

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 117-54
OFFERED BY MR. MOULTON OF MASSACHUSETTS

Page 820, after line 3, insert the following:

1 (e) REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM WAR.—
2 Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
3 this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
4 the Secretary of each military department, shall submit
5 to the appropriate congressional committees an assess-
6 ment of lessons learned by the respective military depart-
7 ments from the conflict following the Russian invasion of
8 Ukraine that includes the following:

9 (1) Lessons learned from intelligence-sharing
10 activities conducted between the United States,
11 NATO, the European Union, and Ukraine through-
12 out the conflict.

13 (2) Observed tactics and techniques of informa-
14 tion-related capabilities and the integration of infor-
15 mation-related capabilities in supporting Ukraine ob-
16 jectives.

17 (3) Analysis of the capabilities, tactics, and
18 techniques implemented throughout the conflict fol-
19 lowing the Russian invasion of Ukraine, from each

1 military department, with a focus on the Army,
2 Navy, and Air Force.

3 (4) Analysis of all collected information to iden-
4 tify recurring strengths and weaknesses in United
5 States and NATO tactics, training, and equipment.

6 (5) Recommendations to address any corrective
7 actions.

8 (f) FORM; PUBLICATION.—The report required by
9 subsection (e) shall be submitted in unclassified form but
10 may include a classified annex. The unclassified portion
11 of such report shall be published on a publicly accessible
12 website of the Department of Defense.

13 (g) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that—

15 (1) the United States could greatly benefit from
16 on-the-ground combat observations of the conflict
17 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine to learn
18 lessons about modern warfare between near-peer ad-
19 versaries, and successful and unsuccessful aspects of
20 both sides' tactics, operations, and strategy;

21 (2) expert projections of how this conflict was
22 likely to unfold were inaccurate, suggesting the
23 United States has many lessons to learn from this
24 conflict;

1 (3) the Department of Defense should, when
2 feasible, organize Combat Observation Teams, who
3 should be given battlefield access as non-combatants,
4 with specialized skill sets to collect information, in-
5 cluding by conducting first-person interviews, or
6 other conflict-specific assessments and observations;

7 (4) such collection and observations should
8 occur after the conflict has largely subsided, and the
9 physical, political, and escalatory risk of sending an
10 American combat observer team is sufficiently low;

11 (5) such teams should consist of talented senior
12 officers and non-commissioned officers with appro-
13 priate experience and specialties for their task;

14 (6) Combat Observation Teams should be en-
15 couraged to interview Ukrainian military members,
16 and civilians, conduct site surveys, and work with
17 the United States embassy and other allied countries
18 as appropriate; and

19 (7) the time is ripe for an infusion of lessons
20 from Ukraine, and observations could ensure the
21 United States is prepared for the future of modern
22 warfare and conflict.

