

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119-8
OFFERED BY MR. GOTTHEIMER OF NEW JERSEY

At the end of title XVII, add the following:

1 **Subtitle C—Bunker Buster Act of**
2 **2025**

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This subtitle may be cited as the “Bunker Buster Act
5 of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The United States Nuclear Regulatory
9 Commission defines “high-enriched uranium” as
10 uranium enriched to at least 20 percent uranium-
11 235.

12 (2) Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan
13 of Action, Iran agreed to refrain from producing en-
14 riched uranium containing more than 3.67 percent
15 uranium-235 for 15 years.

16 (3) On January 13, 2019, the head of the
17 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar
18 Salehi, told the Fars News Agency, “If we want to
19 come out of the nuclear deal and produce, within
20 four days we could start our 20 percent.”.

1 (4) On April 16, 2021, Dr. Salehi told the state
2 television that Iran had begun enriching uranium to
3 60 percent.

4 (5) On July 14, 2021, the former President of
5 Iran, President Hassan Rouhani, said during a press
6 conference that Iran has the knowledge and ability
7 to enrich weapons-grade uranium at 90 percent.

8 (6) According to an International Atomic En-
9 ergy Agency (IAEA) report, as of May 11, 2024,
10 Iran has 142.1 kilograms (313.2 pounds) of ura-
11 nium enriched up to 60 percent, an increase of 20.6
12 kilograms (45.4 pounds) since the last report by the
13 United Nations watchdog in February. Uranium en-
14 riched at 60 percent purity is just a short, technical
15 step away from weapons-grade levels of 90 percent.
16 Iran's overall stockpile of enriched uranium stands
17 at 6,201.3 kilograms (1,3671.5 pounds), which rep-
18 resents an increase of 675.8 kilograms (1,489.8
19 pounds) since the IAEA's previous report.

20 (7) The current stockpile is enough to make
21 several nuclear bombs according to the criteria the
22 IAEA uses to make such determinations.

23 (8) Reports indicate the Iran may be con-
24 structing new facilities to help expand its nuclear
25 program.

1 (9) In June 2024, the IAEA elected to censure
2 Iran for its violation of international responsibilities
3 under its nuclear agreement and demanded its co-
4 operation, including the readmittance of inspectors
5 and the restoration of camera surveillance at nuclear
6 sites.

7 (10) In June the IAEA announced Iran is in-
8 stalling 1,400 new advanced centrifuges at its
9 Fordow facility.

10 (11) Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been at
11 war with Hamas in the Gaza strip, which has used
12 Iranian funding and direction to target the Jewish
13 state.

14 (12) Hamas continues to hide within civilian in-
15 frastructure, fire rockets at humanitarian crossings,
16 and steal international aid and resources that are
17 only further hurting the Palestinian civilians. Hamas
18 has built tunnels under United Nations Relief and
19 Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
20 East (UNRWA) buildings, including a large data
21 center under UNRWA's Gaza base, and stores weap-
22 ons in UNRWA schools.

23 (13) As of June 2024, Ansarullah, or otherwise
24 known as the Houthis, have launched at least 60 at-
25 tacks at ships. They have seized 1 vessel, killed 4

1 sailors, and sunk 2 ships since November 2023. The
2 Houthis have also launched drones, missiles, and
3 mortars toward Israel and at United States and its
4 allies. The Houthis operate with Iranian funds.

5 (14) Since October 7, 2023, Hezbollah has
6 launched over 5,000 rockets, missiles, and drones at
7 Israel. Iran has, provided Hezbollah with more than
8 100,000 missiles and rockets.

9 (15) Iran is expanding its missile capacity and
10 weaponization program to further assist their prox-
11 ies across the region.

12 (16) On June 12, 2025, 60 days had lapsed
13 without an agreement in diplomatic negotiations to
14 prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon.

15 (17) On June 12, 2025, IAEA board declared
16 Iran in violation of its non-proliferation obligations.

