

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 118-36**  
**OFFERED BY MR. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

At the end of subtitle C of title XVII, add the following:

1 **SEC. 17\_\_ . UPDATING THE ANNUAL REPORT ON AL-HOL IN**  
2 **CONNECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
3 **ASSETS. RECIDIVISM, AND OTHER FACTORS**  
4 **IN SYRIA OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.**

5 Section 1262(f)(1)(A) of the National Defense Au-  
6 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 is amended—

7 (1) in clause (ii), by adding at the end before  
8 the semicolon the following: “, including the disposi-  
9 tion of Department of Defense assets in support of  
10 the security of the facilities and camps”;

11 (2) in clause (iii), by striking “and” at the end;

12 (3) in clause (iv), by striking the period at the  
13 end and inserting “; and”; and

14 (4) by adding at the end the following:

15 “(v) the impact of the activities of state and non-state  
16 actors on the security of the facilities and camps.”.

1 **SEC. 17\_\_ . MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON MILI-**  
2 **TARY POWER OF IRAN RELATED TO SYRIA.**

3 Section 1245(b) of the National Defense Authoriza-  
4 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (10 U.S.C. 113 note) is  
5 amended by adding at the end the following:

6 “(13) An assessment of Iranian assets in Syria,  
7 to include those that aid their force projection, anti-  
8 access and aerial denial, and the potential introduc-  
9 tion of destabilizing types or numbers of conven-  
10 tional and unconventional weapons and other capa-  
11 bilities.”.

12 **SEC. 17\_\_ . INTERAGENCY STRATEGY TO COUNTER NORMAL-**  
13 **IZATION WITH ASSAD REGIME.**

14 (a) REPORT AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

15 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 180 days  
16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-  
17 nually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State  
18 (in consultation with the Administrator of the Drug  
19 Enforcement Administration, and the heads of other  
20 appropriate Federal departments and agencies) shall  
21 submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
22 a report and strategy to describe and counter ac-  
23 tions taken or planned by foreign governments to  
24 normalize, engage with, or upgrade political, diplo-  
25 matic, or economic ties with the regime led by

1       Bashar al-Assad in Syria (in this section referred to  
2       as the “Assad regime”).

3           (2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the report  
4       under paragraph (1) shall include—

5           (A) a description of violations of inter-  
6       national law and human rights abuses com-  
7       mitted by Bashar al-Assad, the Government of  
8       the Russian Federation, or the Government of  
9       Iran and progress towards justice and account-  
10      ability for the Syrian people;

11          (B) a full list of diplomatic meetings at the  
12      Ambassador level or above, between the Syrian  
13      regime and any representative of the Govern-  
14      ments of Turkiye, the United Arab Emirates,  
15      Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait,  
16      the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria,  
17      Morocco, Libya, or Lebanon, respectively;

18          (C) a list including an identification of—

19           (i) any single covered activity exceed-  
20      ing \$500,000; and

21           (ii) any combination of covered activi-  
22      ties by the same source that, in aggregate,  
23      exceed \$500,000 and occur within a single  
24      year;

1 (D) for each identified single activity or  
2 aggregate activities, as the case may be, in-  
3 cluded in the list described in subparagraph  
4 (C), a determination of whether such activity  
5 violates United States sanctions or provides  
6 support or benefit to the Assad regime, or those  
7 acting on behalf of the Assad regime, Russia, or  
8 Iran; or are knowingly responsible for serious  
9 human rights abuses against the Syrian people.

10 (E) a description of the steps the United  
11 States is taking to actively deter recognition or  
12 normalization of relations by other governments  
13 with the Assad regime, including specific diplo-  
14 matic engagements

15 (F) an assessment of how recognition or  
16 normalization of relations by other governments  
17 with the Assad regime impacts the national se-  
18 curity of the United States, prospects for imple-  
19 mentation of the United Nations Security  
20 Council Resolution 2254, prospects for justice  
21 and accountability for war crimes in Syria, and  
22 the benefits derived by the Government of the  
23 Russian Federation or the Government of Iran.

24 (b) SCOPE.—The initial report required by subsection  
25 (a) shall address the period beginning on January 1, 2021,

1 and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, and  
2 each subsequent report shall address the one-year period  
3 following the conclusion of the scope of the prior report.

4 (c) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) shall  
5 be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a  
6 classified annex. The unclassified section of such a report  
7 shall be made publicly available on a website of the United  
8 States Federal Government.

9 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

10 (1) the term “appropriate congressional com-  
11 mittees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
13 Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on  
14 Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Com-  
15 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-  
16 resentatives; and

17 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
18 the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee  
19 on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on  
20 Intelligence of the Senate; and

21 (2) the term “covered activity” means gifts, do-  
22 nation, in kind donations, and direct assistance, in-  
23 cluding humanitarian assistance—

24 (A) by a foreign person located in Turkey,  
25 the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan,

1 Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Kingdom of  
2 Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya,  
3 or Lebanon; to

4 (B) a recipient in any area of Syria held  
5 by the Assad regime.

6 **SEC. 17\_. REPORTS ON MANIPULATION OF UNITED NA-**  
7 **TIONS BY ASSAD REGIME IN SYRIA.**

8 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-  
9 ment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the  
10 Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committee on For-  
11 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-  
12 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the  
13 manipulation of the United Nations by the regime led by  
14 Bashar al-Assad in Syria (in this section referred to as  
15 the “Assad regime”), including—

16 (1) a description of conditions, both explicit and  
17 implicit, set by the Assad regime with respect to  
18 United Nations operations in Syria including with  
19 respect to implementing partners, hiring practices,  
20 allocation of grants and contracts, and procurement  
21 of goods and services;

22 (2) a description of the extent to which the  
23 United Nations has rejected or otherwise opposed  
24 any of the conditions described in paragraph (1);

1           (3) an identification of officials or employees of  
2           the United Nations (including funds, programs and  
3           specialized agencies of the United Nations) with ties  
4           to the Assad regime, including family ties;

5           (4) a full account of access restrictions imposed  
6           by the Assad regime and the overall impact on the  
7           ability of the United Nations to deliver international  
8           assistance to target beneficiaries in areas outside re-  
9           gime control;

10          (5) a description of ways in which United Na-  
11          tions aid improperly benefits the Assad regime and  
12          its associates in defiance of basic humanitarian prin-  
13          ciples;

14          (6) a description of the due diligence mecha-  
15          nisms and vetting procedures in place to ensure enti-  
16          ties contracted by the United Nations to ensure  
17          goods, supplies, or services provided to Syria do not  
18          have links to the Assad regime, known human rights  
19          abusers;

20          (7) an identification of entities affiliated with  
21          the Assad regime, including the Syria Trust for De-  
22          velopment and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, for-  
23          eign government ministries, and private corporations  
24          owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the  
25          Assad regime, that have received United Nations

1 funding, contracts, or grants or have otherwise en-  
2 tered into a formalized partnership with the United  
3 Nations;

4 (8) an assessment of the degree to which the  
5 various forms of manipulation described in this sec-  
6 tion has resulted in compromises of the humani-  
7 tarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impar-  
8 tiality, and independence of the United Nations; and

9 (9) a strategy to reduce the ability of the Assad  
10 regime to manipulate or otherwise influence the  
11 United Nations and other aid operations in Syria  
12 and ensure United States and international aid is  
13 delivered in a neutral and impartial manner con-  
14 sistent with basic humanitarian principles.

