

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119–8
OFFERED BY MR. HUIZENGA OF MICHIGAN

At the end of subtitle A of title XVII, add the following:

1 **SEC. 17 ____ . MAPPING AND REPORT ON STRATEGIC PORTS.**

2 (a) MAPPING AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

3 (1) MAPPING OF GLOBAL PORTS.—The Sec-
4 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
5 Defense, shall—

6 (A) develop an updated, global mapping of
7 foreign and domestic ports identified to be of
8 importance to the United States, because of a
9 capability to provide military, diplomatic, eco-
10 nomic, or resource exploration superiority; and

11 (B) identify any efforts by the Government
12 of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or
13 other PRC entities to build, buy, or otherwise
14 control, directly or indirectly, such ports.

15 (2) SUBMISSION OF MAP.—The Secretary of
16 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
17 shall submit the mapping developed pursuant to sub-
18 section (a) to the appropriate congressional commit-

1 tees. Such submission shall be in unclassified form,
2 but may include a classified annex.

3 (b) STUDY AND REPORT ON STRATEGIC PORTS.—

4 (1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State,
5 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall
6 conduct a study of—

7 (A) strategic ports;

8 (B) the reasons such ports are of interest
9 to the United States;

10 (C) the activities and plans of the Govern-
11 ment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
12 to expand its control over strategic ports out-
13 side of the People’s Republic of China;

14 (D) the public and private actors, such as
15 China Ocean Shipping Company, that are exe-
16 cuting and supporting the activities and plans
17 of the Government of the PRC to expand its
18 control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;

19 (E) the activities and plans of the Govern-
20 ment of the PRC to expand its control over
21 maritime logistics by promoting products, such
22 as LOGINK, and setting industry standards
23 outside the PRC;

24 (F) how the control by the Government of
25 the PRC over strategic ports outside of the

1 PRC could harm the national security or eco-
2 nomic interests of the United States and allies
3 and partners of the United States; and

4 (G) measures the United States Govern-
5 ment could take to ensure open access and se-
6 curity for strategic ports and offer alternatives
7 to PRC investments or stakes in strategic ports.

8 (2) CONDUCT OF STUDY.—The Secretary of
9 State and the Secretary of Defense may enter into
10 an arrangement with a federally funded research
11 and development center under which the center shall
12 conduct the study required under subsection (a).

13 (3) REPORT.—

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
16 Secretary of State, in coordination with the
17 Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appro-
18 priate congressional committees a report on the
19 findings of the study conducted under sub-
20 section (a).

21 (B) ELEMENTS.—The report required by
22 paragraph (1) shall include—

23 (i) a detailed list of all known stra-
24 tegic ports operated, controlled, or owned,
25 directly or indirectly, by the PRC or by a

foreign person of the PRC, and an assessment of the national security and economic interests relevant to each such port;

(ii) a detailed list of all known strategic ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States or United States persons and an assessment of the national security and economic interests relevant to each such port;

(iii) an assessment of vulnerabilities of—

(I) ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States; and

(II) strategic ports;

(iv) an analysis of the activities and actions of the Government of the PRC to gain control or ownership over strategic ports, including promoting products, such as LOGINK, and setting industry standards;

(v) an assessment of how the Government of the PRC plans to expand its control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;

1 (vi) a suggested strategy, developed in
2 consultation with the heads of the relevant
3 United States Government offices, that
4 suggests courses of action to secure trusted
5 investment and ownership of strategic
6 ports and maritime infrastructure, protect
7 such ports and infrastructure from PRC
8 control, and ensure open access and secu-
9 rity for such ports, that includes—

10 (I) a list of relevant existing au-
11 thorities that can be used to carry out
12 the strategy;

13 (II) a list of any additional au-
14 thorities necessary to carry out the
15 strategy;

16 (III) an assessment of products
17 owned by the Government of the PRC
18 or by an entity headquartered in the
19 PRC that are used in connection with
20 strategic ports or maritime infrastruc-
21 ture;

22 (IV) an assessment of the costs
23 to—

24 (aa) secure such trusted in-
25 vestment and ownership;

1 (bb) replace products owned
2 by the Government of the PRC
3 or an entity headquartered in the
4 PRC that are used in connection
5 with such ports; and

6 (cc) enhance transparency
7 around the negative impacts of
8 PRC control over strategic ports;
9 and

10 (V) a list of funding sources to
11 secure trusted investment and owner-
12 ship of strategic ports, which shall in-
13 clude—

14 (aa) an identification of pri-
15 vate funding sources; and

16 (bb) an identification of
17 public funding sources, including
18 loans, loan guarantees, and tax
19 incentives; and

20 (vii) a suggested strategy for Federal
21 agencies to maintain an up-to-date list of
22 strategic ports.

23 (viii) an assessment of any national
24 security threat posed by such investments
25 or activities to United States diplomatic

1 and defense personnel and facilities in the
2 vicinity of such ports, including through
3 cyber threats, electronically enabled espionage,
4 or other means.

5 (C) FORM OF REPORT.—The report re-
6 quired by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
7 unclassified form, but may include a classified
8 annex.

9 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

10 (1) The term “appropriate congressional com-
11 mittees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Commerce, Science,
13 and Transportation, the Committee on Armed
14 Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
15 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
16 Senate; and

17 (B) the Committee on Transportation and
18 Infrastructure, the Committee on Energy and
19 Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services,
20 the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Per-
21 manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
22 House of Representatives.

23 (2) The term “relevant United States Govern-
24 ment offices” means—

25 (A) the Unified Combatant Commands;

1 (B) the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

2 (C) the Office of the Secretary of State;

3 (D) the United States International Devel-

4 opment Finance Corporation;

5 (E) the Office of the Director of National

6 Intelligence; and

7 (F) the Maritime Administration of the

8 Department of Transportation.

9 (3) The term “strategic port” means an inter-
10 national port or waterway that the heads of the rel-
11 evant United States Government offices determine is
12 critical to the national security or economic pros-
13 perity of the United States.

