

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119-33
OFFERED BY MRS. KIM OF CALIFORNIA

Add at the end of subtitle A of title XVII the following:

1 **SEC. 17 ____ . DETER PRC AGGRESSION AGAINST TAIWAN.**

2 (a) PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE.—

3 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days
4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Co-
5 ordinator for Sanctions of the Department of State
6 and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
7 Control of the Department of the Treasury, in co-
8 ordination with the Director of National Intelligence
9 and the heads of other Federal agencies, as appro-
10 priate, shall establish an interagency task force to
11 identify military and non-military entities that could
12 be subject to sanctions or other economic actions im-
13 posed by the United States immediately following
14 any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an
15 attempt to achieve, or has the significant effect of
16 achieving, the physical or political control of Taiwan,
17 including by taking any of the actions described in
18 paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (d).

1 (2) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after
2 the establishment of the PRC Sanctions Task Force,
3 the Task Force shall provide a briefing to the appro-
4 priate congressional committees for identifying pro-
5 posed targets for sanctions or other economic actions
6 referred to in paragraph (1), which shall—

7 (A) assess how existing sanctions programs
8 could be used to impose sanctions with respect
9 to entities identified by the Task Force;

10 (B) develop or propose, as appropriate,
11 new sanctions authorities that might be re-
12 quired to impose sanctions with respect to such
13 entities;

14 (C) analyze the potential economic con-
15 sequences to the United States, and to allies
16 and partners of the United States, of imposing
17 various types of such sanctions with respect to
18 such entities;

19 (D) assess measures that could be taken to
20 mitigate the consequences referred to in sub-
21 paragraph (C), including through the use of li-
22 censes, exemptions, carve-outs, and other ap-
23 proaches;

24 (E) include coordination with allies and
25 partners of the United States—

1 (i) to leverage sanctions and other
2 economic tools including actions targeting
3 the PRC's financial and industrial sectors
4 to deter or respond to aggression against
5 Taiwan;

6 (ii) to identify and resolve potential
7 impediments to coordinating sanctions-re-
8 lated efforts or other economic actions with
9 respect to responding to or deterring ag-
10 gression against Taiwan; and

11 (iii) to identify industries, sectors, or
12 goods and services where the United States
13 and allies and partners of the United
14 States can take coordinated action through
15 sanctions or other economic tools that will
16 have a significant negative impact on the
17 economy of the PRC; and

18 (iv) to coordinate actions with part-
19 ners and allies to provide economic support
20 to Taiwan and other countries being
21 threatened by the PRC, including meas-
22 ures to counter economic coercion by the
23 PRC;

24 (F) assess the resource gaps and needs at
25 the Department of State, the Department of

1 the Treasury, the Department of Commerce,
2 the United States Trade Representative, and
3 other Federal agencies, as appropriate, to most
4 effectively use sanctions and other economic
5 tools to respond to the threats posed by the
6 PRC;

7 (G) recommend how best to target sanc-
8 tions and other economic tools against individ-
9 uals, entities, and economic sectors in the PRC,
10 which shall take into account—

11 (i) the role of such targets in sup-
12 porting policies and activities of the Gov-
13 ernment of the PRC, or of the Chinese
14 Communist Party, that pose a threat to
15 the national security or foreign policy in-
16 terests of the United States;

17 (ii) the negative economic implications
18 of such sanctions and tools for the Govern-
19 ment of the PRC, including its ability to
20 achieve its objectives with respect to Tai-
21 wan; and

22 (iii) the potential impact of such sanc-
23 tions and tools on the stability of the glob-
24 al financial system, including with respect
25 to—

1 (I) state-owned enterprises;

2 (II) officials of the Government
3 of the PRC and of the Chinese Com-
4 munist Party;

5 (III) financial institutions associ-
6 ated with the Government of the
7 PRC; and

8 (IV) companies in the PRC that
9 are not formally designated by the
10 Government of the PRC as state-
11 owned enterprises; and

12 (H) identify any foreign military or non-
13 military entities that would likely be used to
14 achieve the outcomes specified in subsection (d),
15 including entities in the shipping, logistics, en-
16 ergy (including oil and gas), maritime, aviation,
17 ground transportation, and technology sectors.

18 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
19 the briefing required under subsection (a)(2), and annu-
20 ally thereafter, the PRC Sanctions Task Force shall sub-
21 mit a classified report to the appropriate congressional
22 committees that includes information regarding—

23 (1) any entities identified pursuant to sub-
24 section (a)(2)(H);

1 (2) any new authorities required to impose
2 sanctions with respect to such entities;

3 (3) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the
4 United States, and allies and partners of the United
5 States resulting from the imposition of sanctions
6 with respect to such entities;

7 (4) mitigation measures that could be employed
8 to limit any deleterious economic impacts on the
9 United States and allies and partners of the United
10 States of such sanctions;

11 (5) the status of coordination with allies and
12 partners of the United States regarding sanctions
13 and other economic tools identified under this sec-
14 tion;

15 (6) resource gaps and recommendations to en-
16 able the Department of State and the Department
17 of the Treasury to use sanctions to more effectively
18 respond to the malign activities of the Government
19 of the PRC; and

20 (7) any additional resources that may be nec-
21 essary to carry out the strategies and recommenda-
22 tions included in the report submitted pursuant to
23 subsection (a)(2).

24 (c) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—

1 (1) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING CON-
2 TINUED UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN
3 AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC.—Nothing in
4 this section may be construed as a change to the
5 One China Policy of the United States, which is
6 guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C.
7 3301 et seq.), the three United States-People’s Re-
8 public of China Joint Communiqués, and the Six As-
9 surances.

10 (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING SANC-
11 TIONS AUTHORITIES IDENTIFIED OR RECOMMENDED
12 BY THE TASK FORCE.—None of the sanctions identi-
13 fied or recommended pursuant to this section are
14 self-executing. Any such sanctions may only be im-
15 posed on an entity if they are explicitly authorized
16 under—

17 (A) a Federal law that was in effect on the
18 day before the date of the enactment of this
19 Act; or

20 (B) an Act of Congress that is enacted
21 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

22 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

23 (1) The term “appropriate congressional com-
24 mittees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
2 the Senate;

3 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,
4 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

5 (C) the Committee on Commerce, Science,
6 and Transportation of the Senate;

7 (D) the Committee on Finance of the Sen-
8 ate;

9 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
10 the House of Representatives;

11 (F) the Committee on Financial Services
12 of the House of Representatives;

13 (G) the Committee on Energy and Com-
14 merce of the House of Representatives; and

15 (H) the Committee on Ways and Means of
16 the House of Representatives.

17 (2) The term “PRC” means the People’s Re-
18 public of China.

19 (3) The terms “PRC Sanctions Task Force”
20 and “Task Force” mean the task force established
21 pursuant to subsection (a).

