AMENDMENT TO
RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 118–10
OFFERED BY MR. TORRES OF NEW YORK

At the end of subtitle C of title XVIII, add the following new section:

SEC. 18. STRATEGY RELATING TO CENSORSHIP APPARATUS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.

(a) Strategy.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (acting through the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, and the heads of such independent civil society organizations as the President determines relevant) shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on—

(A) how to combat the censorship apparatus of the CCP;
(B) the programs of the United States Government to combat such apparatus, the challenges such programs face as a result of censorship activities under such apparatus, and policy recommendations to fill gaps in such programs.

(2) METRICS.—The strategy under paragraph (1) shall include metrics for measuring the success of the programs specified in subparagraph (A) of such paragraph.

(3) MATTERS.—In addition to the metrics under paragraph (2), the strategy under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of the following matters:

(A) Themes of domestic disinformation and censorship promulgated by the People’s Republic of China regarding the United States, including an assessment of the following:

(i) Opinions within relevant online forums.

(ii) The role of the “50 Cent Party” (also referred to as “wumao dang”) and other similar groups paid by the CCP to promote narratives in line with the goals and interests of the CCP.
(iii) The effects of censorship on the understanding of information regarding Xinjiang, Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong.

(B) The perception held by citizens of the People’s Republic of China regarding breaking events published by United States news outlets, including major newspapers and smaller forums.

(C) Specific topics, words, and phrases deleted from news articles or other information materials under the censorship apparatus of the CCP, including—

(i) any themes common across such deletions;

(ii) the methods by which such deletions are made;

(iii) the role of artificial intelligence in making such deletions; and

(iv) the role of individuals working for the CCP, and the role of the bureaucratic structures of the CCP, in making such deletions.

(D) How ideas regarding current political events in the United States and geopolitical events relating to United States-China relations...
from newspapers and other media outlets, including state-sponsored newspapers and media outlets, are repackaged across the internet in the People’s Republic of China.

(E) The specific governmental elements of, and governmental positions within, the CCP that are primarily responsible for conducting censorship under the censorship apparatus of the CCP.

(F) The effect of such censorship on the national security of the United States.

(G) The effect of such censorship on major social media platforms within the People’s Republic of China, including Weibo, Wechat, and Douyin, and how the People’s Republic of China censors’ content, intimidates users and enforces state propaganda.

(H) Internet secure access or circumvention technology usage, including user numbers, availability, and methodology.

(I) Significant usage spikes connected to events in or around China (including around significant anniversaries such as the anniversary of Tiananmen Square, during Hong Kong protests, and during Covid protests).
(J) The investments by the CCP in the censorship apparatus of the CCP during the 20-year period preceding the date of the strategy or update to the strategy (as the case may be), to the extent such data may be ascertained.

(K) Any current diplomatic efforts conducted in a bilateral or multilateral forum to address the matters referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (J).

(4) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—In addition to the metrics under paragraph (2) and the assessment of matters under paragraph (3), the strategy under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A review of existing public-private partnerships under which technology capable of circumventing the censorship apparatus of the CCP is provided and an assessment of the feasibility and utility of entering into new public-private partnerships (or developing other new tools) to increase free expression, circumvent censorship, and obstruct digital surveillance in the People’s Republic of China.

(B) A description of any programs or activities of the United States Government to provide access by citizens of the People’s Republic
of China to a diverse range of fact-based infor-

mation, and the funding levels required for any

such programs or activities, including the ef-
forts of the United States Agency for Global

Media, the Secretary of State, the Adminis-

trator of the United States Agency for Inter-

national Development, and the Chief Executive

Officer and efforts funded under the Count-

tering the People’s Republic of China Malign

Influence Fund.

(C) A description of any programs of the

Department of State that promote Internet

freedom in the People’s Republic of China (in-

cluding through monitoring and evaluation ef-

forts) and the funding levels required for any

such programs, including the Countering the

People’s Republic of China Malign Influence

Fund.

(D) Recommended measures to protect

Chinese Americans, recent immigrants from the

People’s Republic of China, Chinese nationals

currently studying or working in the United

States, and Chinese lawful permanent residents,

who speak out against censorship, including a

list of policy recommendations, new activities,
or current activities carried out using funds from the Countering the People’s Republic of China Malign Influence Fund that need to be expanded or scaled up in other manners.

(E) Proposed penalties for targeting individuals who actively support or enable the censorship and suppression efforts of the CCP.

(b) FORM.—The strategy under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representatives.

(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.