

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 117-54**  
**OFFERED BY MR. LANGEVIN OF RHODE ISLAND**

Add at the end of title LII of division E the following:

**1 SEC. 5206. SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT ENTITIES.**

2 (a) IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT  
3 ENTITIES.—Subtitle A of title XXII of the Homeland Se-  
4 curity Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) is amended by  
5 adding at the end the following new section:

6 **“SEC. 2220D. PROCEDURE FOR DESIGNATION OF SYSTEM-**  
7 **ICALLY IMPORTANT ENTITIES.**

8 “(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF CRITERIA AND PROCE-  
9 DURES.—

10 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 12 months  
11 after the date of the enactment of this section, the  
12 Secretary, acting through the Director, in consulta-  
13 tion with the National Cyber Director, Sector Risk  
14 Management Agencies, the Critical Infrastructure  
15 Partnership Advisory Council, and, as appropriate,  
16 other government and nongovernmental entities,  
17 shall establish criteria and procedures for identifying  
18 and designating certain entities as systemically im-  
19 portant entities for purposes of this section.

1           “(2) CONSIDERATION.—In establishing the cri-  
2           teria for designation under paragraph (1), the Sec-  
3           retary shall consider the following:

4                   “(A) The consequences that a disruption  
5                   to a system, asset, or facility under an entity’s  
6                   control would have on one or more national  
7                   critical functions.

8                   “(B) The degree to which the entity has  
9                   the capacity to engage in operational collabora-  
10                  tion with the Agency, and the degree to which  
11                  such operational collaboration would benefit na-  
12                  tional security.

13                  “(C) The entity’s role and prominence  
14                  within critical supply chains or in the delivery  
15                  of critical functions.

16                  “(D) Any other factors the Secretary de-  
17                  termines appropriate.

18           “(3) ELEMENTS.—The Secretary shall develop  
19           a mechanism for owners and operators of critical in-  
20           frastructure to submit information to assist the Sec-  
21           retary in making designations under this subsection.

22           “(b) DESIGNATION OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT  
23           ENTITIES.—

24                   “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, using the  
25                   criteria and procedures established under subsection

1 (a)(1) and any supplementary information submitted  
2 under subsection (a)(3), shall designate certain enti-  
3 ties as systemically important entities.

4 “(2) NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATION STA-  
5 TUS.—The Secretary shall notify designees within  
6 30 days of designation or dedesignation, with an ex-  
7 planation of the basis for such determination.

8 “(3) REGISTER.—The Secretary shall maintain  
9 and routinely update a list, or register, of such enti-  
10 ties, with contact information.

11 “(4) LIMITATIONS.—

12 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The number of des-  
13 igned entities shall not exceed 200 in total.

14 “(B) SUNSET.—Beginning on the date  
15 that is four years after the date of the enact-  
16 ment of this section, the Secretary, after con-  
17 sultation with the Director, may increase the  
18 number of designated entities provided—

19 “(i) such number does not exceed 150  
20 percent of the prior maximum;

21 “(ii) the Secretary publishes such new  
22 maximum number in the Federal Register;  
23 and

1                   “(iii) such new maximum number has  
2                   not been changed in the immediately pre-  
3                   ceding four years.

4           “(c) REDRESS.—

5                   “(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),  
6                   the Secretary shall develop a mechanism, consistent  
7                   with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United  
8                   States Code, for an entity notified under subsection  
9                   (b)(2) to present evidence that the Secretary should  
10                  reverse—

11                   “(A) the designation of a facility, system,  
12                   or asset as systemically important critical infra-  
13                   structure;

14                   “(B) the determination that a facility, sys-  
15                   tem, or asset no longer constitutes systemically  
16                   important critical infrastructure; or

17                   “(C) a final judgment entered in a civil ac-  
18                   tion seeking judicial review brought in accord-  
19                   ance with paragraph (2).

20                  “(2) APPEAL TO FEDERAL COURT.—A civil ac-  
21                  tion seeking judicial review of a final agency action  
22                  taken under the mechanism developed under para-  
23                  graph (1) shall be filed in the United States District  
24                  Court for the District of Columbia.

