

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 116–57**

**OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO**

Add at the end of subtitle G of title XII the following:

1 **SEC. 12 \_\_\_\_ . SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CROSS-BORDER VIO-**  
2 **LENCE IN THE GALWAN VALLEY AND THE**  
3 **GROWING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF THE**  
4 **PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
6 ings:

7 (1) Since a truce in 1962 ended skirmishes be-  
8 tween India and the People’s Republic of China, the  
9 countries have been divided by a 2,100-mile-long  
10 Line of Actual Control.

11 (2) In the decades since the truce, military  
12 standoffs between India and the People’s Republic of  
13 China have flared; however, the standoffs have rare-  
14 ly claimed the lives of soldiers.

15 (3) In the months leading up to June, 15,  
16 2020, along the Line of Actual Control, the People’s  
17 Republic of China—

18 (A) reportedly amassed 5,000 soldiers; and

1 (B) is believed to have crossed into pre-  
2 viously disputed territory considered to be set-  
3 tled as part of India under the 1962 truce.

4 (4) On June 6, 2020, the People’s Republic of  
5 China and India reached an agreement to deescalate  
6 and disengage along the Line of Actual Control.

7 (5) On June 15, 2020, at least 20 Indian sol-  
8 diers and an unconfirmed number of Chinese sol-  
9 diers were killed in skirmishes following a weeks-  
10 long standoff in Eastern Ladakh, which is the de  
11 facto border between India and the People’s Repub-  
12 lic of China.

13 (6) Following the deadly violence, Prime Min-  
14 ister Narendra Modi of India stated, “[w]henever  
15 there have been differences of opinion, we have al-  
16 ways tried to ensure that those differences never  
17 turned into a dispute”.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
19 gress that—

20 (1) India and the People’s Republic of China  
21 should work toward deescalating the situation along  
22 the Line of Actual Control; and

23 (2) the expansion and aggression of the Peo-  
24 ple’s Republic of China in and around disputed terri-  
25 tories, such as the Line of Actual Control, the South

1       China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, is of significant  
2       concern.

