

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119-33
OFFERED BY MR. STEUBE OF FLORIDA

At the end of subtitle B of title XII of division A,
add the following:

1 **SEC. 12__ . MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON MILI-**
2 **TARY POWER OF IRAN.**

3 Section 1245(b) of the National Defense Authoriza-
4 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (10 U.S.C. 113 note) is
5 amended—

6 (1) in paragraph (2)—

7 (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking “and
8 capabilities” and inserting “, capability, capac-
9 ity, readiness, and organization”;

10 (B) by striking subparagraph (C) and in-
11 serting the following:

12 “(C) the character, extent, trajectory, and
13 consequences of Iran’s security cooperation with
14 the People’s Republic of China, the Russian
15 Federation, and the Democratic People’s Re-
16 public of Korea, including weapons develop-
17 ment, the procurement of dual-use components
18 and advanced conventional capabilities, military
19 exercises, and intelligence sharing, and how this

1 cooperation could help Iran reconstitute and
2 strengthen its military power;” and

3 (C) in subparagraph (E), by striking the
4 period at the end and inserting “and how Iran
5 would use large infusions of funding and rev-
6 enue to reconstitute and strengthen its military
7 capabilities.”;

8 (2) in paragraph (3)—

9 (A) in subparagraph (C)—

10 (i) by striking “and” before “Ansar
11 Allah”; and

12 (ii) by striking the semicolon at the
13 end and inserting “, or any Specially Des-
14 ignated Global Terrorist;”;

15 (B) in subparagraph (I)(i), by striking
16 “ability to use proxies” and inserting “use of
17 non-state cyber actors, proxies;”;

18 (C) by striking subparagraph (J); and

19 (D) by redesignating subparagraphs (K)
20 and (L) as (J) and (K), respectively;

21 (3) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through
22 (14) as paragraphs (5) through (15), respectively;

23 (4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the fol-
24 lowing:

1 “(4) An assessment of Iran’s ability to manipu-
2 late the information environment, both domestically
3 and internationally, against the interests of the
4 United States and its allies in order to achieve mili-
5 tary advantages and objectives, including—

6 “(A) the methodology and impact of Iran’s
7 social media information war against United
8 States and Israeli attacks;

9 “(B) the methodology and impact of Ira-
10 nian government agents threatening expatriate
11 Iranians with violence against their family
12 members still living in Iran;

13 “(C) the methodology and impact of Ira-
14 nian influence operations messaging that seeks
15 to weaken international support for Israel;

16 “(D) an assessment of Iranian efforts to
17 covertly stoke and financially support campus
18 protests and violence in the United States
19 against United States and Israeli military ac-
20 tions; and

21 “(E) an assessment of Iranian efforts to
22 leverage action at international organizations to
23 place pressure on the United States and its al-
24 lies.”;

25 (5) in paragraph (5) (as so redesignated)—

1 (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking “and
2 the locations of missile launch, storage, and
3 production sites;” and inserting “the locations
4 of missile launch, storage, and production sites,
5 and China’s provision of missile precursor
6 chemicals;”;

7 (B) in subparagraph (E)—

8 (i) by striking “and” after “vehicle
9 program” and inserting a comma;

10 (ii) by striking the semicolon at the
11 end and inserting “, and how Russia’s
12 space-launch cooperation has strengthened
13 Iranian space and military capabilities;”;

14 (C) by redesignating subparagraphs (F),
15 (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (G), (H),
16 (I), and (J), respectively;

17 (D) by inserting after subparagraph (E)
18 the following:

19 “(F) an inventory and assessment of any
20 instances in which China or Russia have pro-
21 vided intelligence to Iran for the purposes of
22 targeting United States forces;” and

23 (E) in subparagraph (G) (as so redesign-
24 nated), by striking the semicolon at the end and
25 inserting “, including first-person view (FPV)

1 drones to regional proxies and an assessment of
2 how cooperation with Russia and China has
3 strengthened Iranian drone capabilities;”;

4 (6) by striking paragraph (11) (as so redesign-
5 nated) and inserting the following:

6 “(11) An assessment of the threat posed by
7 Iran and its proxies against United States and part-
8 ner military and diplomatic facilities and civilian and
9 critical infrastructure, including—

10 “(A) a list of all ballistic and cruise mis-
11 sile, unmanned aircraft systems, rocket, and loi-
12 tering munition attacks against these assets
13 during the preceding year; and

14 “(B) an estimate of the damages, in dol-
15 lars, of the strikes identified in subparagraph
16 (A).”;

17 (7) by redesignating paragraphs (14) and (15)
18 (as so redesignated) as paragraphs (15) and (16),
19 respectively;

20 (8) by inserting after paragraph (13) the fol-
21 lowing:

22 “(14) Complicity, involvement, and degree of
23 association of elements of the Iranian national secu-
24 rity state, such as the IRGC’s Basij paramilitary
25 force, the Law Enforcement Force (LEF), and other

1 paramilitary and military organizations of the Is-
2 lamic Republic of Iran, in the violation of human
3 rights and systematic repression of the Iranian peo-
4 ple, including censoring, throttling, and shutting
5 down the internet and developing and supporting the
6 internal Iranian intranet known as the National In-
7 formation Network (NIN).”; and

8 (9) in paragraph (15) (as so redesignated), by
9 striking “(12)” and inserting “(14)”.

