
19 114–92; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) directs the Director
20 of the Missile Defense Agency to modernize and im-
21 prove the reliability of the ground-based interceptor
22 fleet by speeding the development of the redesigned
23 kill vehicle (RKV) to replace all capability-enhance-
24 ment I exoatmospheric kill vehicles by September
25 30, 2022.

1 (24) Section 1681 of the National Defense Au-
2 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
3 114–92; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) makes the multi-ob-
4 ject kill vehicle (MOKV), which is a new technology
5 that would allow single interceptors to engage more
6 than one target, a program of record and directs the
7 Director of the Missile Defense Agency to begin rig-
8 orous flight testing of a multiple-object kill vehicle
9 for the ground-based midcourse defense system by
10 2020.

11 (25) Section 1680 of the National Defense Au-
12 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
13 114–92; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) required the Sec-
14 retary of Defense to report on the efforts of the De-
15 partment of Defense to develop and deploy an air-
16 borne or other boost phase defense system for mis-
17 sile defense by fiscal year 2025.

18 (26) Section 1685 of the National Defense Au-
19 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
20 114–92) requires the Director to commence the con-
21 cept definition of a space-based ballistic missile
22 intercept layer to the ballistic missile defense system
23 and to draft operational concepts for how a space-
24 based ballistic missile intercept layer would function

1 in the context of a multi-layer missile defense archi-
2 tecture.

3 (27) Section 1683 of the National Defense Au-
4 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
5 114–92) and section 238 of the National Defense
6 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law
7 113–66) requires the Director to plan the future
8 construction of an additional missile defense site in
9 the United States, including the possibility of a site
10 on the East Coast of the United States that is capa-
11 ble of protecting the homeland.

12 (28) The Department of Defense and the Mis-
13 sile Defense Agency are continuing to deploy Aegis
14 Ballistic Missile Defense, Aegis Ashore, and Ter-
15 minal High Altitude Area Defense systems to more
16 robustly defend members of the Armed Forces, allies
17 and partners of the United States, cities and popu-
18 lation centers in the United States, and critical in-
19 frastructure of the United States.

20 (29) The current United States missile defense
21 architecture, including the ground-based midcourse
22 defense and terminal segment defenses like the Ter-
23 minal High Altitude Area Defense, Aegis Ballistic
24 Missile Defense, Aegis Ashore, and Patriot Air and
25 Missile Defense System, are presently capable of de-

1 fending deployed Armed Forces of the United
2 States, as well as allies and partners of the United
3 States.

4 (30) General Robinson, in testimony before the
5 Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on April
6 6, 2017, stated “As adversaries continue to pursue
7 credible and advanced capabilities, we too must
8 evolve our missile defense capabilities to outpace in-
9 creasingly complex threats.”.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that the Secretary of Defense should use the upcom-
12 ing Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and the
13 Missile Defeat Review (MDR) to accelerate the develop-
14 ment of new and existing means to increase the capacity,
15 capability, and reliability of the ground-based midcourse
16 defense element of the ballistic missile defense system and
17 other missile defense programs.

18 (c) ACCELERATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN
19 ADVANCED MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES TOWARD
20 FIELDING.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—To the degree practicable,
22 the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall use
23 the policies of the Department of Defense to accel-
24 erate the development, testing, and fielding of the
25 redesigned kill vehicle, the multi-object kill vehicle,

1 the C3 booster, a space-based sensor layer, an air-
2 borne laser on unmanned aerial vehicles, and an ad-
3 ditional missile defense site, including the completion
4 of any outstanding environmental impact statements
5 (EISs) for an additional missile defense site on the
6 East Coast or in the Midwest regions of the United
7 States.

8 (2) PRIORITY.—The Director shall prioritize
9 the development of capabilities listed in paragraph
10 (1) subject to annual authorization and appropria-
11 tion of funding.

12 (3) DEVELOPMENT.—The Director shall use
13 sound acquisition processes and program manage-
14 ment to develop the capabilities set forth in para-
15 graph (1).

16 **SEC. 1699F. AUTHORIZATION TO INCREASE CURRENT**
17 **GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE CA-**
18 **PACITY BY 28 GROUND-BASED INTERCEP-**
19 **TORS.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
21 ings:

22 (1) A report from Johns Hopkins University,
23 published in 2015, and entitled “North Korea’s Nu-
24 clear Futures: Technology and Strategy”, concluded

1 that, by 2020, North Korea could have as many as
2 100 nuclear weapons.