17 (18) On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a co-
18 ordinated series of strikes against Iranian military
19 and government targets in efforts to disrupt Iran's
20 development of a nuclear weapon based on Israeli in-
21 telligence assessment that Iran had taken steps put-
22 ting them closer to achieving nuclear latency.

23 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

24 It is the sense of Congress that the United States
25 should—

1 (1) seek to extend the limitations on Iran's en-
2 riched uranium, including through engagement in
3 multilateral diplomatic initiatives;

4 (2) ensure that Israel and other allies are pre-
5 pared for all contingencies if Iran pursues develop-
6 ment of a nuclear weapon;

7 (3) send a clear signal to Iran that development
8 of a nuclear weapon will never be tolerated; and

9 (4) reaffirm the United States commitment to
10 deter Iranian nuclear development with a credible
11 military threat.

12 **SEC. 4. ACTIONS TO ENSURE ISRAEL IS PREPARED FOR**
13 **ALL CONTINGENCIES IF IRAN SEEKS TO DE-**
14 **VELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the preliminary condi-
16 tions described in subsection (b), the President is author-
17 ized to take the actions described in subsection (c), upon
18 the request of the Government of Israel, to ensure Israel
19 is prepared for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop
20 a nuclear weapon.

21 (b) PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS.—The President may
22 exercise the authority of subsection (a) only if the Presi-
23 dent first determines and certifies to Congress that it is
24 vital to the national security interests of the United States

1 to do so and the conditions in subsection (c)(2)(B) are
2 met.

3 (c) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—The actions described in
4 this subsection are the following:

5 (1) To provide for the construction of infra-
6 structure in Israel to accommodate large ordnance
7 systems that are designed to destroy underground
8 nuclear infrastructure, including—

9 (A) construction of extended runways for
10 aircraft that carry the Massive Ordnance Pene-
11 trator (MOP);

12 (B) aircraft to carry and deliver the MOP;

13 (C) basing options for such aircraft; and

14 (D) munition storage facilities.

15 (2)(A) To store in the territory of Israel the
16 MOP or related munitions described in paragraph
17 (1), to be used by the United States except as pro-
18 vided in subparagraph (B).

19 (B) To transfer the MOP or related munitions
20 described in paragraph (1) to Israeli custody if the
21 President determines and certifies to Congress
22 that—

23 (i) Iran—

24 (I) is in noncompliance with the NPT
25 Safeguards Agreement;

- 1 (II) has modified its implementation
2 of the NPT Safeguards Agreement (includ-
3 ing modified Code 3.1); or
- 4 (III) as determined by the President,
5 has reduced access of inspectors of the
6 IAEA in such a manner so as to be preju-
7 dicial to the IAEA's ability to provide con-
8 fidence as to the non-diversion of declared
9 nuclear material and absence of undeclared
10 nuclear activities;
- 11 (ii) it is vital to the national security of the
12 United States to do so;
- 13 (iii) Israel has no other means to achieve
14 a mutual national security objective of destroy-
15 ing Iran's underground nuclear infrastructure
16 or facilities; and
- 17 (iv) a dual key control system is in place
18 requiring approval by the President, acting
19 through the Secretary of Defense (which may
20 not be further delegated) for deployment of the
21 MOP or related munitions described in para-
22 graph (1) prior to Israeli deployment of such
23 munitions.

1 (3) To provide for training of Israeli personnel
2 with respect to the MOP or related munitions de-
3 scribed in paragraph (1).

4 (4) To conduct joint research and development
5 with Israel to—

6 (A) enhance United States ordnance; and

7 (B) develop Israeli capability for ordnance
8 to destroy underground infrastructure, includ-
9 ing Hezbollah rocket storage and manufac-
10 turing facilities and underground Iranian nu-
11 clear facilities.

12 (d) NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT DEFINED.—In
13 this section, the term “NPT Safeguards Agreement”
14 means the Agreement between Iran and the International
15 Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
16 in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
17 of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on May 15,
18 1974.

19 **SEC. 5. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**

20 Nothing in this subtitle may be construed to serve
21 as an authorization for the use of military force against
22 Iran.

