

**AMENDMENT TO**  
**RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 117-31**  
**OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO**

Title VI of division D is amended to read as follows:

1     **TITLE VI—PRIORITIZING THE**  
2     **THREAT POSED BY THE PRC**  
3             **Subtitle A—Ideological**  
4             **Competition**

5     **SEC. 30601. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SOCIALISM.**

6             (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

7                     (1) According to Merriam-Webster, socialism  
8                     may be defined as “any of various economic and po-  
9                     litical theories advocating collective or governmental  
10                    ownership and administration of the means of pro-  
11                    duction and distribution of goods”.

12                   (2) At the core of socialist thought are the be-  
13                   liefs that property ultimately belongs to the state not  
14                   the individual and that the individual is entitled to  
15                   an equal share of resources, regardless of work ethic,  
16                   skill, talent, or other merit or endowment.

17                   (3) The People’s Republic of China is the  
18                   world’s foremost socialist state and one of the few  
19                   remaining Communist states.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
2 gress that—

3 (1) socialism is antithetical to the American  
4 way of life which emphasizes hard work, personal  
5 discipline, innovation, entrepreneurship, the family,  
6 the right to pass on one's property to one's dece-  
7 dents, and the right to enjoy the fruits of ones la-  
8 bors; and

9 (2) a world dominated by a socialist power or  
10 powers would be inimical to American interests and  
11 values.

12 **SEC. 30602. GENERAL SECRETARY ACT.**

13 (a) UNITED STATES POLICY.— It is the policy of the  
14 United States to—

15 (1) condemn in the strongest possible terms the  
16 horrific human rights abuses being perpetuated and  
17 enabled by the leadership of the Chinese Communist  
18 Party (CCP);

19 (2) urge all countries to do the same;

20 (3) recognize the deep friendship between the  
21 United States and the citizens of the People's Re-  
22 public of China, the first victims of their govern-  
23 ment's cruelty; and

24 (4) honor the memory of all those who have  
25 died as a result of the callous rule of the CCP.

1 (b) PROHIBITION ON USING FEDERAL FUNDS TO  
2 REFER TO THE HEAD OF STATE OF THE PEOPLE’S RE-  
3 PUBLIC OF CHINA AS “PRESIDENT” ON NEW UNITED  
4 STATES GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICA-  
5 TIONS.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the  
6 Federal Government may not obligate or expend any funds  
7 for the creation and dissemination of United States Gov-  
8 ernment documents and communications that refer to the  
9 head of state of the People’s Republic of China as any-  
10 thing other than “General Secretary of the Chinese Com-  
11 munist Party”, or alternatively, as “General Secretary”.

12 **Subtitle B—Countering Gray Zone**  
13 **Threats**

14 **SEC. 30611. GRAY ZONE DEFENSE ASSESSMENT ACT.**

15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
16 gress as follows:

17 (1) Gray zone competition is a central and en-  
18 during aspect of great-power competition and the  
19 United States should elevate, as a central feature of  
20 its approach to great-power competition, effective re-  
21 sponses to, and capabilities to conduct, gray zone  
22 campaigns.

23 (2) An effective, whole-of-government approach,  
24 and especially the coordination of efforts among the  
25 Department of State, the Department of Defense,

1 the Intelligence Community, the Department of the  
2 Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the  
3 United States Agency for International Develop-  
4 ment, is essential to meeting the gray zone chal-  
5 lenges posed by competitors.

6 (3) Since gray zone activity takes place below  
7 the threshold of major war and since narrative for-  
8 mation is a critical aspect of gray zone campaigns,  
9 the Department of State should take a preeminent  
10 role in coordinating, within the National Security  
11 Council process, the disparate means of national  
12 power as the United States seeks to respond to ag-  
13 gressive gray zone campaigns.

14 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
15 United States—

16 (1) to seek effective responses, particularly at  
17 the Department of State, to gray zone campaigns by  
18 United States adversaries and to recognize the para-  
19 mount importance of such responses to the national  
20 interests of the United States;

21 (2) that upholding the international rule of law  
22 and the rules-based international order, championed  
23 by the United States since the Second World War,  
24 is a core national security interest of the United  
25 States and that United States gray zone campaigns

1 shall seek to uphold this core national security inter-  
2 est; and

3 (3) to call on United States allies and partners  
4 to employ sufficient national resources to equitably  
5 contribute to the response to shared security and  
6 gray zone challenges.

7 (c) EVALUATION OF NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR  
8 CONDUCTING GRAY ZONE OPERATIONS.—

9 (1) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after  
10 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President  
11 shall conduct a review and submit to the appropriate  
12 congressional committees a report on the capabilities  
13 of the United States to conduct and respond to gray  
14 zone campaigns and proposed changes to enhance  
15 such capabilities.

16 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-  
17 graph (1) shall also include the following:

18 (A) A discussion of capacity and effective-  
19 ness of the interagency to routinely marshal  
20 disparate elements of national power to effec-  
21 tively respond in a coordinated manner to ad-  
22 versary gray zone campaigns against the United  
23 States or partner nations.

24 (B) A discussion of the interagency's ca-  
25 pacity to recognize adversary campaigns from

1 weak signals, including rivals' intent, capability,  
2 impact, interactive effects, and impact on  
3 United States interests.

4 (C) A description of the process for deter-  
5 mining the tolerance for adversary gray zone  
6 activity, including the methods and mechanisms  
7 for—

8 (i) determining which adversary gray  
9 zone activities are unacceptable;

10 (ii) communicating these positions to  
11 adversaries;

12 (iii) developing theories of deterrence;

13 and

14 (iv) establishing and regularly review-  
15 ing protocols with allies and partners to re-  
16 spond to such activities.

17 (D) Recommendations for addressing gaps  
18 between agencies of the Federal Government as  
19 well as inadequacies and inefficiencies in the  
20 interagency coordination of such agencies and  
21 their elements, including—

22 (i) a discussion of how such rec-  
23 ommendations will be sufficient to achieve  
24 United States gray zone objectives and to

1 counter adversary gray zone campaigns;  
2 and

3 (ii) rough order-of-magnitude budget  
4 estimates for the implementations of the  
5 recommendations.

6 (E) A description of the institutional re-  
7 forms undertaken or planned to be undertaken  
8 to address the gaps identified pursuant to sub-  
9 paragraph (D) to better enable effective gray  
10 zone campaigns.

11 (F) A description of any proposed institu-  
12 tional reform, including for which the President  
13 requires additional statutory authority and a  
14 justification for such additional authority.

15 (G) Any proposed necessary investments or  
16 legislative proposals for the creation or aug-  
17 mentation of institutions or authorities to sig-  
18 nificantly increase United States capability to  
19 mitigate gray zone threats, the rationale for  
20 each, and expected cost.

21 (H) A description of the process for deter-  
22 mining political warfare tolerance, including  
23 for—

24 (i) determining which adversary gray  
25 zone activities are unacceptable;

1 (ii) communicating these positions to  
2 adversaries; and

3 (iii) establishing and regularly review-  
4 ing protocols with allies and partners to re-  
5 spond to such activities.

6 (3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-  
7 section shall be submitted in unclassified format and  
8 may contain a classified annex.

9 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
10 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-  
11 propriate congressional committees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
13 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,  
14 the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-  
15 mittee on Financial Services, the Committee on  
16 Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on  
17 Homeland Security of the House of Representa-  
18 tives; and

19 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
20 the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-  
21 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on  
22 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the  
23 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-  
24 portation, and the Committee on Homeland Se-  
25 curity and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.



1 (d) DEPARTMENT OF STATE GRAY ZONE DEFENSE  
2 ASSESSMENT.—

3 (1) REPORT ON GRAY ZONE CAPABILITIES OF  
4 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180  
6 days after the date of the enactment of this  
7 Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the  
8 appropriate congressional committees a report  
9 discussing the capabilities of the Department of  
10 State to contribute to the ability of the United  
11 States to defend against and conduct gray zone  
12 campaigns.

13 (B) ELEMENTS.—The report required by  
14 subparagraph (A) shall also include the fol-  
15 lowing:

16 (i) The capabilities, offices, and units  
17 that are especially suited to gray zone op-  
18 erations and a description of the cor-  
19 responding roles to play.

20 (ii) A list of activities that are being  
21 undertaken, as of the date of the submis-  
22 sion of the report, to respond to adversary  
23 gray zone campaigns.

24 (iii) An evaluation of the adequacy  
25 and utility of established Department of

1 State definitions for understanding gray  
2 zone activity by adversaries and for  
3 operationalizing gray zone efforts.