3 (2) By December 31, 2017, the United States
4 will have 44 operational ground-based interceptors
5 distributed between Fort Greely, Alaska, and Van-
6 denberg Air Force Base, California.

7 (3) Missile Field 1 and Missile Field 2 at Fort
8 Greely have the capacity to house an additional 14
9 and 6 ground-based interceptors, respectively, with-
10 out the added infrastructure costs of some common
11 ground systems.

12 (4) A report by the Department of Defense,
13 submitted to Congress in 2013, and entitled “Home-
14 land Defense Hedging Policy and Strategy”, rec-
15 ommended acquiring 14 operational and testing
16 spares for increased testing requirements and to
17 support increased capacity as a hedge against
18 emerging threats.

19 (b) INCREASE IN CAPACITY.—The Secretary of De-
20 fense shall, subject to the annual authorization of appro-
21 priations and the annual appropriation of funds for Na-
22 tional Missile Defense, increase the number of United
23 States ground-based interceptors by 28.

24 (c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director
3 of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the
4 congressional defense committees a report on infra-
5 structure requirements to increase the number of
6 ground-based interceptors at Missile Field 1 and
7 Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely to 20 ground-based
8 interceptors each.

9 (2) CONTENTS.—The report required by para-
10 graph (1) shall include the following:

11 (A) An analysis of the strategic, oper-
12 ational, and tactical benefits of adding addi-
13 tional ground-based interceptors at each missile
14 field.

15 (B) A detailed description of the infra-
16 structure needed and costs associated with ex-
17 panding each missile field.

18 (C) An identification of any environmental,
19 technical, or logistical barriers to expanding
20 each missile field.

21 (D) Any analysis of alternatively using
22 Missile Field 4 and Missile Field 5 to increase
23 the number of ground-based interceptors.

1 grandfather conducted in their 60 total years of
2 being in power.

3 (2) According to senior Department of Defense
4 officials, Iran, which has the most active and diverse
5 ballistic missile development program in the Middle
6 East, may be able to deploy an operational inter-
7 continental ballistic missile by 2020.

8 (3) A 2013 Department of Defense report to
9 Congress, entitled “Homeland Defense Hedging Pol-
10 icy and Strategy”, stated that the most cost-effective
11 and near-term option for increasing homeland inter-
12 ceptor capacity is at existing missile fields.

13 (4) Phase 3 of former President Clinton’s
14 “3+3” strategy for national missile defense outlined
15 as many as 250 interceptors.

16 (5) The 2000 Final Environmental Impact
17 Statement for Fort Greely included the authoriza-
18 tion for up to 100 ground-based interceptors to en-
19 sure that growth would not incur any unexpected en-
20 vironmental delays.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that it is the policy of the United States to maintain
23 and improve, with the allies of the United States, an effec-
24 tive, robust layered missile defense system capable of de-
25 fending the citizens of the United States residing in terri-

1 tories and States of the United States, allies of the United
2 States, and deployed Armed Forces of the United States.

3 (c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director
6 of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the
7 congressional defense committees a report on in-
8 creasing the capacity of the ground-based midcourse
9 defense element of the ballistic missile defense sys-
10 tem.

11 (2) CONTENTS.—The report required by para-
12 graph (1) shall include the following:

13 (A) An identification of potential sites—
14 new or existing—to allow for the increase of up
15 to 100 ground-based interceptors.

16 (B) An analysis of the strategic, oper-
17 ational, tactical, and cost benefits of each site.

18 (C) A description of any environmental,
19 legal, or tactical challenges associated with each
20 site.

21 (D) A detailed description of the infra-
22 structure needed and costs associated with each
23 site.

1 (E) A summary of any completed or out-
2 standing environmental impact statements
3 (EIS) on each site.

4 (F) An operational evaluation and cost
5 analysis of the deployment of transportable
6 ground-based interceptors, including an identi-
7 fication of potential sites, including in the east-
8 ern United States and at Vandenberg Air Force
9 Base, and an examination of any environ-
10 mental, legal, or tactical challenges associated
11 with such deployments, including to any sites
12 identified in subparagraph (A).