1       “(d) REPORTING FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT  
2 ENTITIES.—

3           “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than two years  
4 after the date of the enactment of this section, the  
5 Secretary, acting through the Director, in consulta-  
6 tion with the National Cyber Director, Sector Risk  
7 Management Agencies, the CISA Cybersecurity Ad-  
8 visory Committee, and relevant government and non-  
9 government entities, shall establish reporting re-  
10 quirements for systemically important entities.

11           “(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The requirements es-  
12 tablished under subsection (a) shall directly support  
13 the Department’s ability to understand and  
14 prioritize mitigation of risks to national critical func-  
15 tions and ensure that any information obtained by  
16 a systemically important entity pursuant to this sec-  
17 tion is properly secured.

18           “(3) REPORTED INFORMATION.—The require-  
19 ments under paragraph (2) may include obligations  
20 for systemically important entities to—

21           “(A) identify critical assets, systems, sup-  
22 pliers, technologies, software, services, proc-  
23 esses, or other dependencies that would inform  
24 the Federal Government’s understanding of the

1 risks to national critical functions present in  
2 the entity's supply chain;

3 “(B) associate specific third-party entities  
4 with the supply chain dependencies identified  
5 under subparagraph (A);

6 “(C) detail the supply chain risk manage-  
7 ment practices put in place by the systemically  
8 important entity, including, where applicable,  
9 any known security and assurance requirements  
10 for third-party entities under subparagraph  
11 (B); and

12 “(D) identify any documented security con-  
13 trols or risk management practices that third-  
14 party entities have enacted to ensure the con-  
15 tinued delivery of critical services to the system-  
16 ically important entity.

17 “(4) DUPLICATIVE REQUIREMENTS.—

18 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall  
19 coordinate with the head of any Federal agency  
20 with responsibility for regulating the security of  
21 a systemically important entity to determine  
22 whether the reporting requirements under this  
23 subsection may be fulfilled by any reporting re-  
24 quirement in effect on the date of the enact-

1           ment of this section or subsequently enacted  
2           after such date.

3           “(B) EXISTING REQUIRED REPORTS.—If  
4           the Secretary determines that an existing re-  
5           porting requirement for a systemically impor-  
6           tant entity substantially satisfies the reporting  
7           requirements under this subsection, the Sec-  
8           retary shall accept such report and may not re-  
9           quire a such entity to submit an alternate or  
10          modified report.

11          “(C) COORDINATION.—The Secretary shall  
12          coordinate with the head any Federal agency  
13          with responsibilities for regulating the security  
14          of a systemically important entity to eliminate  
15          any duplicate reporting or compliance require-  
16          ments relating to the security or resiliency of  
17          such entities.

18          “(e) INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SYSTEMICALLY IM-  
19          PORTANT ENTITIES.—

20          “(1) IDENTIFICATION OF INFORMATION  
21          NEEDS.—Not later than one year after the date of  
22          the enactment of this section, the Secretary, acting  
23          through the Director, shall establish a process to so-  
24          licit and compile relevant information from Sector  
25          Risk Management Agencies and any other relevant

1 Federal agency to inform and identify common in-  
2 formation needs and interdependencies across sys-  
3 temically important entities

4 “(2) INTERDEPENDENCIES AND RISK IDENTI-  
5 FICATION.—In establishing the process under para-  
6 graph (1), the Secretary, acting through the Direc-  
7 tor, shall incorporate methods and procedures—

8 “(A) to identify the types of information  
9 needed to understand interdependence of sys-  
10 temically important entities and areas where a  
11 nation-state adversary may target to cause  
12 widespread compromise or disruption, includ-  
13 ing—

14 “(i) common technologies, including  
15 hardware, software, and services, used  
16 within systemically important entities;

17 “(ii) critical lines of businesses, serv-  
18 ices, processes, and functions on which  
19 multiple systemically important entities are  
20 dependent;

21 “(iii) specific technologies, compo-  
22 nents, materials, or resources on which  
23 multiple systemically important entities are  
24 dependent; and



1                   “(iv) Federal, State, local, Tribal, or  
2                   territorial government services, functions,  
3                   and processes on which multiple system-  
4                   ically important entities are dependent;  
5                   and