4 (iv) Recommendations, including pro-  
5 posed necessary investments and the ra-  
6 tionale and expected costs of such invest-  
7 ments, for addressing gaps within the De-  
8 partment of State and its coordination  
9 with the interagency to effectively conduct  
10 gray zone operations.

11 (v) An identification of 25 priority  
12 countries at the front lines of adversary  
13 gray zone aggression and a discussion of  
14 the information described in clauses (i)  
15 through (iii) with respect to each such  
16 country, developed in consultation with rel-  
17 evant embassy country teams.

18 (2) CONTESTING THE INFORMATION  
19 BATTLESPACE.—

20 (A) FINDING.—Congress finds that the  
21 Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and  
22 Public Affairs of the Department of State could  
23 be presumed to be responsible for coordinating  
24 all public relations components of gray zone  
25 campaigns, while in fact such responsibilities

1 are not so located nor are they effectively co-  
2 ordinated.

3 (B) FOREIGN DISINFORMATION EFFORTS  
4 REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the  
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary  
6 of State, acting through the Under Secretary  
7 for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, shall  
8 submit to the appropriate congressional com-  
9 mittees a report summarizing United States  
10 policy on foreign disinformation and propa-  
11 ganda efforts in the global information contest,  
12 that shall include—

13 (i) a list of all elements of current  
14 United States policy relating to this issue;

15 (ii) a brief summary of the threats  
16 faced to United States interests and the  
17 nature of the United States response, in-  
18 cluding—

19 (I) the broad objectives of United  
20 States global information operations  
21 and needed additional capabilities;

22 (II) which offices or entities with-  
23 in the Department, and within the  
24 broader United States Government,

1 are responsible for conducting infor-  
2 mation operations;

3 (III) a list of current activities  
4 and programs, within the Department  
5 and across the United States Govern-  
6 ment, that currently comprise United  
7 States efforts; and

8 (IV) a list of specific additional  
9 capabilities and investments required  
10 to improve United States effectiveness  
11 and order of magnitude cost esti-  
12 mates;

13 (iii) a description of the processes  
14 within the Department of State for vetting  
15 and accountability for Global Engagement  
16 Center grantees, to prevent misuse or  
17 mistargeting of information campaigns;

18 (iv) examples of the effective use of  
19 targeted international development and  
20 stabilization assistance as part of gray  
21 zone campaigns;

22 (v) an assessment of the manner and  
23 extent to which gray zone considerations  
24 have been included when planning invest-

1                   ments in security cooperation and security-  
2                   sector assistance; and

3                   (vi) the adequacy of the Department  
4                   of State's public affairs elements, including  
5                   the Global Engagement Center, for con-  
6                   ducting and responding to information op-  
7                   erations conducted as part of a gray zone  
8                   campaign.

9                   (C) REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WITH  
10                  RESPECT TO MALIGN ACTIVITIES OF THE  
11                  PRC.—Not later than 90 days after the date of  
12                  the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of  
13                  State, in consultation with the Administrator of  
14                  the United States Agency for International De-  
15                  velopment and the Chief Executive Officer of  
16                  the United States Agency for Global Media,  
17                  shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
18                  committees a report that describes the efforts of  
19                  the Department of State with respect to re-  
20                  search to determine which strategic communica-  
21                  tions techniques and methods are most useful  
22                  at reaching populations that are targets of Chi-  
23                  nese disinformation.

24                  (3) GRAY ZONE THREATS AT MULTILATERAL  
25                  ORGANIZATIONS.—

1           (A) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—The Prin-  
2           cipal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau  
3           of International Organization Affairs shall  
4           prioritize efforts to counter attempts by the  
5           People’s Republic of China (PRC) to control  
6           and coerce international organizations.

7           (B) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than  
8           180 days after the date of the enactment of this  
9           Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the  
10          Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the  
11          Bureau of International Organization Affairs,  
12          shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
13          committees a report on threats to United States  
14          interests at international organizations.

15          (C) ELEMENTS.—The report required by  
16          subparagraph (B) shall also include each of the  
17          following:

18                 (i) An assessment of the level of influ-  
19                 ence exerted by the PRC, and the vectors  
20                 for such influence, at—

21                         (I) each specialized organization  
22                         or agency of the United Nations;

23                         (II) the World Bank, the Inter-  
24                         national Monetary Fund, and the  
25                         World Trade Organization; and

1 (III) any other international or-  
2 ganization the Principal Deputy As-  
3 sistant Secretary determines is sub-  
4 stantially and illicitly influenced by  
5 the PRC.

6 (ii) The total annual Chinese financial  
7 contributions, total annual United States  
8 contributions, and total annual contribu-  
9 tions of the top six donors to each organi-  
10 zation assessed pursuant to clause (i).

11 (iii) An assessment of the multilateral  
12 organizations where enhanced United  
13 States efforts, support, or engagement  
14 would materially contribute to competitive  
15 advantage in the gray zone, including spe-  
16 cific proposed activities and associated  
17 costs.

18 (4) FORM.—Each report required by this sub-  
19 section shall be submitted in unclassified form but  
20 may contain a classified annex.

21 (5) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
22 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-  
23 propriate congressional committees” means the  
24 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-

1        representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-  
2        tions of the Senate.

3            (6) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—

4        The Secretary of State is authorized to consolidate  
5        the reports required by this subsection.

6            (e) INDO-PACIFIC PRIORITY THEATER FOR GRAY  
7        ZONE RESPONSE.—

8            (1) IN GENERAL.—Among the gray zone cam-  
9        paigns the Department of State seeks to counter,  
10       the Secretary of State shall give particular priority  
11       to responding to campaigns conducted by the PRC  
12       (including its agents or instrumentalities), including  
13       by—

14            (A) requiring each diplomatic or consular  
15       post in the East-Asia Pacific and South and  
16       Central Asia regions to prominently include in  
17       their country strategies responses to Chinese  
18       gray zone activities and the building of gray  
19       zone deterrence capabilities; and

20            (B) ensuring sufficient staffing at diplo-  
21       matic and consular posts throughout the Indo-  
22       Pacific to effectively counter Chinese gray zone  
23       campaigns.

24            (2) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the  
25       date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of



1 State shall submit to the Committees on Armed  
2 Services of the Senate and the House of Representa-  
3 tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
4 Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
5 House of Representatives a report that includes a  
6 short summary of Indo-Pacific maritime gray zone  
7 threats and also includes—

8 (A) an outline of the United States posi-  
9 tion on primary maritime gray zone operations  
10 and associated territorial disputes in the Indo-  
11 Pacific;

12 (B) specific gray zone actions undertaken  
13 by the PRC to gain gradual advantage with re-  
14 spect to its territorial claims;

15 (C) places where the norms of inter-  
16 national and maritime law are most at risk of  
17 being ignored or subverted;

18 (D) any proposed opportunities for the res-  
19 olution of territorial disputes and potential  
20 United States contributions to such efforts; and

21 (E) the specific actions with respect to  
22 such maritime gray zone threats which, if un-  
23 dertaken by the PRC, would be considered un-  
24 acceptable according to stated United States  
25 policy.

1           (3) FORM.—The report required to be sub-  
2           mitted by this subsection shall be submitted in clas-  
3           sified form with an unclassified summary.

4           (f) REPORT ON STAFFING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.—

5           (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after  
6           the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary  
7           of State, in consultation with the Administrator of  
8           the United States Agency for International Develop-  
9           ment, the Director of National Intelligence, the Sec-  
10          retary of Defense, and the Secretary of Commerce,  
11          shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs  
12          and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the  
13          House of Representatives and the Committee on  
14          Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce,  
15          Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report  
16          that discusses the relative numbers of United States  
17          and Chinese diplomatic, commercial, and military  
18          personnel in the Indo-Pacific region. The report  
19          shall also include—

20                 (A) the disaggregated numbers of United  
21                 States and Chinese diplomatic, commerce pro-  
22                 motion, and military personnel stationed in  
23                 each country in the region;

24                 (B) an assessment of the relative capabili-  
25                 ties of Chinese diplomatic missions in each such

1 country to influence private- and public-sector  
2 decision making, compared to those of the  
3 United States;

4 (C) an assessment of the strength of busi-  
5 ness ties between the PRC and each such coun-  
6 try; and

7 (D) a determination whether businesses or  
8 other entities owned or controlled by the PRC  
9 or by Chinese persons are serving as auxiliaries  
10 for Chinese diplomatic missions to such coun-  
11 try.