13 (G) A determination of the appropriate
14 fleet mix of ground-based interceptor kill vehi-
15 cles and boosters to maximize overall system ef-
16 fectiveness and increase its capacity and capa-
17 bility, including the costs and benefits of contin-
18 ued inclusion of capability enhancement II
19 (CE-II) Block 1 interceptors after the fielding
20 of the redesigned kill vehicle.

21 (H) A description of the planned improve-
22 ments to homeland ballistic missile defense sen-
23 sor and discrimination capabilities and an as-
24 sessment of the expected operational benefits of

1 such improvements to homeland ballistic missile
2 defense.

3 (I) The benefit of supplementing ground-
4 based midcourse defense elements with other,
5 more distributed, elements, including both Aegis
6 ships and Aegis Ashore installations with
7 Standard Missile-3 Block IIA and other inter-
8 ceptors in Hawaii and at other locations for
9 homeland missile defense.

10 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
11 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
12 include a classified annex.

13 **SEC. 1699H. EVALUATION AND EVOLUTION OF TERRES-**
14 **TRIAL GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE**
15 **SENSORS.**

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
17 ings:

18 (1) United States missile defense sensors are
19 the unheralded backbone of the missile defense ar-
20 chitecture of the United States, positioned to provide
21 the Armed Forces with critical data needed to suc-
22 cessfully intercept threats from rogue nations like
23 Iran and North Korea.

24 (2) The United States uses a wide variety of
25 UHF, L-, S-, and X-band ground-based sensors and

1 only a few infrared space-based sensors for early
2 warning, tracking, and discrimination of ballistic
3 missiles.

4 (3) The United States currently has operational
5 upgraded early warning radars (UEWRs) for home-
6 land missile defense at Beale Air Force Base, Cali-
7 fornia, Fylingdales, United Kingdom, and Thule Air
8 Force Base, Greenland, and will soon add upgrade
9 early warning radars at Cape Cod, Massachusetts,
10 and Clear Air Force Station, Alaska.

11 (4) Originally constructed in the 1970s, the
12 COBRA DANE radar at Eareckson Air Station on
13 Shemya, Alaska, provides critical information on
14 missile defense threats to the Armed Forces.

15 (5) The Long Range Discrimination Radar
16 (LRDR), a new, land-based, S-band radar on Clear
17 Air Force Station will begin to deliver persistent
18 long-range discrimination, precision tracking, and
19 hit estimation when construction completes on the
20 radar by 2020.

21 (b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director
24 of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with
25 the Secretary of the Air Force, shall submit to the

1 congressional defense committees a report on the
2 status of the integrated layers of missile defense ra-
3 dars.

4 (2) CONTENTS.—The report required by para-
5 graph (1) shall include the following:

6 (A) A detailed analysis of the expected im-
7 provements resulting from the integration of
8 the Long Range Discrimination Radar into the
9 missile defense system architecture of the
10 United States, including—

11 (i) any adjustments to homeland mis-
12 sile defense tactics, techniques, and proce-
13 dures;

14 (ii) possible adjustments to ground-
15 based midcourse defense shot-doctrine and
16 required interceptor capacity;

17 (iii) possibilities for direct integration
18 with Fort Greely's Command and Control
19 node; and

20 (iv) impacts on regional missile de-
21 fense systems including Aegis Ballistic
22 Missile Defense, Aegis Ashore, and Ter-
23 minal High Altitude Area Defense.

1 (B) A detailed comparison of the capabili-
2 ties of Long Range Discrimination Radar and
3 the COBRA DANE radar, including—

4 (i) the unique capabilities of each
5 radar;

6 (ii) the overlapping capabilities of
7 each radar; and

8 (iii) the advantages and disadvantages
9 of each radar's location.

10 (C) A modernization plan for the long-term
11 continued operations and maintenance of the
12 COBRA DANE radar or a plan to replace its
13 capability if COBRA DANE cannot remain
14 operational, and the costs associated with each
15 plan.

16 (c) ASSESSMENT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
17 THE UNITED STATES.—Not later than 90 days after the
18 date on which the Director submits the report under sub-
19 section (b)(1), the Comptroller General of the United
20 States shall—

21 (1) complete a review of the plan required by
22 subsection (b)(2)(C); and

23 (2) submit to the congressional defense commit-
24 tees a report on such review that includes the find-

1 ings and recommendations of the Comptroller Gen-
2 eral.

3 (d) FORM.—The reports submitted subsections (b)
4 and (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
5 include a classified annex.

