AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 116–19
OFFERED BY MS. FRANKEL OF FLORIDA

At the end of subtitle G of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR SHORTER- 
OR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE GROUND 
LAUNCHED BALLISTIC OR CRUISE MISSILE 
SYSTEMS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—

(1) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s February 
1, 2019, announcement of the decision of the United 
States to withdraw from the INF Treaty, without 
proper consultation with Congress, is a serious 
breach of Congress’s proper constitutional role as a 
co-equal branch of government;

(2) United States withdrawal from the INF 
Treaty will free Russia to deploy greater quantities 
of the SSC–8 missile to the detriment of United 
States national security and that of our allies in Eu-
rope and the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) alliance makes critical contributions to
United States national security, and the failure to weigh the concerns of NATO allies risks weakening the joint resolve necessary to counter Russia’s aggressive behavior;

(4) as opposed to withdrawing from the INF Treaty, the United States should continue to advance other diplomatic, economic, and military measures outlined in the “Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy” to resolve the concerns related to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty and to reach agreement on measures to ensure the INF Treaty’s future viability; and

(5) further, in lieu of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, the United States should look at options to expand arms control treaties to include China in an effort to limit its short- and intermediate-range missiles.

(b) PROHIBITION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2020 may be made available for the research, development, testing, evaluation, procurement, or deployment of a United States shorter- or intermediate-range ground launched ballistic or cruise missile system with a range between 500 and
5,500 kilometers until the following has been submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress:

(1) A report from the Secretary of Defense, jointly with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, that includes—

(A) a detailed diplomatic proposal for negotiating an agreement to obtain the strategic stability benefits of the INF Treaty;

(B) an assessment of the implications, in terms of the military threat to the United States and its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, of Russian deployment of intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles without restriction;

(C) identification of what types of technologies and programs the United States would need to pursue to offset the additional Russian capabilities, and at what cost;

(D) identification of what mission requirements will be met by INF Treaty-type systems; and

(E) details regarding ramifications of a collapse of the INF Treaty on the ability to generate consensus among States Parties to the NPT Treaty ahead of the 2020 NPT Review
Conference, and assesses the degree to which Russia will use the United States unilateral withdrawal to sow discord within the NATO alliance.

(2) A copy or copies of at least one Memorandum of Understanding from a NATO or Indo-Pacific ally that commits it to host deployment of any such ballistic or cruise missile system on its own territory, and in the case of deployment on the European continent, has the concurrence of the North Atlantic Council.

(3) An unedited copy of an analysis of alternatives conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation that considers other ballistic or cruise missile systems, to include sea- and air-launched missiles, that could be deployed to meet current capability gaps due to INF Treaty restrictions, and further to include cost, schedule, and operational considerations.

(c) FORM.—The documents required by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to authorize the use of funds de-
scribed in subsection (b) for the research, development, testing, evaluation, procurement, or deployment of INF Treaty-type systems in the United States or its territories.

(e) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Appropriate Congressional Committees.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional defense committees; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.


(3) NPT Treaty.—The term “NPT Treaty” means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington July 1, 1968.