12 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph  
13 (1) shall be submitted in classified form with an un-  
14 classified summary.

15 **SEC. 30612. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO THE**  
16 **WUHAN INSTITUTE OF VIROLOGY.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—No funds authorized or appro-  
18 priated by Federal law may be made available for any pur-  
19 pose to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

20 (b) GAO STUDY AND REPORT.—Not later than 2  
21 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
22 Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct  
23 a study, and submit to Congress a report, on the amount  
24 of Federal funds awarded or indirectly given to Wuhan  
25 Institute of Virology or researchers affiliated with Wuhan

1 Institute of Virology, during the 15-year period preceding  
2 such date of enactment were provided, whether purposely  
3 or inadvertently, to the People’s Republic of China, Chi-  
4 nese Communist Party, or the Wuhan Institute of Virol-  
5 ogy, or any agency or instrumentality thereof.

## 6 **Subtitle C—Human Rights**

### 7 **SEC. 30621. FALUN GONG PROTECTION ACT.**

8 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
9 gress that—

10 (1) killing a human being through involuntary  
11 organ extraction is an egregious violation of uni-  
12 versal standards of medical ethics and is in direct  
13 contradiction of basic standards of human decency;

14 (2) the forced harvesting of organs violates Ar-  
15 ticle 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human  
16 Rights, which states that “Everyone has the right to  
17 life, liberty and security of person.”, and Article 4,  
18 which states that “No one shall be held in slavery  
19 or servitude.”;

20 (3) the United Nations Human Rights Council  
21 should issue a formal condemnation of the People’s  
22 Republic of China (PRC) for its persecution of  
23 Falun Gong;

24 (4) any collaboration with or participation in  
25 the PRC’s organ transplant system by the United

1 States Government or a United States person or or-  
2 ganization presents serious ethical challenges that  
3 would jeopardize the integrity of the United States  
4 organ transplantation system; and

5 (5) the Chinese Communist Party's state-spon-  
6 sored persecution of Falun Gong must come to an  
7 immediate end.

8 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
9 United States to—

10 (1) avoid any cooperation with the PRC in the  
11 organ transplantation field while the Chinese Com-  
12 munist Party remains in power;

13 (2) take appropriate measures, including using  
14 relevant sanctions authorities, to coerce the Chinese  
15 Communist Party to end any state-sponsored organ  
16 harvesting campaign; and

17 (3) work with allies, partners, and multilateral  
18 institutions to highlight China's persecution of  
19 Falun Gong and coordinate closely with the inter-  
20 national community on targeted sanctions and visa  
21 restrictions.

22 (c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
23 FORCED ORGAN HARVESTING WITHIN THE PEOPLE'S  
24 REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

1           (1) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President  
2           shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3)  
3           with respect to each foreign person included in the  
4           most recent list submitted pursuant to paragraph  
5           (2).

6           (2) LIST OF PERSONS.—

7           (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180  
8           days after the date of the enactment of this  
9           Act, the President shall submit to the appro-  
10          priate congressional committees a list of foreign  
11          persons, including senior government officials,  
12          military leaders, and other persons who the  
13          President determines are knowingly responsible  
14          for or complicit in, or have directly or indirectly  
15          engaged in, the involuntary harvesting of or-  
16          gans within the People’s Republic of China.

17          (B) UPDATES OF LISTS.—The President  
18          shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
19          committees an updated list under subparagraph  
20          (A)—

21                  (i) as new information becomes avail-  
22                  able;

23                  (ii) not later than one year after the  
24                  date of the enactment of this Act; and

25                  (iii) annually thereafter for five years.

1 (C) FORM.—The list required by subpara-  
2 graph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified  
3 form, but may include a classified annex.

4 (3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-  
5 scribed in this paragraph are the following:

6 (A) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The Presi-  
7 dent shall exercise all of the powers granted to  
8 the President by the International Emergency  
9 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)  
10 (except that the requirements of section 202 of  
11 such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to  
12 the extent necessary to block and prohibit all  
13 transactions in property and interests in prop-  
14 erty of the person if such property and interests  
15 in property are in the United States, come  
16 within the United States, or are or come within  
17 the possession or control of a United States  
18 person.

19 (B) INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN INDI-  
20 VIDUALS.—

21 (i) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMIS-  
22 SION, OR PAROLE.—A foreign person in-  
23 cluded in the most recent list submitted  
24 pursuant to paragraph (2) is—

1 (I) inadmissible to the United  
2 States;

3 (II) ineligible to receive a visa or  
4 other documentation to enter the  
5 United States; and

6 (III) otherwise ineligible to be  
7 admitted or paroled into the United  
8 States or to receive any other benefit  
9 under the Immigration and Nation-  
10 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

11 (ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—A  
12 foreign person described in clause (i) is  
13 also subject to the following:

14 (I) Revocation of any visa or  
15 other entry documentation regardless  
16 of when the visa or other entry docu-  
17 mentation is or was issued.

18 (II) A revocation under subclause  
19 (I) shall take effect immediately and  
20 automatically cancel any other valid  
21 visa or entry documentation that is in  
22 the foreign person's possession.

23 (C) EXCEPTION.—Sanctions under sub-  
24 paragraph (B) shall not apply to an alien if ad-  
25 mitting or paroling the alien into the United



1 States is necessary to permit the United States  
2 to comply with the Agreement regarding the  
3 Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at  
4 Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into  
5 force November 21, 1947, between the United  
6 Nations and the United States, or other appli-  
7 cable international obligations of the United  
8 States.

9 (4) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF  
10 GOODS.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—The requirement to  
12 block and prohibit all transactions in all prop-  
13 erty and interests in property under paragraph  
14 (3)(A) shall not include the authority to impose  
15 sanctions on the importation of goods.

16 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,  
17 the term “good” means any article, natural or  
18 man-made substance, material, supply or manu-  
19 factured product, including inspection and test  
20 equipment, and excluding technical data.

21 (5) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in  
22 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-  
23 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
24 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person who violates,  
25 attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a

1 violation of regulations promulgated to carry out  
2 paragraph (1) to the same extent that such penalties  
3 apply to a person who commits an unlawful act de-  
4 scribed in section 206(a) of that Act.

5 (6) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL  
6 SECURITY.—The following activities shall be exempt  
7 from sanctions under this subsection:

8 (A) Activities subject to the reporting re-  
9 quirements under title V of the National Secu-  
10 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).

11 (B) Any authorized intelligence or law en-  
12 forcement activities of the United States.

13 (d) REPORT.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year  
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-  
16 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of  
17 Health and Human Services and the Director of the  
18 National Institutes of Health, shall submit to the  
19 appropriate congressional committees a report on  
20 the organ transplant policies and practices of the  
21 People’s Republic of China.

22 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report  
23 required under paragraph (1) shall include—

24 (A) a summary of de jure and de facto  
25 policies toward organ transplantation in the

1 PRC, including with respect to prisoners of con-  
2 science (including Falun Gong) and other pris-  
3 oners;

4 (B)(i) the number of organ transplants  
5 that are known to occur or are estimated to  
6 occur on an annual basis in the PRC;

7 (ii) the number of known or estimated vol-  
8 untary organ donors in the PRC;

9 (iii) an assessment of the sources of organs  
10 for transplant in the PRC; and

11 (iv) an assessment of the time, in days,  
12 that it takes to procure an organ for transplant  
13 within the Chinese medical system and an as-  
14 sessment of whether such timetable is possible  
15 based on the number of known or estimated  
16 organ donors in the PRC;

17 (C) a list of all United States grants over  
18 the past 10 years that have supported research  
19 on organ transplantation in the PRC or in col-  
20 laboration between a Chinese and a United  
21 States entity; and

22 (D) a determination as to whether the per-  
23 secution of Falun Gong practitioners within the  
24 People's Republic of China constitutes an  
25 "atrocitv" (as such term is defined in section 6

1 of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Pre-  
2 vention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22  
3 U.S.C. 2656 note)).

4 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-  
5 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,  
6 but may include a classified annex.

7 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-  
8 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-  
9 sional committees” means—

10 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
11 House of Representatives; and

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
13 Senate.

14 **SEC. 30622. AUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS FOR CHINESE**  
15 **REPATRIATION OF NORTH KOREAN REFU-**  
16 **GEES.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 104(b)  
18 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement  
19 Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214; Public Law 114–122) is  
20 amended—

21 (1) in subparagraph (M), by striking “or” after  
22 the semicolon;

23 (2) in subparagraph (N), by striking the period  
24 and inserting “; or”; and

1           (3) by adding at the end the following new sub-  
2 paragraph:

3           “(O) knowingly, directly or indirectly, re-  
4 patriating North Korean refugees to North  
5 Korea.”.