6                   “(B) to associate specific systemically im-  
7                   portant entities with the information identified  
8                   under subparagraph (A),

9                   “(3) INFORMATION NEEDS AND INDICATIONS  
10                  AND WARNING.—In establishing the process under  
11                  paragraph (1), the Secretary, acting through the Di-  
12                  rector, in consultation with the Director of National  
13                  Intelligence, shall incorporate methods and proce-  
14                  dures to—

15                  “(A) provide indications and warning to  
16                  systemically important entities regarding na-  
17                  tion-state adversary cyber operations relevant to  
18                  information identified under paragraph (2)(A);  
19                  and

20                  “(B) to identify information needs for the  
21                  cyber defense efforts of such entities.

22                  “(4) RECURRENT INPUT.—Not later than 30  
23                  days after the establishment of the process under  
24                  paragraph (1) and no less often than biennially  
25                  thereafter, the Secretary, acting through the Direc-

1       tor, shall solicit information from systemically im-  
2       portant entities utilizing such process.

3               “(5) INTELLIGENCE SHARING.—

4                       “(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than five  
5       days after discovery of information that indi-  
6       cates a credible threat to an identifiable system-  
7       ically important entity, the Director of National  
8       Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary,  
9       shall share the appropriate intelligence informa-  
10      tion with such entity.

11                      “(B) EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION.—The  
12      Director of National Intelligence, in coordina-  
13      tion with the Secretary, shall share any intel-  
14      ligence information related to a systemically im-  
15      portant entity with such entity not later than  
16      24 hours after the Director of National Intel-  
17      ligence determines that such information indi-  
18      cates an imminent threat—

19                               “(i) to such entity, or to a system,  
20                               asset, or facility such entity owns or oper-  
21                               ates; or

22                               “(ii) to national security, economic se-  
23                               curity, or public health and safety relevant  
24                               to such entity.

1           “(C) NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS.—  
2           Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) or (B), the  
3           Director of National Intelligence may withhold  
4           intelligence information pertaining to a system-  
5           ically important entity if the Director of Na-  
6           tional Intelligence, with the concurrence of the  
7           Secretary and the Director, determines that  
8           withholding such information is in the national  
9           security interest of the United States.

10           “(D) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later  
11           than three years after the date of the enact-  
12           ment of this section and annually thereafter,  
13           the Secretary, in coordination with the National  
14           Cyber Director and the Director of National In-  
15           telligence, shall submit to the Committee on  
16           Homeland Security of the House of Representa-  
17           tives, the Committee on Homeland Security and  
18           Government Affairs of the Senate, the Perma-  
19           nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
20           House of Representatives, and the Select Com-  
21           mittee on Intelligence of the Senate, a report  
22           that—

23                   “(i) provides an overview of the intel-  
24                   ligence information shared with system-  
25                   ically important entities; and

1           “(ii) evaluates the relevance and suc-  
2           cess of the classified, actionable informa-  
3           tion the intelligence community (as such  
4           term is defined in section 3(4) of the Na-  
5           tional Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.  
6           3003(4)) provided to systemically impor-  
7           tant entities.

8           “(E) INTELLIGENCE SHARING.—Notwith-  
9           standing any other provision of law, information  
10          or intelligence shared with systemically impor-  
11          tant entities under the processes established  
12          under this subsection shall not constitute favor-  
13          ing one private entity over another.

14          “(f) PRIORITIZATION.—In allocating Department re-  
15          sources, the Secretary shall prioritize systemically impor-  
16          tant entities in the provision of voluntary services, and en-  
17          courage participation in programs to provide technical as-  
18          sistance in the form of continuous monitoring and detec-  
19          tion of cybersecurity risks.

20          “(g) INCIDENT RESPONSE.—In the event that a sys-  
21          temically important entity experiences a serious cyber inci-  
22          dent, the Secretary shall—

23                 “(1) promptly establish contact with such entity  
24                 to acknowledge receipt of notification, obtain addi-  
25                 tional information regarding such incident, and as-

1 certain the need for incident response or technical  
2 assistance;

3 “(2) maintain routine or continuous contact  
4 with such entity to monitor developments related to  
5 such incident;

6 “(3) assist in incident response, mitigation, and  
7 recovery efforts;

8 “(4) ascertain evolving needs of such entity;  
9 and

10 “(5) prioritize voluntary incident response and  
11 technical assistance for such covered entity.

