AMENDMENT TO RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 117–13
OFFERED BY MR. GARAMENDI OF CALIFORNIA

Add at the end of title XVI the following new subtitle:

Subtitle F—Ballistic Missiles

SEC. 1661. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, “is $1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017–2046 period: more than $800 billion to operate and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and about $400 billion to modernize them”. With inflation, the cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not include the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

(2) The Government Accountability Office found in July 2020 that the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration have still not taken meaningful steps to address affordability concerns or heeded the Government Ac-
countability Office’s recommendation to consider “deferring the start of or cancelling specific modernization programs”, including the W87–1 warhead modification program, to address increases in the weapons activities budget requests of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

(3) The ground-based strategic deterrent program is expected to cost between $93,100,000,000 and $95,800,000,000 which does not include the cost of the W87–1 warhead modification program or the cost to produce new plutonium pits for the warhead. The total estimated life cycle cost of the ground based strategic deterrent program is $264,000,000,000, and the program is intended to replace 400 deployed Minuteman III missiles with more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test flights and spares.

(4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to Northrop Grumman for the engineering and manufacturing component of the ground-based strategic deterrent program in September 2020, raising concerns that the absence of competition for the award may result in higher than projected costs to United States taxpayers.
(5) The National Nuclear Security Administration is also in the early stages of developing a replacement intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, the W87–1, and expanding plutonium pit production to build new warhead cores, costing at least $12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, to meet the modernization needs of the ground-based strategic deterrent program.

(6) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III missiles is possible for multiple decades and, according to the Congressional Budget Office, through 2036 this would cost $37,000,000,000 less in 2017 dollars than developing and deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent program.

(7) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard M. Clark, then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, noted in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that we have “one more opportunity” to conduct life extension on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, indicating the technical feasibility of extending the Minuteman III missile despite his stated preference for the ground-based strategic deterrent.
(8) Even in the absence of an intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review signaled that the United States would have an assured retaliatory capability in the form of ballistic missile submarines, which are, “at present, virtually undetectable, and there are no known, near-term credible threats to the survivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] force”, a benefit that will be enhanced as the Department of Defense moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic submarine fleet with the new Columbia class ballistic missile fleet.

(9) While intercontinental ballistic missiles had historically been the most responsive leg of the United States nuclear triad, advances in ballistic missile submarine communications now provide immediate dissemination of information during wartime.

(10) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be recalled, leaving decision-makers with mere minutes to decide whether to launch the missiles before they are destroyed, known as a posture of “launch on warning” or “launch under attack” in the face of a perceived nuclear attack, greatly increasing the risk
of a national leader initiating a nuclear war by mistake.

(11) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defense Forces correctly identified a false warning in an early warning system that showed several United States incoming nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders from launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel Petrov the nickname “the man who saved the world”.

(12) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who once briefed President Bill Clinton on a suspected Russian first nuclear strike, wrote that the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad is “destabilizing because it invites an attack” and intercontinental ballistic missiles are “some of the most dangerous weapons in the world” and “could even trigger an accidental nuclear war”.

(13) General James Cartwright, former vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the United States Strategic Command, wrote, with Secretary Perry, “[T]he greatest danger is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder—that we might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we make decisions about which weapons to buy, we
should use this simple rule: If a nuclear weapon increases the risk of accidental war and is not needed to deter an intentional attack, we should not build it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as...the [intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks of accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer need to bear. We are safer without these expensive weapons, and it would be foolish to replace them.”.

(14) General George Lee Butler, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command, said, “I would have removed land-based missiles from our arsenal a long time ago. I’d be happy to put that mission on the submarines. So, with a significant fraction of bombers having a nuclear weapons capability that can be restored to alert very quickly, and with even a small component of Trident submarines—with all those missiles and all those warheads on patrol—it’s hard to imagine we couldn’t get by.”.

(15) While a sudden “bolt from the blue” first strike from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly unlikely scenario, extending the Minuteman III would maintain the purported role of the interconti-
nental ballistic missile leg of the triad to absorb such
an attack.

SEC. 1662. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SERVICE LIFE OF
MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BAL-
LISTIC MISSILES AND PAUSE IN DEVELOP-
MENT OF GROUND-BASED STRATEGIC DETER-
RENT PROGRAM.

It is the policy of the United States that—

(1) the operational life of the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles shall be safely ex-
tended until at least 2040; and

(2) the research, development, testing, and eval-
uation of the ground-based strategic deterrent pro-
gram shall be paused until 2031.

SEC. 1663. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND
BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM
AND W87–1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PRO-
GRAM.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by
this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022
for the Department or Defense or the National Nuclear
Security Administration may be obligated or expended for
the ground-based strategic deterrent program (including
with respect to supporting infrastructure) or the W87–1
warhead modification program.
SEC. 1664. LIFE EXTENSION OF MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

(a) LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM.—Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall commence efforts for a life extension program of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles to extend the life of such missiles to 2040.

(b) ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM.—In carrying out the life extension program under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure the following:

(1) The program will incorporate new and necessary technologies that could also be incorporated in the future ground-based strategic deterrent program, including with respect to technologies that—

(A) increase the resilience against adversary missile defenses; and

(B) incorporate new nuclear command, control, and communications systems.

(2) The program will use nondestructive testing methods and technologies similar to the testing methods used by the Navy for Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic missiles to reduce destructive testing.