6           (b) TECHNICAL CORRECTION.—Subparagraph (A) of  
7 section 104(b)(2) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy  
8 Enhancement Act of 2016 is amended by striking  
9 “205(c)” and inserting “205(d)”.

10          (c) .—Paragraph (2) of section 104(b) of the North  
11 Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 is  
12 amended—

13           (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking “and” at  
14 the end;

15           (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period  
16 at the end and inserting “; and”; and

17           (3) by adding at the end the following:

18           “(E) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTA-  
19 TION OF GOODS.—

20           “(i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding  
21 any other provision of this section, the au-  
22 thority or a requirement to impose sanc-  
23 tions under this section with respect to  
24 persons described in paragraph (1)(O)  
25 shall not include the authority or a re-

1                   requirement to impose sanctions on the im-  
2                   portation of goods.

3                   “(ii) GOOD DEFINED.—In this sec-  
4                   tion, the term ‘good’ means any article,  
5                   natural or manmade substance, material,  
6                   supply, or manufactured product, including  
7                   inspection and test equipment, and exclud-  
8                   ing technical data.”.

9                   **Subtitle D—Defending Our**  
10                   **Economy From the PRC**

11                   **SEC. 30631. DEFUND PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ACT.**

12                   (a) PROHIBITIONS ON CCP COMPANIES LISTED IN  
13                   BOTH THE SECTION 1237 LIST AND THE SECTION 1260H  
14                   LIST.—

15                   (1) PROHIBITION ON PURCHASE OR SALE OF  
16                   CERTAIN SECURITIES.—Except as provided in para-  
17                   graph (5) or paragraph (8)(B), a United States per-  
18                   son is prohibited from purchasing or selling any—

19                   (A) publicly traded security issued by a  
20                   covered entity;

21                   (B) publicly traded security that is deriva-  
22                   tive of a publicly traded security issued by a  
23                   covered entity; and

1 (C) security that is designed to provide in-  
2 vestment exposure to a publicly traded security  
3 issued by a covered entity.

4 (2) COVERED ENTITIES.—The term “covered  
5 entity” includes the following:

6 (A) Any person that is a Communist Chi-  
7 nese military company and included on the list  
8 maintained by the Department of Defense in  
9 accordance with section 1237(b) of the Strom  
10 Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act  
11 for Fiscal Year 1999 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as  
12 of the date of the enactment of this Act.

13 (B) Any person that was designated as a  
14 Communist Chinese military company on June  
15 2, 2021, in accordance with such section  
16 1237(b).

17 (C) Any person that is a Chinese military  
18 company or a military-civil fusion contributor  
19 and included on the list maintained by the De-  
20 partment of Defense in accordance with section  
21 1260H(b) of the National Defense Authoriza-  
22 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113  
23 note) as of the date of the enactment of this  
24 Act.

25 (3) APPLICABILITY.—

1           (A) INITIAL APPLICABILITY.—If a person  
2           qualifies as covered entity on the date of the en-  
3           actment of this Act, the prohibitions under this  
4           section shall apply to any purchase or sale that  
5           occurs at or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight  
6           time on the date that is 60 days after the date  
7           of the enactment of this Act.

8           (B) FUTURE ADDITIONS.—If a person  
9           qualifies as covered entity after the date of the  
10          enactment of this Act, the prohibitions under  
11          this section shall apply to any purchase or sale  
12          that occurs at or after 12:01 a.m. eastern day-  
13          light time on the date that is 60 days after the  
14          date on which the person qualifies as a covered  
15          entity.

16          (4) RULE OF APPLICATION.—The prohibitions  
17          under this subsection shall apply except to the ex-  
18          tent provided by statutes, or in any regulation,  
19          order, directive, or license that may be issued pursu-  
20          ant to this section, and notwithstanding any con-  
21          tract entered into or any license granted before the  
22          date of enactment of this Act.

23          (5) EXCEPTION WITH RESPECT TO DIVEST-  
24          MENT.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the pur-  
25          chase or sale of publicly traded securities otherwise



1 prohibited by such paragraph that is made solely to  
2 affect the divestment, in whole or in part, of such  
3 securities by a United States person shall be per-  
4 mitted until—

5 (A) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on  
6 June 3, 2022, with respect to any person that  
7 qualifies as a covered entity on the date of the  
8 enactment of this Act; or

9 (B) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on  
10 the date that is 1 year after the date on which  
11 a person qualifies as a covered entity after the  
12 date of the enactment of this Act.

13 (6) MAINTENANCE OF LISTS.—The Secretary of  
14 Defense is authorized to make additions or deletions  
15 to the lists described in paragraph (2) on an ongoing  
16 basis based on the latest information available. The  
17 Secretary of Defense shall, concurrently with the  
18 publication of the lists in accordance with the appli-  
19 cable provisions of law, transmit a copy of such lists  
20 to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the  
21 Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence.

22 (7) EVASION OF PROHIBITION.—The following  
23 acts are prohibited:

24 (A) Any transactions by a United States  
25 person or within the United States that evade

1 or avoid, or have the purpose of evading or  
2 avoiding, cause a violation of, or attempt to vio-  
3 late the prohibitions set forth in this section.

4 (B) Any conspiracy formed to violate any  
5 of the prohibition set forth in this section.

6 (8) AUTHORIZATION FOR REGULATIONS AND  
7 PENALTIES.—

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the  
9 Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary  
10 of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director  
11 of National Intelligence, and the heads of other  
12 executive departments and agencies as deemed  
13 appropriate by the Secretary of the Treasury, is  
14 hereby authorized to take such actions, includ-  
15 ing the promulgation of rules and regulations,  
16 and to employ all powers granted to the Presi-  
17 dent by the International Emergency Economic  
18 Powers Act, to carry out the purposes of this  
19 section.

20 (B) REGULATIONS.—Rules and regulations  
21 issued pursuant to this section may, among  
22 other things, establish procedures to license  
23 transactions otherwise prohibited pursuant to  
24 this section if, prior to issuing any license  
25 under this section, the Secretary of the Treas-

1           ury shall consult with the Secretary of State,  
2           the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of  
3           National Intelligence.

4           (C) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided  
5           for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of  
6           the International Emergency Economic Powers  
7           Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) with respect to a person  
8           that knowingly violates, attempts to violate,  
9           conspires to violate, or causes a violation of reg-  
10          ulations promulgated under this paragraph or  
11          commits any acts described in paragraph (6) to  
12          the same extent that such penalties apply to a  
13          person that knowingly commits an unlawful act  
14          described in section 206(a) of that Act.

15          (D) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTA-  
16          TION GOODS.—

17               (i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding  
18               any other provision of this section, the au-  
19               thority or a requirement to impose sanc-  
20               tions under this subsection shall not in-  
21               clude the authority or a requirement to im-  
22               pose sanctions on the importation of goods.

23               (ii) GOOD DEFINED.—In this subpara-  
24               graph, the term “good” means any article,  
25               natural or manmade substance, material,

1 supply, or manufactured product, including  
2 inspection and test equipment, and exclud-  
3 ing technical data.

4 (b) LIMITATION ON JUDICIAL REVIEW.—

5 (1) DECISIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—

6 The decision of the Secretary of Defense as to any  
7 question regarding the inclusion of a Communist  
8 Chinese military company, a Chinese military com-  
9 pany, or a military-civil fusion contributor on either  
10 of the lists described in subsection (a)(2) may not be  
11 reviewed by any official or by any court, whether by  
12 action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.

13 (2) RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED  
14 BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.—The rules  
15 and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the  
16 Treasury under subsection (a)(8) shall be final and  
17 not subject to any further agency review or to judi-  
18 cial review by any court (including under chapter 7  
19 of title 5, United States Code).

20 **SEC. 30632. CODIFYING THE DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVI-**  
21 **LEGES AND RELATED PROVISIONS UNDER**  
22 **TITLE 15, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.**

23 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
24 gress that—

1           (1) denial orders are an important foreign pol-  
2           icy tool to use against foreign entities and individ-  
3           uals, especially Chinese persons, with a pattern of  
4           violating United States laws, especially laws relating  
5           to intellectual property; and

6           (2) the Department of Commerce should vigor-  
7           ously utilize denial orders to hold such persons ac-  
8           countable.