6 **SEC. 1699I. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A SPACE-**
7 **BASED MISSILE DEFENSE SENSOR ARCHITEC-**
8 **TURE.**

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
10 ings:

11 (1) The Missile Defense Agency currently oper-
12 ates the Space Tracking and Surveillance System-
13 Demonstration (STSS–D), a two satellite constella-
14 tion for testing purposes, which uses sensors capable
15 of detecting visible and infrared light and serves as
16 an experimental space tracker for the ballistic mis-
17 sile defense system.

18 (2) Conceptually developed in 2009, the Preci-
19 sion Tracking Space (PTSS) would have provided
20 the persistent space-based tracking of ballistic mis-
21 siles, including object characterization and discrimi-
22 nation, and would have also supported homeland, re-
23 gional, and theater missile defense.

24 (3) Projected to enter orbit in 2018, the Missile
25 Defense Agency and the Applied Physics Laboratory

1 of Johns Hopkins University is currently conducting
2 a Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) experiment, a
3 network of small sensors hosted on commercial sat-
4 ellites, used to collect the energy signature of the im-
5 pact between a ballistic missile threat and an inter-
6 ceptor from the ballistic missile defense system.

7 (4) Section 236 of the National Defense Au-
8 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law
9 113–66) required the Secretary of Defense to con-
10 duct an evaluation of options and alternatives for fu-
11 ture sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense
12 in order to enhance the ballistic missile defense ca-
13 pabilities of the United States.

14 (5) General John Hyten, Commander of the
15 United States Strategic Command, has argued for
16 the “deployment of a global space-based sensor sys-
17 tem with discrimination capability” as a “critical
18 component to improving the effectiveness of our de-
19 ployed interceptors” and to provide “multiple re-
20 sponse especially as potential adversaries embark on
21 improving countermeasures against our [missile de-
22 fense] systems.”.

23 (6) Admiral James Syring, the Director of the
24 Missile Defense Agency, has stated, “From a missile
25 defense perspective, we have to develop a future

1 operational space layer. Given where the threat is
2 going with hypersonics and more ICBMs and so
3 forth this persistent tracking and discrimination ca-
4 pability from space is a must.”.

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that the Department of Defense shall develop a resil-
7 ient space-based missile defense sensor layer to provide
8 persistent, launch-to-intercept tracking, discrimination,
9 and kill assessment of ballistic missile threats and provide
10 this capability to the Armed Forces as soon as technically
11 feasible.

12 (c) SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE SENSOR AR-
13 CHITECTURE.—

14 (1) DEVELOPMENT.—The Director of the Mis-
15 sile Defense Agency shall develop a highly reliable
16 space-based missile defense sensor architecture for
17 the ground-based midcourse defense system using
18 sound acquisition practices.

19 (2) DEPLOYMENT.—The Director shall—

20 (A) conduct rigorous testing of the space-
21 based missile defense sensor architecture devel-
22 oped under paragraph (1) as soon as technically
23 feasible; and

24 (B) produce and deploy a space-based mis-
25 sile defense sensor architecture as soon as tech-

1 nically feasible after the date on which the Di-
2 rector successfully carries out subparagraph
3 (A).

4 (d) CAPABILITIES AND CRITERIA.—The Director
5 shall ensure that the space-based missile defense sensor
6 architecture developed under subsection (c)(1) provides
7 the following functions and capabilities:

8 (1) SENSOR FUNCTIONS.—At a minimum, mis-
9 sile defense-related sensors shall include the fol-
10 lowing:

11 (A) Detection.

12 (B) Tracking.

13 (C) Characterization.

14 (D) Classification.

15 (E) Discrimination.

16 (F) Debris mitigation.

17 (G) Kill assessment.

18 (2) SENSOR ARCHITECTURE CAPABILITIES.—At
19 a minimum, maximization or improvement of sensor-
20 related capabilities shall include the following:

21 (A) Handling of increasing raid sizes.

22 (B) Precision tracking of threat missiles.

23 (C) Providing fire-control-quality tracks of
24 evolving threat missiles.

1 (D) Enabling launch-on-remote and en-
2 gage-on-remote capabilities.

3 (E) Discriminating lethal objects (war-
4 heads) from other objects.

5 (F) Effectively assessing the results of en-
6 gagements.

7 (G) Enabling enhanced shot doctrine.

