

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119-33
OFFERED BY MR. MCDOWELL OF NORTH
CAROLINA

At the end, add the following:

1 **DIVISION E—XPCC SANCTIONS**
2 **ACT OF 2026**
3 **TITLE LI—XPCC SANCTIONS ACT**
4 **OF 2026**

5 **SEC. 51_. SHORT TITLE.**

6 This Act may be cited as the “XPCC Sanctions Act
7 of 2026”.

8 **SEC. 51_. FINDINGS.**

9 Congress makes the following findings:

10 (1) The People’s Republic of China has engaged
11 in a systematic campaign to suppress any ethnic,
12 cultural, or religious identity that competes with loy-
13 alty to the Chinese Communist Party. It has tar-
14 geted distinct communities with mass detention and
15 surveillance, forced labor, reeducation, and the de-
16 struction of cultural and religious institutions.

17 (2) The Muslim Uyghur community of the
18 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has
19 been subject to genocide and repression, including

1 mass imprisonment, forced sterilization, and “reedu-
2 cation efforts” designed to dilute their political influ-
3 ence and destroy long-standing cultural and religious
4 practices.

5 (3) Chinese authorities have also forcibly moved
6 thousands of people from Xinjiang deeper into the
7 interior of the country as a source of forced labor,
8 which continues to be a central element of Beijing’s
9 human rights abuses against the Uyghurs.

10 (4) China’s use of forced labor contributes to
11 Beijing’s industrial policy, including the manufac-
12 turing of electric vehicles, solar panels, and agricul-
13 tural products for export.

14 (5) The Xinjiang Production and Construction
15 Corps (XPCC) is central to these efforts, serving as
16 the functional government in the XUAR and oper-
17 ating a bureau of prisons as one of the world’s larg-
18 est state-run corporate enterprises.

19 (6) In July 2020, the United States designated
20 the XPCC as a paramilitary organization subordi-
21 nate to the Chinese Communist Party that enhanced
22 the CCP’s internal control over the XUAR and com-
23 mitted serious human rights abuses against ethnic
24 minorities.

1 (7) The XPCC is the model for China’s broader
2 system of repression and forced labor. The same in-
3 stitutional logic underlying XPCC operations —
4 mass detention, reeducation, destruction of cultural
5 and religious institutions, and forced labor — has
6 been replicated beyond Xinjiang against other mi-
7 nority communities. As entities continue to collabo-
8 rate with the XPCC, they increase its influence and
9 raise the likelihood of the expanded application of
10 these tactics.

11 (8) The XPCC has developed surveillance tools
12 and technologies that it can export to other regions
13 and entities in China for use in repression against
14 minority communities.

15 (9) Xi Jinping’s “Sinicization” program relies
16 on much of the same surveillance architecture used
17 against the Uyghurs. Designed to convert Christian
18 worship and belief into a vehicle for government
19 propaganda, the program has followed the estab-
20 lished pattern of raids, detention in reeducation cen-
21 ters, prison factories, and state-sponsored labor
22 camps — mirroring the mechanisms used against
23 the Uyghur community.

24 (10) In December 2025, Chinese authorities
25 conducted a massive raid on Christian faith groups

1 days before Christmas in Wenzhou. In one of the
2 largest crackdowns on Christians in recent memory,
3 hundreds of worshippers were detained, including
4 prominent church leaders Lin Enzhao and Lin Enci,
5 and Yayang Church — one of the largest unregis-
6 tered Protestant congregations in China — was sub-
7 sequently demolished.

8 (11) There are up to 130 million Chinese Chris-
9 tians, spanning multiple ethnic communities, making
10 it one of the largest and most vulnerable religious
11 communities in the world.

12 (12) Entities that collaborate with the XPCC
13 therefore participate in a system of repression whose
14 reach extends to minorities across China. The same
15 industrial and mass detention infrastructure under-
16 lying the persecution of the Uyghur community also
17 underlies the escalating campaign against Christian
18 communities, and those who enable it facilitate re-
19 pression against both.

20 **SEC. 51_. REPORT ON ENTITIES COLLABORATING WITH**
21 **XINJIANG PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION**
22 **CORPS.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
25 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Di-

1 rector of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appro-
2 priate congressional committees a report on entities col-
3 laborating with the Xinjiang Production and Construction
4 Corps (XPCC).

5 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required in subsection
6 (a) shall include the following:

7 (1) A list of each foreign person or entity
8 that—

9 (A) engages or has engaged, on an after
10 July 31, 2020, in transactions with—

11 (i) the XPCC; or

12 (ii) any entity currently under United
13 States sanctions for violations of the
14 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020
15 (Public Law 116–145), Public Law 117–
16 78 (commonly referred to as the “Uyghur
17 Forced Labor Prevention Act”), the Global
18 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
19 Act (Public Law 114-328), and Executive
20 Order No. 13818 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
21 “Blocking the Property of Persons In-
22 volved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or
23 Corruption”);

24 (B) uses, in whole or in part, in any good
25 which such person or entity produces or sells, a

1 good or material produced by XPCC or any en-
2 tity currently under United States sanctions for
3 violations of the laws specified in subparagraph
4 (A)(ii) and Executive Order No. 13818; or

5 (C) provides material, technological, or fi-
6 nancial support to XPCC or any entity cur-
7 rently under United States sanctions for viola-
8 tions of the laws specified in subparagraph
9 (A)(ii) and Executive Order No. 13818.