9           (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than one year after the  
10          date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Com-  
11          merce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the  
12          Secretary of Treasury, and Attorney General, shall submit  
13          to Congress a strategy regarding how denial orders issued  
14          by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department  
15          of Commerce to deny the export privileges of foreign enti-  
16          ties and individuals, especially entities and individuals lo-  
17          cated in China, can be better utilized as part of a holistic  
18          approach to hold such entities and individuals accountable  
19          for theft of United States intellectual property.

20          (c) CODIFICATION OF DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVI-  
21          LEGES AND RELATED PROVISIONS UNDER TITLE 15,  
22          CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.—The provisions of  
23          part 730 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, relating  
24          to general information, and section 766.25 of such title,

1 relating to administrative action denying export privileges,  
2 are hereby enacted into law.

3 **SEC. 30633. CHINA TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTROL ACT**  
4 **OF 2021.**

5 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

6 (1) CHINESE PERSON.—The term “Chinese  
7 person” means—

8 (A) an individual who is a citizen or na-  
9 tional of the People’s Republic of China; or

10 (B) an entity organized under the laws of  
11 the People’s Republic of China or otherwise  
12 subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of  
13 the People’s Republic of China.

14 (2) COVERED NATIONAL INTEREST TECH-  
15 NOLOGY OR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The term  
16 “covered national interest technology or intellectual  
17 property” includes the following:

18 (A) Technology or intellectual property  
19 that would make a significant contribution to  
20 the military potential of the People’s Republic  
21 of China that would prove detrimental to the  
22 national security of the United States.

23 (B) Technology or intellectual property  
24 that is a component of the production of prod-

1           ucts included in the most recent list required  
2           under subsection (e)(1).

3           (C) Technology used by the Government of  
4           the People’s Republic of China to carry out vio-  
5           lations of human rights or religious liberties.

6           (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-  
7           son” means any person that is not a United States  
8           person.

9           (4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with  
10          respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,  
11          means that a person has actual knowledge, or should  
12          have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the  
13          result.

14          (5) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The term “in-  
15          tellectual property” means—

16                (A) any work protected by a copyright  
17                under title 17, United States Code;

18                (B) any property protected by a patent  
19                granted by the United States Patent and  
20                Trademark Office under title 35, United States  
21                Code;

22                (C) any word, name, symbol, or device, or  
23                any combination thereof, that is registered as a  
24                trademark with the United States Patent and  
25                Trademark Office under the Act entitled “An

1 Act to provide for the registration and protec-  
2 tion of trademarks used in commerce, to carry  
3 out the provisions of certain international con-  
4 ventions, and for other purposes”, approved  
5 July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the  
6 “Lanham Act” or the “Trademark Act of  
7 1946”) (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.);

8 (D) a trade secret (as defined in section  
9 1839 of title 18, United States Code); or

10 (E) any other form of intellectual property.

11 (6) TECHNOLOGY.—The term “technology” in-  
12 cludes goods or services relating to information sys-  
13 tems, internet-based services, production-enhancing  
14 logistics, robotics, artificial intelligence, bio-  
15 technology, or computing.

16 (7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
17 “United States person” means—

18 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-  
19 fully admitted for permanent residence to the  
20 United States; or

21 (B) an entity organized under the laws of  
22 the United States or of any jurisdiction within  
23 the United States, including a foreign branch of  
24 such an entity.



1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
2 gress that—

3 (1) while the United States is committed to  
4 promoting cultural and technological exchange with  
5 other countries, it is our responsibility to protect the  
6 United States when channels for such exchange are  
7 exploited by adversaries; and

8 (2) the People’s Republic of China consistently  
9 seeks to exploit those channels, not only in its theft  
10 of intellectual property but also in its manipulation  
11 of lawful transfer and uses of technology in ways  
12 that directly support its military objectives and  
13 threaten the United States.

14 (c) CONTROL OF EXPORT OF COVERED NATIONAL  
15 INTEREST TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
16 TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that  
18 is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this  
19 Act, the President shall control the export or re-ex-  
20 port to, or transfer in, the People’s Republic of  
21 China of any covered national interest technology or  
22 intellectual property subject to the jurisdiction of the  
23 United States or exported by any United States per-  
24 son.

1           (2) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90  
2       days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
3       Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce  
4       shall jointly submit to Congress a report assessing  
5       whether covered national interest technology or intel-  
6       lectual property should be controlled as required by  
7       paragraph (1) under—

8           (A) the International Traffic in Arms Reg-  
9       ulations under subchapter M of chapter I of  
10      title 22, Code of Federal Regulations; or

11          (B) the Export Administration Regulations  
12      under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15,  
13      Code of Federal Regulations.

14          (3) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 180 days  
15      after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
16      President shall prescribe such regulations as are  
17      necessary to carry out paragraph (1).

18      (d) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
19      PROVISION TO OR PURCHASE FROM PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC  
20      OF CHINA OF COVERED NATIONAL INTEREST TECH-  
21      NOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—

22          (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, pursu-  
23      ant to the International Emergency Economic Pow-  
24      ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit  
25      all transactions in all property and interests in prop-

1 erty of a person described in paragraph (2) if such  
2 property and interests in property are in the United  
3 States, come within the United States, or are or  
4 come within the possession or control of a United  
5 States person.

6 (2) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described  
7 in this paragraph is—

8 (A) a foreign person that, on or after the  
9 date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly  
10 sells or otherwise provides to, or knowingly pur-  
11 chases from, the People’s Republic of China any  
12 covered national interest technology or intellec-  
13 tual property subject to the jurisdiction of the  
14 United States; or

15 (B) a Chinese person that, on or after such  
16 date of enactment, knowingly uses covered na-  
17 tional interest technology or intellectual prop-  
18 erty provided to the Chinese person in violation  
19 of subsection (c) or any other export control law  
20 of the United States.

21 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF  
22 GOODS.—

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—The requirement to  
24 block and prohibit all transactions in all prop-  
25 erty and interests in property under paragraph

1 (1) shall not include the authority to impose  
2 sanctions on the importation of goods.

3 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,  
4 the term “good” means any article, natural or  
5 man-made substance, material, supply or manu-  
6 factured product, including inspection and test  
7 equipment, and excluding technical data.

8 (4) WAIVER.—The President may waive the im-  
9 position of sanctions under paragraph (1) with re-  
10 spect to a person if the President determines and re-  
11 ports to Congress that the waiver is in the national  
12 security interests of the United States.

13 (5) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

14 (A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President  
15 may exercise all authorities provided under sec-  
16 tions 203 and 205 of the International Emer-  
17 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702  
18 and 1704) to carry out this subsection.

19 (B) PENALTIES.—A person that violates,  
20 attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or  
21 causes a violation of paragraph (1) or any regu-  
22 lation, license, or order issued to carry out that  
23 paragraph shall be subject to the penalties set  
24 forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206  
25 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-

1           ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as  
2           a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
3           scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

4           (C) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER-  
5           GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements of  
6           section 202 of the International Emergency  
7           Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall  
8           not apply for purposes of this subsection.

9           (e) ESTABLISHMENT OF LIST OF CERTAIN PROD-  
10          UCTS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT OF PEO-  
11          PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OR USED BY THAT GOVERN-  
12          MENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.—

13          (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days  
14          after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-  
15          nually thereafter, the Secretary of Commerce shall  
16          set forth a list of products manufactured or pro-  
17          duced in, or exported from, the People’s Republic of  
18          China that are determined by—

19                 (A) the Secretary—

20                         (i) to receive support from the Gov-  
21                         ernment of the People’s Republic of China  
22                         pursuant to the Made in China 2025 In-  
23                         dustrial policy of that Government; or

24                         (ii) to otherwise receive support from  
25                         that Government and that have or will in

1 the future displace net exports of like  
2 products by the United States; or

3 (B) the Secretary of State to be used by  
4 the Government of the People's Republic of  
5 China to carry out violations of human rights  
6 or religious liberties.

7 (2) IDENTIFICATION OF PRODUCTS RECEIVING  
8 SUPPORT PURSUANT TO MADE IN CHINA 2025 POL-  
9 ICY.—

10 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Com-  
11 merce shall include in the list under paragraph  
12 (1)(A)(i) any product specified in the following  
13 documents set forth by the Government of the  
14 People's Republic of China:

15 (i) Notice on Issuing Made in China  
16 2025.

17 (ii) China Manufacturing 2025.

18 (iii) Notice on Issuing the 13th Five-  
19 year National Strategic Emerging Indus-  
20 tries Development Plan.

