

**AMENDMENT TO**  
**RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 118–10**  
**OFFERED BY MR. TORRES OF NEW YORK**

At the end of subtitle C of title XVIII, add the following new section:

1 **SEC. 18\_\_ . STRATEGY RELATING TO CENSORSHIP APPA-**  
2 **RATUS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.**

3 (a) STRATEGY.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
6 President (acting through the Secretary of State, in  
7 consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Di-  
8 rector of National Intelligence, the Administrator of  
9 the United States Agency for International Develop-  
10 ment, the Chief Executive Officer of the United  
11 States Agency for Global Media, and the heads of  
12 such independent civil society organizations as the  
13 President determines relevant) shall develop and  
14 submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
15 a strategy on—

16 (A) how to combat the censorship appa-  
17 ratus of the CCP;

1 (B) the programs of the United States  
2 Government to combat such apparatus, the  
3 challenges such programs face as a result of  
4 censorship activities under such apparatus, and  
5 policy recommendations to fill gaps in such pro-  
6 grams.

7 (2) METRICS.—The strategy under paragraph  
8 (1) shall include metrics for measuring the success  
9 of the programs specified in subparagraph (A) of  
10 such paragraph.

11 (3) MATTERS.—In addition to the metrics  
12 under paragraph (2), the strategy under paragraph  
13 (1) shall include an assessment of the following mat-  
14 ters:

15 (A) Themes of domestic disinformation  
16 and censorship promulgated by the People’s Re-  
17 public of China regarding the United States, in-  
18 cluding an assessment of the following:

19 (i) Opinions within relevant online fo-  
20 rums.

21 (ii) The role of the “50 Cent Party”  
22 (also referred to as “wumao dang”) and  
23 other similar groups paid by the CCP to  
24 promote narratives in line with the goals  
25 and interests of the CCP.

1 (iii) The effects of censorship on the  
2 understanding of information regarding  
3 Xinjiang, Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong.

4 (B) The perception held by citizens of the  
5 People's Republic of China regarding breaking  
6 events published by United States news outlets,  
7 including major newspapers and smaller fo-  
8 rums.

9 (C) Specific topics, words, and phrases de-  
10 leted from news articles or other information  
11 materials under the censorship apparatus of the  
12 CCP, including—

13 (i) any themes common across such  
14 deletions;

15 (ii) the methods by which such dele-  
16 tions are made;

17 (iii) the role of artificial intelligence in  
18 making such deletions; and

19 (iv) the role of individuals working for  
20 the CCP, and the role of the bureaucratic  
21 structures of the CCP, in making such de-  
22 letions.

23 (D) How ideas regarding current political  
24 events in the United States and geopolitical  
25 events relating to United States-China relations

1 from newspapers and other media outlets, in-  
2 cluding state-sponsored newspapers and media  
3 outlets, are repackaged across the internet in  
4 the People's Republic of China.

5 (E) The specific governmental elements of,  
6 and governmental positions within, the CCP  
7 that are primarily responsible for conducting  
8 censorship under the censorship apparatus of  
9 the CCP.

10 (F) The effect of such censorship on the  
11 national security of the United States.

12 (G) The effect of such censorship on major  
13 social media platforms within the People's Re-  
14 public of China, including Weibo, Wechat, and  
15 Douyin, and how the People's Republic of  
16 China censors' content, intimidates users and  
17 enforces state propaganda.

18 (H) Internet secure access or circumven-  
19 tion technology usage, including user numbers,  
20 availability, and methodology.

21 (I) Significant usage spikes connected to  
22 events in or around China (including around  
23 significant anniversaries such as the anniver-  
24 sary of Tiananmen Square, during Hong Kong  
25 protests, and during Covid protests).

1           (J) The investments by the CCP in the  
2           censorship apparatus of the CCP during the  
3           20-year period preceding the date of the strat-  
4           egy or update to the strategy (as the case may  
5           be), to the extent such data may be ascertained.

6           (K) Any current diplomatic efforts con-  
7           ducted in a bilateral or multilateral forum to  
8           address the matters referred to in subpara-  
9           graphs (A) through (J).

10          (4) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—In addition to  
11          the metrics under paragraph (2) and the assessment  
12          of matters under paragraph (3), the strategy under  
13          paragraph (1) shall include the following:

14               (A) A review of existing public-private  
15               partnerships under which technology capable of  
16               circumventing the censorship apparatus of the  
17               CCP is provided and an assessment of the fea-  
18               sibility and utility of entering into new public-  
19               private partnerships (or developing other new  
20               tools) to increase free expression, circumvent  
21               censorship, and obstruct digital surveillance in  
22               the People’s Republic of China.

23               (B) A description of any programs or ac-  
24               tivities of the United States Government to pro-  
25               vide access by citizens of the People’s Republic

1 of China to a diverse range of fact-based infor-  
2 mation, and the funding levels required for any  
3 such programs or activities, including the ef-  
4 forts of the United States Agency for Global  
5 Media, the Secretary of State, the Adminis-  
6 trator of the United States Agency for Inter-  
7 national Development, and the Chief Executive  
8 Officer and efforts funded under the Coun-  
9 tering the People’s Republic of China Malign  
10 Influence Fund.

11 (C) A description of any programs of the  
12 Department of State that promote Internet  
13 freedom in the People’s Republic of China (in-  
14 cluding through monitoring and evaluation ef-  
15 forts) and the funding levels required for any  
16 such programs, including the Countering the  
17 People’s Republic of China Malign Influence  
18 Fund.

19 (D) Recommended measures to protect  
20 Chinese Americans, recent immigrants from the  
21 People’s Republic of China, Chinese nationals  
22 currently studying or working in the United  
23 States, and Chinese lawful permanent residents,  
24 who speak out against censorship, including a  
25 list of policy recommendations, new activities,

1 or current activities carried out using funds  
2 from the Countering the People’s Republic of  
3 China Malign Influence Fund that need to be  
4 expanded or scaled up in other manners.

5 (E) Proposed penalties for targeting indi-  
6 viduals who actively support or enable the cen-  
7 sorship and suppression efforts of the CCP.

8 (b) FORM.—The strategy under subsection (a) may  
9 be submitted in classified form.

10 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-  
11 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-  
12 sional committees” means the following:

13 (1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the  
14 Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Be-  
15 tween the United States and the Chinese Communist  
16 Party of the House of Representatives.

17 (2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
18 Senate.