8 (H) Integrating with all elements of the
9 current missile defense system, including the
10 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Aegis
11 Ballistic Missile Defense, Aegis Ashore, and Pa-
12 triot Air and Missile Defense System.

13 (I) Such other capabilities as the Secretary
14 of Defense determines appropriate.

15 (e) PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.—The management of
16 the space-based missile defense sensor architecture devel-
17 oped under subsection (c) shall report directly to the Dep-
18 uty Director of the Missile Defense Agency.

19 (f) REPORT ON FUNDING PROFILE.—The Director
20 shall include with the budget justification materials sub-
21 mitted to Congress in support of the budget of the Depart-
22 ment of Defense for fiscal year 2018 (as submitted with
23 the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title
24 31, United States Code) a report on the funding profile
25 necessary to carry out subsection (c).

1 **SEC. 1699J. AUTHORIZATION FOR MORE GROUND-BASED**
2 **MIDCOURSE DEFENSE TESTING.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) General John Hyten, Commander of the
6 United States Strategic Command, stated that
7 North Korea is quickly advancing their missile and
8 nuclear technology because their rapid testing ca-
9 dence allows them to quickly apply lessons learned
10 in testing to advance new capabilities.

11 (2) General Hyten characterized the current ir-
12 regular testing environment in the United States as
13 “the wrong kind of testing environment” due to
14 risk-aversion and fear of failure.

15 (3) Regular missile defense testing, including
16 ground testing and non-intercept tests, not only im-
17 proves the missile defense system, but also gives the
18 members of the Armed Forces experience with and
19 confidence in their tactics, techniques, and proce-
20 dures.

21 (4) Since 2006 and adjusted for inflation, fund-
22 ing for testing of the ground-based midcourse de-
23 fense element has decreased 83.5 percent, from more
24 than \$400,000,000 to \$65,800,000.

25 (5) Section 1689 of the National Defense Au-
26 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law

1 114–328) requires the Director of the Missile De-
2 fense Agency to administer a flight test of the
3 ground-based midcourse defense element of the bal-
4 listic missile defense system at least once each fiscal
5 year.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) at a minimum, the Missile Defense Agency
9 should continue to flight test the ground-based mid-
10 course defense element at least once each fiscal year;

11 (2) the Department of Defense should allocate
12 increased funding to homeland missile defense test-
13 ing to ensure that our defenses continue to evolve
14 faster than the threats against which they are pos-
15 tured to defend;

16 (3) in order to rapidly innovate, develop, and
17 field new technologies, the Director of the Missile
18 Defense Agency should continue to focus testing
19 campaigns on delivering increased capabilities to the
20 Armed Forces as quickly as possible; and

21 (4) the Director of the Missile Defense Agency
22 should seek to establish a more prudent balance be-
23 tween risk mitigation and the more rapid testing
24 pace needed to quickly develop and deliver new capa-
25 bilities to the Armed Forces.

1 (c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
3 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director
4 of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the
5 congressional defense committees a revised missile
6 defense testing campaign plan that accelerates the
7 development and deployment of new missile defense
8 technologies.

9 (2) CONTENTS.—The report required by para-
10 graph (1) shall include the following:

11 (A) A detailed analysis of the acceleration
12 of each of following programs:

13 (i) Redesigned kill vehicle.

14 (ii) Multi-object kill vehicle.

15 (iii) Configuration-3 booster.

16 (iv) Lasers mounted on small un-
17 manned aerial vehicles.

18 (v) Space-based missile defense sensor
19 architecture.

20 (vi) Such additional technologies as
21 the Director considers appropriate.

22 (B) A new deployment timeline for each of
23 the programs in listed in subparagraph (A) or
24 a detailed description of why the current

1 timeline for deployment technologies under
2 those programs is most suitable.

3 (C) An identification of any funding or pol-
4 icy restrictions that would slow down the de-
5 ployment of the technologies under the pro-
6 grams listed in subparagraph (A).

7 (D) A risk assessment of the potential
8 cost-overruns and deployment delays that may
9 be encountered in the expedited development
10 process of the capabilities under paragraph (1).

11 (d) REPORT ON FUNDING PROFILE.—The Director
12 shall include with the budget justification materials sub-
13 mitted to Congress in support of the budget of the Depart-
14 ment of Defense for fiscal year 2018 (as submitted with
15 the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title
16 31, United States Code) a report on the funding profile
17 necessary for the new testing campaign plan required by
18 subsection (c)(1).