21 (iv) Guiding Opinion on Promoting  
22 International Industrial Capacity and  
23 Equipment Manufacturing Cooperation.

24 (v) Any other document that ex-  
25 presses a national strategy or stated goal

1 in connection with the Made in China 2025  
2 industrial policy set forth by the Govern-  
3 ment of the People's Republic of China,  
4 the Communist Party of China, or another  
5 entity or individual capable of impacting  
6 the national strategy of the People's Re-  
7 public of China.

8 (B) INCLUDED PRODUCTS.—In addition to  
9 such products as the Trade Representative shall  
10 include pursuant to subparagraph (A) in the  
11 list under paragraph (1)(A)(i), the Trade Rep-  
12 resentative shall include products in the fol-  
13 lowing industries:

- 14 (i) Civil aircraft.
- 15 (ii) Turbine engines.
- 16 (iii) Motor car and vehicle.
- 17 (iv) Advanced medical equipment.
- 18 (v) Advanced construction equipment.
- 19 (vi) Agricultural machinery.
- 20 (vii) Railway equipment.
- 21 (viii) Diesel locomotive.
- 22 (ix) Moving freight.
- 23 (x) Semiconductor.
- 24 (xi) Lithium battery manufacturing.
- 25 (xii) Artificial intelligence.

1 (xiii) High-capacity computing.

2 (xiv) Quantum computing.

3 (xv) Robotics.

4 (xvi) Biotechnology.

5 **SEC. 30634. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF TIKTOK ON FED-**  
6 **ERAL SYSTEMS.**

7 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

8 (1) the term “covered application” means the  
9 social networking service TikTok or any successor  
10 application or service developed or provided by  
11 ByteDance Limited or an entity owned by  
12 ByteDance Limited;

13 (2) the term “executive agency” has the mean-  
14 ing given that term in section 133 of title 41, United  
15 States Code; and

16 (3) the term “information technology” has the  
17 meaning given that term in section 11101 of title  
18 40, United States Code.

19 (b) PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF TIKTOK.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after  
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director  
22 of the Office of Management and Budget, in con-  
23 sultation with the Administrator of General Services,  
24 the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure  
25 Security Agency, the Director of National Intel-



1       ligence, and the Secretary of Defense, and consistent  
2       with the information security requirements under  
3       subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 44, United  
4       States Code, shall develop standards and guidelines  
5       for executive agencies requiring the removal of any  
6       covered application from information technology.

7               (2) NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH EX-  
8       CEPTIONS.—The standards and guidelines developed  
9       under paragraph (1) shall include—

10                   (A) exceptions for law enforcement activi-  
11                   ties, national security interests and activities,  
12                   and security researchers; and

13                   (B) for any authorized use of a covered ap-  
14                   plication under an exception, requirements for  
15                   agencies to develop and document risk mitiga-  
16                   tion actions for such use.

17       **SEC. 30635. PROHIBITION ON DISCLOSING GENETIC INFOR-**  
18                   **MATION TO CHINA.**

19               (a) PROHIBITION.—A commercial DNA testing serv-  
20       ice may not disclose the genetic information of any indi-  
21       vidual, or any aggregate of such information, to the Peo-  
22       ple’s Republic of China, or to any entity under the influ-  
23       ence, control, or ownership of the People’s Republic of  
24       China.

1 (b) ENFORCEMENT BY FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-  
2 SION.—

3 (1) UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRAC-  
4 TICES.—A violation of this section or a regulation  
5 promulgated under this section shall be treated as a  
6 violation of a regulation under section 18(a)(1)(B)  
7 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.  
8 57a(a)(1)(B)) regarding unfair or deceptive acts or  
9 practices.

10 (2) POWERS OF COMMISSION.—The Federal  
11 Trade Commission shall enforce this section and the  
12 regulations promulgated under this section in the  
13 same manner, by the same means, and with the  
14 same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all  
15 applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade  
16 Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incor-  
17 porated into and made part of this section. Any per-  
18 son who violates this section or a regulation promul-  
19 gated under this section shall be subject to the pen-  
20 alties and entitled to the privileges and immunities  
21 provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act.

22 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

23 (1) COMMERCIAL DNA TESTING SERVICE.—The  
24 term “commercial DNA testing service” means any

1 person that provides genealogical or ancestry-related  
2 information based on an individual’s DNA.

3 (2) GENETIC INFORMATION.—The term “ge-  
4 netic information” means, with respect to any indi-  
5 vidual, information about such individual’s genetic  
6 tests.

7 (3) GENETIC TEST.—The term “genetic test”  
8 has the meaning given such term by section 201 of  
9 the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of  
10 2008 (Public Law 110–233; 42 U.S.C. 2000ff).

11 **Subtitle E—Strengthening Our**  
12 **Partnerships With Taiwan**

13 **PART 1—PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE**  
14 **WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION**

15 **SEC. 30641. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD**  
16 **HEALTH ORGANIZATION.**

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
18 ings:

19 (1) The World Health Organization (WHO) is  
20 a specialized agency of the United Nations, charged  
21 with coordinating health efforts within the United  
22 Nations system. The World Health Assembly  
23 (WHA) is the decision-making body of the WHO,  
24 which convenes annually in May to set the policies  
25 and priorities of the organization. Statehood is not

1 a requirement for attendance at the WHA, and nu-  
2 merous observers, including nonmembers and non-  
3 governmental organizations, attended the most re-  
4 cent virtual WHA in May 2020.

5 (2) Taiwan began seeking to participate in the  
6 WHO as an observer in 1997. In 2009, with strong  
7 support from successive United States Administra-  
8 tions, Congress, and like-minded WHO Member  
9 States, and during a period of improved Cross-Strait  
10 relations, Taiwan received an invitation to attend  
11 the WHA as an observer under the name “Chinese  
12 Taipei”. Taiwan received the same invitation each  
13 year until 2016, when following the election of Presi-  
14 dent Tsai-Ing Wen of the Democratic Progressive  
15 Party, Taiwan’s engagement in the international  
16 community began facing increased resistance from  
17 the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan’s in-  
18 vitation to the 2016 WHA was received late and in-  
19 cluded new language conditioning Taiwan’s partici-  
20 pation on the PRC’s “one China principle”. The  
21 WHO did not invite Taiwan to attend the WHA as  
22 an observer in 2017, 2018, 2019, or 2020.

23 (3) Taiwan remains a model contributor to  
24 world health, having provided financial and technical  
25 assistance to respond to numerous global health

1 challenges. Taiwan has invested over \$6 billion in  
2 international medical and humanitarian aid efforts  
3 impacting over 80 countries since 1996. In 2014,  
4 Taiwan responded to the Ebola crisis by donating \$1  
5 million and providing 100,000 sets of personal pro-  
6 tective equipment., Through the Global Cooperation  
7 and Training Framework – which partners Taiwan  
8 with the United States and Japan as a platform for  
9 sharing Taiwan’s expertise in a variety of crucial  
10 fields – the United States and Taiwan have jointly  
11 conducted training programs for technical health ex-  
12 perts to combat MERS, Dengue Fever, and Zika. In  
13 2020, after successfully containing the spread of the  
14 novel coronavirus within its borders while upholding  
15 democratic principles, Taiwan generously donated  
16 millions of pieces of personal protective equipment  
17 and COVID-19 tests to countries in need. These dis-  
18 eases know no borders, and Taiwan’s needless exclu-  
19 sion from global health cooperation increases the  
20 dangers presented by global pandemics.

21 (4) Taiwan’s international engagement has  
22 faced increased resistance from the PRC. Taiwan  
23 was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the Inter-  
24 national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite  
25 participating as a guest at the organization’s prior

1 summit in 2013. Taiwan's requests to participate in  
2 the General Assembly of the International Criminal  
3 Police Organization (INTERPOL) have also been  
4 rejected. In May 2017, PRC delegates disrupted a  
5 meeting of the Kimberley Process on conflict dia-  
6 monds held in Perth, Australia, until delegates from  
7 Taiwan were asked to leave. Since 2016, the Demo-  
8 cratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, the Re-  
9 public of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina  
10 Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Solomon Is-  
11 lands, and the Republic of Kiribati have terminated  
12 longstanding diplomatic relationships with Taiwan  
13 and granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC.