12 “(h) OPERATIONAL COLLABORATION WITH SYSTEM-  
13 ICALLY IMPORTANT ENTITIES.—The head of the office for  
14 joint cyber planning established pursuant to section 2216,  
15 in carrying out the responsibilities of such office with re-  
16 spect to relevant cyber defense planning, joint cyber oper-  
17 ations, cybersecurity exercises, and information-sharing  
18 practices, shall, to the extent practicable, prioritize the in-  
19 volvement of systemically important entities.

20 “(i) EMERGENCY PLANNING.—In partnership with  
21 systemically important entities, the Secretary, in coordina-  
22 tion with the Director, the heads of Sector Risk Manage-  
23 ment Agencies, and the heads of other Federal agencies  
24 with responsibilities for regulating critical infrastructure,

1 shall regularly exercise response, recovery, and restoration  
2 plans to—

3 “(1) assess performance and improve the capa-  
4 bilities and procedures of government and system-  
5 ically important entities to respond to a major cyber  
6 incident; and

7 “(2) clarify specific roles, responsibilities, and  
8 authorities of government and systemically impor-  
9 tant entities when responding to such an incident.

10 “(j) INTERAGENCY COUNCIL FOR CRITICAL INFRA-  
11 STRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY COORDINATION.—

12 “(1) INTERAGENCY COUNCIL FOR CRITICAL IN-  
13 FRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY COORDINATION.—

14 There is established an Interagency Council for Crit-  
15 ical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Coordination (in  
16 this section referred to as the ‘Council’).

17 “(2) CHAIRS.—The Council shall be co-chaired  
18 by—

19 “(A) the Secretary, acting through the Di-  
20 rector; and

21 “(B) the National Cyber Director.

22 “(3) MEMBERSHIP.—The Council shall be com-  
23 prised of representatives from the following:

24 “(A) Appropriate Federal departments and  
25 agencies, including independent regulatory

1 agencies responsible for regulating the security  
2 of critical infrastructure, as determined by the  
3 Secretary and National Cyber Director.

4 “(B) Sector Risk Management Agencies.

5 “(C) The National Institute of Standards  
6 and Technology.

7 “(4) FUNCTIONS.—The Council shall be respon-  
8 sible for the following:

9 “(A) Reviewing existing regulatory authori-  
10 ties that could be utilized to strengthen cyberse-  
11 curity for critical infrastructure, as well as po-  
12 tential forthcoming regulatory requirements  
13 under consideration, and coordinating to ensure  
14 that any new or existing regulations are stream-  
15 lined and harmonized to the extent practicable,  
16 consistent with the principles described in para-  
17 graph (5).

18 “(B) Developing cross-sector and sector-  
19 specific cybersecurity performance goals that  
20 serve as clear guidance for critical infrastruc-  
21 ture owners and operators about the cybersecu-  
22 rity practices and postures that the American  
23 people can trust and should expect for essential  
24 services.

1           “(C) Facilitating information sharing and,  
2           where applicable, coordination on the develop-  
3           ment of cybersecurity policy, rulemaking, ex-  
4           aminations, reporting requirements, enforce-  
5           ment actions, and information sharing prac-  
6           tices.

7           “(D) Recommending to members of the  
8           council general supervisory priorities and prin-  
9           ciples reflecting the outcome of discussions  
10          among such members.

11          “(E) Identifying gaps in regulation that  
12          could invite cybersecurity risks to critical infra-  
13          structure, and as appropriate, developing legis-  
14          lative proposals to resolve such regulatory gaps.

15          “(F) Providing a forum for discussion and  
16          analysis of emerging cybersecurity developments  
17          and cybersecurity regulatory issues.