10 (2) A description of the activities in which the
11 foreign person or entity described in paragraph (1)
12 has engaged to justify the inclusion of such person
13 on the list required under such paragraph.

14 (c) FORM.—

15 (1) LIST.—The list required under subsection
16 (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

17 (2) ACTIVITIES.—The description of the activi-
18 ties required under subsection (b)(2) shall be sub-
19 mitted in unclassified form but may contain a classi-
20 fied annex.

21 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

22 (1) the term “appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees” means—

24 (A) the congressional defense committees;

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
2 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
3 the House of Representatives; and

4 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
6 Senate; and

7 (2) the term “XPCC” means—

8 (A) the Xinjiang Production and Construc-
9 tion Corps; and

10 (B) any subsidiary, affiliate, or successor
11 entity of the Xinjiang Production and Construc-
12 tion Corps.

13 **SEC. 51__ . DETERMINATION ON SANCTIONS FOR HUMAN**
14 **RIGHTS ABUSES AND FORCED LABOR.**

15 (a) DETERMINATIONS REQUIRED.—Not later than
16 90 days after the date on which the report required by
17 section 51__ is submitted, the President shall—

18 (1) determine whether reasonable grounds exist
19 for each foreign person identified in such report to
20 be included on the Entity List maintained by the
21 Department of Homeland Security pursuant to Pub-
22 lic Law 117–78 (commonly referred to as the
23 “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act”); and

24 (2) determine whether reasonable grounds exist
25 for each foreign entity identified in such report and

1 the following entities to be included on the Entity
2 List maintained by the Department of Homeland
3 Security pursuant to the Uyghur Forced Labor Pre-
4 vention Act:

5 (A) Xinjiang Huaxin Rui'an Group Co.,
6 Ltd.

7 (B) Xinjiang Huaxin Rui'an Investment
8 Co., Ltd.

9 (C) Xinjiang Suokesi New Material Co.,
10 Ltd.

11 (D) Luthai Textile Co., Ltd.

12 (E) Shandong Meijia Group Co., Ltd.

13 (F) Chenguang Biotech Group Co., Ltd.

14 (G) Xinjiang Joinworld Co., Ltd.

15 (H) Shanghai Huayi Group Co., Ltd.

16 (I) Camel Group Co., Ltd.

17 (J) Xinjiang Nonferrous Metal Industry
18 (Group) Co. Ltd.

19 (K) Century Sunshine Group Holdings
20 Ltd.

21 (L) Xinjiang Tianyun Organic Agriculture
22 Co., Ltd.

23 (M) Beijing Yanjing Beer Co., Ltd.

24 (N) Wuxi Shangji Automation Co., Ltd.

1 (O) Xinjiang Yuli Xinlong Vermiculite Co.,
2 Ltd.

3 (P) Xinjiang Geology and Mineral Invest-
4 ment (Group) Co./Xinjiang Xinfeng Lithium
5 Mine (Ganfeng) Co., Ltd.

6 (Q) Xinjiang Lihua (Group) Co., Ltd.; and

7 (3) determine whether reasonable grounds exist
8 for each foreign person and entity identified in such
9 report to be designated pursuant to the Global
10 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and
11 Executive Order No. 13818.

12 (b) REPORT.—The President shall submit to the ap-
13 propriate congressional committees, in accordance with
14 subsection (a), a report not later than 30 days after the
15 determination in described in subsection (a), that in-
16 cludes—

17 (1) the determination described in subsection
18 (a);

19 (2) a description of the type of sanctions im-
20 posed with respect to each entity and person; and

21 (3) a justification for each entity and person
22 identified in the report required by section 51__ for
23 which the President determines sanctions are not
24 applicable.

1 (c) TEMPORARY RESCISSION OF AUTHORITY.—Not-
2 withstanding other provision of law, if the President does
3 not transmit the determinations required by paragraphs
4 (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) on or before the date
5 that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
6 the President may not change funding allocations pursu-
7 ant to reports submitted under section 653(a) of the For-
8 eign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2413) until such time that
9 each such determination is transmitted to the appropriate
10 congressional committees.

11 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
12 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
13 gressional committees” means—

14 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
15 Senate;

16 (2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
17 Urban Affairs of the Senate;

18 (3) the Committee of Homeland Security and
19 Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

20 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
21 House of Representatives;

22 (5) the Committee on Financial Services of the
23 House of Representatives; and

1 (6) the Committee on Homeland Security of the
2 House of Representatives.