14 (5) Congress has established a policy of support  
15 for Taiwan's participation in international bodies  
16 that address shared transnational challenges, par-  
17 ticularly in the WHO. Congress has passed multiple  
18 measures to direct the Secretary of State to estab-  
19 lish a strategy for, and to report annually to Con-  
20 gress on, efforts to obtain observer status for Tai-  
21 wan at the WHA. Congress also passed legislation  
22 directing the Secretary to report on a strategy to  
23 gain observer status for Taiwan at the ICAO Assem-  
24 bly, and to report on a strategy to gain observer sta-  
25 tus for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly. How-

1           ever, since 2016 Taiwan has not received an invita-  
2           tion to attend any of these events as an observer.

3           (b) AUGMENTATION OF REPORT CONCERNING THE  
4 PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH OR-  
5 GANIZATION.—

6           (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 1  
7           of Public Law 108–235 (118 Stat. 656) is amended  
8           by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

9           “(3) An account of the changes and improve-  
10           ments the Secretary of State has made to the  
11           United States plan to endorse and obtain observer  
12           status for Taiwan at the World Health Assembly,  
13           following any annual meetings of the World Health  
14           Assembly at which Taiwan did not obtain observer  
15           status.”.

16           (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made  
17           by paragraph (1) shall take effect and apply begin-  
18           ning with the first report required under subsection  
19           (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 that is sub-  
20           mitted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

1 **PART 2—TAIWAN RELATIONS MODERNIZATION**

2 **ACT**

3 **Subpart A—U.S.-Taiwan Relations**

4 **SEC. 30651. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENHANCING THE**

5 **UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.**

6 It is the policy of the United States—

7 (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the  
8 United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

9 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its  
10 democracy as key elements for the continued peace  
11 and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and  
12 a vital national security interest of the United  
13 States;

14 (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan  
15 under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8)  
16 and the “Six Assurances”;

17 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its  
18 asymmetric defense strategy;

19 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense  
20 spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-  
21 egy;

22 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-  
23 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-  
24 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop  
25 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including  
26 anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense,



1 undersea warfare, advanced command, control, com-  
2 munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,  
3 and reconnaissance, and resilient command and con-  
4 trol capabilities, into its military forces;

5 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's  
6 meaningful participation in the United Nations, the  
7 World Health Assembly, the International Civil  
8 Aviation Organization, the International Criminal  
9 Police Organization, and other international bodies  
10 as appropriate;

11 (8) to advocate for information sharing with  
12 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on  
13 Cancer;

14 (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among  
15 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded  
16 partners;

17 (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-  
18 tially through new agreements or resumption of  
19 talks related to a possible Trade and Investment  
20 Framework Agreement;

21 (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-  
22 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

23 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-  
24 logical cooperation, including improving supply chain  
25 security;

1           (13) to support United States educational and  
2           exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-  
3           moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-  
4           tory, and politics in Taiwan; and

5           (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-  
6           tween the United States and Taiwan.

7 **SEC. 30652. REAUTHORIZATION OF TAIWAN ASSURANCE**  
8           **ACT.**

9           Section 315 of subtitle B of division FF of the Con-  
10          solidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116–260;  
11          commonly referred to as the Taiwan Assurance Act) is  
12          amended adding at the end the following:

13          “(d) Periodic Review – For as long as the guidance  
14          described in subsection (a) remains in effect, the Secretary  
15          shall conduct periodic reviews as described in subsection  
16          (a) and submit updated reports as described in subsection  
17          (c) not less frequently than every two years following the  
18          submission of the initial report described in subsection  
19          (c).”.

20 **SEC. 30653. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.**

21          (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
22          date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
23          shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction,  
24          section of the Foreign Affairs Manual or Foreign Affairs  
25          Handbook, related guidance, or related policies that, ex-

1 plicitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limi-  
2 tations on activities of United States personnel, limits the  
3 ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic  
4 of China (Taiwan) and government representatives from  
5 the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office  
6 (TECRO) to display for official purposes symbols of Re-  
7 public of China sovereignty, including—

8 (1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan);

9 and

10 (2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of  
11 military units.

12 (b) OFFICIAL PURPOSES DEFINED.—In this section,  
13 the term “official purposes” means—

14 (1) the wearing of official uniforms;

15 (2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies  
16 or functions; and

17 (3) appearances on Department of State social  
18 media accounts promoting engagements with Tai-  
19 wan.

20 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-  
21 tion shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-  
22 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or  
23 altering the United States Government’s position on Tai-  
24 wan’s international status.

1 **SEC. 30654. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this Act or any other  
3 provision of law may be construed to require the United  
4 States Government to refer to the democratically elected  
5 government of Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities,” or  
6 preclude referring to the democratically elected govern-  
7 ment of Taiwan as a “government.”

8 (b) ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.—  
9 The Department of State and other United States Govern-  
10 ment departments and agencies shall engage with the  
11 democratically elected government of Taiwan as the legiti-  
12 mate representative of the people of Taiwan and end the  
13 outdated practice of referring to the Government of Tai-  
14 wan as the “Taiwan authorities”. Notwithstanding the  
15 continued supporting role of the American Institute in  
16 Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and  
17 protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United  
18 States Government shall not place any restrictions on the  
19 ability of officials of the Department of State and other  
20 United States Government departments and agencies to  
21 interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the  
22 Taiwan government.

23 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-  
24 tion may be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-  
25 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or

1 altering the United States Government's position on Tai-  
2 wan's international status.

3 **SEC. 30655. REPRESENTATIVE TITLE FOR DIRECTOR OF**  
4 **AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN'S TAIPEI**  
5 **OFFICE.**

6 The position of Director of the American Institute in  
7 Taiwan's Taipei office shall have the title of Representa-  
8 tive.

9 **SEC. 30656. AUTHORIZATION OF GLOBAL COOPERATION**  
10 **AND TRAINING FRAMEWORK.**

11 (a) GLOBAL COOPERATION AND TRAINING FRAME-  
12 WORK.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is  
14 authorized to conduct training programs, workshops,  
15 and other activities with the government of Taiwan  
16 pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding be-  
17 tween the United States and Taiwan signed in 2015  
18 on the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.

19 (2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of  
20 Congress that Global Cooperation and Training  
21 Framework activities that promote ties between the  
22 United States, Taiwan, and other democratic part-  
23 ners, or that undergird Taiwan's diplomatic relation-  
24 ships, or that counter malign authoritarian activi-  
25 ties, are particularly beneficial to our shared inter-

1       ests, and that examples of such activities in 2019 in-  
2       clude:

3               (A) the “Good Energy Governance in the  
4       Indo-Pacific” workshop, co-hosted by Japan,  
5       and Australia;

6               (B) the “International Austronesian Lan-  
7       guages Revitalization Forum,” co-hosted with  
8       Japan and held in Palau, a nation that main-  
9       tains diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and

10              (C) the “Defending Democracy through  
11       Media Literacy II” workshop, which focused on  
12       addressing and countering disinformation in  
13       democratic elections and was co-hosted by  
14       Japan and Sweden.

15              (D) the “Anti-Corruption in the Public and  
16       Private Sections” workshop, which focused on  
17       promoting clean governance, preventing cor-  
18       porate governance, and preserving competitive-  
19       ness through trade secret protection, and co-  
20       hosted by Japan.

21       (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There  
22       are authorized to be appropriated \$3,000,000 for each of  
23       the fiscal years 2026 through 2026 for the Global Co-  
24       operation and Training Framework.

1           **Subpart B—U.S.-Taiwan Defense and Security**  
2   **Cooperation**

3   **SEC. 30661. BOLSTERING THE UNITED STATES SECURITY**  
4   **PARTNERSHIP WITH TAIWAN.**

5           (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the Sense of Con-  
6   gress that steps to bolster United States security partner-  
7   ship in the Indo-Pacific must include encouraging and fa-  
8   cilitating Taiwan’s accelerated acquisition of asymmetric  
9   defense capabilities, which are crucial to defending the is-  
10   lands of Taiwan from invasion, including long-range preci-  
11   sion fires, munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense,  
12   anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-  
13   mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence,  
14   surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and resilient  
15   command and control capabilities, and increasing the con-  
16   duct of relevant and practical training and exercises with  
17   Taiwan’s defense forces;

18           (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy  
19   of the United States—

20                   (1) to strenuously oppose any action by the  
21   People’s Republic of China to use force to change  
22   the status quo on Taiwan; and

23                   (2) that, in order to deter the use of force by  
24   the People’s Republic of China to change the status  
25   quo on Taiwan, the United States should coordinate  
26   with allies and partners to identify and develop sig-

1           nificant economic, diplomatic, and other measures to  
2           deter and impose costs on any such action by the  
3           People’s Republic of China, and to bolster deterrence  
4           by articulating such policies publicly, as appropriate  
5           and in alignment with United States interests.