18          “(5) PRINCIPLES.—In carrying out the activi-  
19          ties under paragraph (4), the Council shall seek to  
20          harmonize regulations in a way that—

21                 “(A) avoids duplicative, overlapping, overly  
22                 burdensome, or conflicting regulatory require-  
23                 ments that do not effectively or efficiently serve  
24                 the interests of national security, economic se-  
25                 curity, or public health and safety;



1           “(B) is consistent with national cyber pol-  
2           icy and strategy, including the National Cyber  
3           Strategy;

4           “(C) recognizes and prioritizes the need for  
5           the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security  
6           Agency, as the lead coordinator for the security  
7           and resilience of critical infrastructure across  
8           all sectors, to have visibility regarding cyberse-  
9           curity threats and security vulnerabilities across  
10          sectors, and leverages regulatory authorities in  
11          a manner that supports such cross-sector visi-  
12          bility and coordination, to the extent prac-  
13          ticable; and

14          “(D) recognizes and accounts for the vari-  
15          ation within and among critical infrastructure  
16          sectors with respect to the level of cybersecurity  
17          maturity, the nature of the infrastructure and  
18          assets, resources available to deploy security  
19          measures, and other factors.

20          “(6) LEVERAGING EXISTING COORDINATING  
21          BODIES.—The Council shall, as appropriate in the  
22          determination of the Co-Chairs, carry out its work  
23          in coordination with critical infrastructure stake-  
24          holders, including sector coordinating councils and  
25          information sharing and analysis organizations, and

1 the Cyber Incident Reporting Council established  
2 pursuant to section 2246.

3 “(7) CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.—Not later  
4 than one year after the date of the enactment of this  
5 section and annually thereafter, the Council shall re-  
6 port to the Committee on Homeland Security of the  
7 House of Representatives, the Committee on Home-  
8 land Security and Government Affairs of the Senate,  
9 and other relevant congressional committees, on the  
10 activities of the Council, including efforts to har-  
11 monize regulatory requirements, and close regulatory  
12 gaps, together with legislative proposals, as appro-  
13 priate.

14 “(k) STUDY ON PERFORMANCE GOALS FOR SYSTEM-  
15 ICALLY IMPORTANT ENTITIES.—

16 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Council shall conduct  
17 a study to develop policy options and recommenda-  
18 tions regarding the development of risk-based cyber-  
19 security performance benchmarks that, if met, would  
20 establish a common minimum level of cybersecurity  
21 for systemically important entities.

22 “(2) AREAS OF INTEREST.—The study required  
23 under paragraph (1) shall evaluate how the perform-  
24 ance benchmarks referred to in such paragraph can  
25 be—

1           “(A) flexible, nonprescriptive, risk-based,  
2           and outcome-focused;

3           “(B) designed to improve resilience and  
4           address cybersecurity threats and security  
5           vulnerabilities while also providing an appro-  
6           priate amount of discretion to operators in de-  
7           ciding which specific technologies or solutions to  
8           deploy;

9           “(C) applicable and appropriate across  
10          critical infrastructure sectors, but also adapt-  
11          able and augmentable to develop tailored, sec-  
12          tor-specific cybersecurity performance goals;  
13          and

14          “(D) reflective of existing industry best  
15          practices, standards, and guidelines to the  
16          greatest extent possible.

17          “(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

18                 “(1) SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT ENTITY.—The  
19                 term ‘systemically important entity’ means a critical  
20                 infrastructure entity the Secretary has designated as  
21                 a systemically important entity pursuant to sub-  
22                 section (b).

23                 “(2) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘Director’ means  
24                 the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure  
25                 Security Agency.

1           “(3) SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY.—  
2           The term ‘Sector Risk Management Agency’ has the  
3           meaning given such term in section 2201.

4           “(4) NATIONAL CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.—The  
5           term ‘national critical functions’ means functions of  
6           government or private sector so vital to the United  
7           States that the disruption, corruption, or dysfunction  
8           of such functions would have a debilitating effect  
9           on security, national economic security, national  
10          public health or safety, or any combination thereof.”  
11          of.”.

12          (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents  
13          in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act is amended  
14          by inserting after the item relating to section 2220C the  
15          following new item:

        “Sec. 2220D. Procedure for designation of covered systemically important entities.”.