6   **SEC. 30662. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OP-**  
7                                   **ERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.**

8           (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
9           date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
10          shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to  
11          sharp power operations and the united front campaign  
12          supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of  
13          China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed  
14          toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

15          (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-  
16          section (a) shall include the following elements:

17                  (1) Development of a response to PRC propa-  
18                  ganda and disinformation campaigns and cyber-in-  
19                  trusions targeting Taiwan, including—

20                          (A) assistance in building the capacity of  
21                          the Taiwan government and private-sector enti-  
22                          ties to document and expose propaganda and  
23                          disinformation supported by the Government of  
24                          the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese  
25                          Communist Party, or affiliated entities;



1 (B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan gov-  
2 ernment's ability to develop a whole-of-govern-  
3 ment strategy to respond to sharp power oper-  
4 ations, including election interference; and

5 (C) media training for Taiwan officials and  
6 other Taiwan entities targeted by  
7 disinformation campaigns.

8 (2) Development of a response to political influ-  
9 ence operations that includes an assessment of the  
10 extent of influence exerted by the Government of the  
11 People's Republic of China and the Chinese Com-  
12 munist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, fi-  
13 nancial institutions, media organizations, and other  
14 entities.

15 (3) Support for exchanges and other technical  
16 assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's  
17 ability to respond to sharp power operations.

18 (4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership,  
19 through the Global Cooperation and Training  
20 Framework, with like-minded governments to share  
21 data and best practices with the Government of Tai-  
22 wan on ways to address sharp power operations sup-  
23 ported by the Government of the People's Republic  
24 of China and the Chinese Communist Party.

1 **SEC. 30663. REPORT.**

2 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-  
3 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation  
4 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appro-  
5 priate committees a report on the feasibility of enhancing  
6 the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan through the For-  
7 eign Military Financing program of the Department of  
8 State.

9 **SEC. 30664. BRIEFING ON TAIWAN SECURITY COOPERA-**  
10 **TION.**

11 Section 1260A of the National Defense Authorization  
12 Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) is amend-  
13 ed—

14 (1) by striking the heading and inserting “**AN-**  
15 **NUAL BRIEFING ON TAIWAN SECURITY CO-**  
16 **OPERATION**”; and

17 (2) by adding at the appropriate place in sub-  
18 section (b) the following new paragraph:

19 “(4) A description of United States efforts to  
20 help Taiwan deter and defeat any military aggres-  
21 sion, including bilateral and multilateral—

22 “(A) individual- and unit-level training;  
23 and

24 “(B) operational exercise programs that  
25 build combined readiness, interoperability,

1 lethality, survivability, joint planning capability,  
2 and shared warfighting situational awareness.”.

3 **SEC. 30665. TAIWAN STATUS REGARDING EXCESS DEFENSE**  
4 **ARTICLES.**

5 Taiwan shall receive the same benefits conferred for  
6 the purposes of transfers pursuant to section 516(c)(2)  
7 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.  
8 2321j(e)(2)).

9 **Subpart C—U.S.-Taiwan Technology & Economic**  
10 **Cooperation and Harmonization Act**

11 **SEC. 30671. FINDINGS.**

12 Congress finds the following:

13 (1) Taiwan is the United States’ tenth largest  
14 partner for bilateral trade in goods, with total trade  
15 of \$86 billion, and the United States’ fifteenth larg-  
16 est export market, a destination for \$31.8 billion in  
17 U.S. exports in 2019.

18 (2) Bilateral trade data dramatically under-  
19 states Taiwan’s importance to the United States’  
20 economy. The trade data does not include the IP li-  
21 censing and contracted manufacturing relationships  
22 between the United States and Taiwan and does not  
23 include the overseas production of Taiwan companies  
24 for export to the United States. In 2018, Taiwan  
25 firms received \$146 billion in U.S. export orders

1 compared with official U.S. data that showed \$46  
2 billion in Taiwan merchandise exports to the United  
3 States

4 (3) Advanced technology supply chains are of  
5 particular importance to the U.S.-Taiwan relation-  
6 ship, and companies from the United States and  
7 Taiwan share mutually beneficial links that have al-  
8 lowed them to collectively establish a dominant posi-  
9 tion in the global manufacture of advanced micro-  
10 electronics, a strategic industry of existential impor-  
11 tance for the United States' national security and  
12 economic prosperity. For example, 60% of Taiwan  
13 Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation's revenue  
14 derived from North American customers in 2019. In  
15 2018, Taiwan was the third largest importer of  
16 semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced  
17 in the United States.

18 (4) U.S.-Taiwan advanced technology supply  
19 chains, especially microelectronics supply chains,  
20 face significant external threats from malign indus-  
21 trial policies that pose both military and economic  
22 risks.

1 **SEC. 30672. U.S.-TAIWAN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC SE-**  
2 **CURITY STRATEGY.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
4 enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period  
5 of four years, the Secretary of State, following interagency  
6 consultation as appropriate, shall submit to the appro-  
7 priate Congressional Committees a strategy to deepen  
8 U.S.-Taiwan economic relations and strengthen supply  
9 chain security in critical technologies.

10 (b) SUBJECT MATTER.—The strategy specified in  
11 subsection (a) shall include:

12 (1) a description of the full range of U.S. inter-  
13 ests in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations;

14 (2) an identification of requests the government  
15 of Taiwan has made to the United States relating to  
16 our shared economic relations that remain out-  
17 standing;

18 (3) an identification of requests the United  
19 States has made to the government of Taiwan relat-  
20 ing to our shared economic relations that remain  
21 outstanding;

22 (4) a description of specific steps the adminis-  
23 tration plans to take to address each such unre-  
24 solved issue;

25 (5) an identification of critical technology sup-  
26 ply chains of particular importance to the U.S.-Tai-

1 wan economic relationship, U.S.-Taiwan interactions  
2 regarding such supply chains, and specific steps the  
3 administration plans to take to enhance the security  
4 and harmonize the regulation of such supply chains;  
5 and

6 (6) a description of government-to-government  
7 interactions between the United States and Taiwan  
8 that have or will be conducted to address the mat-  
9 ters described in paragraphs (1) through (5).

10 (c) FORM.—The report specified in subsection (a)  
11 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include  
12 a classified annex.

13 **SEC. 30673. U.S.-TAIWAN ECONOMIC PROSPERITY PARTNER-**  
14 **SHIP DIALOGUE.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, or their  
16 designee at no lower than the rank of Undersecretary,  
17 with interagency consultation and participation as appro-  
18 priate, shall convene an Economic Prosperity Partnership  
19 Dialogue with the government of Taiwan.

20 (b) FREQUENCY AND LOCATION.—The Economic  
21 Prosperity Partnership Dialogue shall be convened annu-  
22 ally and shall be held in an alternating basis in Wash-  
23 ington, D.C., and Taipei.

24 (c) SUBJECT MATTER OF DIALOGUE.—The subject  
25 matter of the dialogue shall include:

1           (1) The matters included in the U.S. Taiwan  
2           Technology and Economic Security Strategy.

3           (2) Efforts to align and harmonize export con-  
4           trols rules and licensing policies, the definition of  
5           critical technologies, and the administration and en-  
6           forcement of export controls for critical technologies,  
7           including deemed exports.

8           (3) The advancement of mutual economic secu-  
9           rity priorities of the United States and Taiwan, such  
10          as joint efforts to secure technology supply chains,  
11          invest in secure production, and reduce dependencies  
12          on adversarial countries for a significant source of  
13          revenues.

14          (4) Cooperation to respond to shared threats to  
15          economic security and technology supply chains,  
16          such as malign industrial policies that seek to ex-  
17          tract technological talent, know-how, and expertise  
18          from such supply chains in Taiwan and the United  
19          States, specifically including human capital.

20          (5) U.S.-Taiwan research collaboration, edu-  
21          cational exchange, and strategic investment and  
22          R&D for critical technologies.

23          (d) WORKING LEVEL ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary  
24          shall conduct continuing engagements and consultations  
25          with the Government of Taiwan at the working level as

1 necessary to advance the U.S.-Taiwan Technology and  
2 Economic Security Strategy.

3 (e) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION.—The Sec-  
4 retary or their designee shall consult with the appropriate  
5 Congressional Committees prior to and after convening  
6 each U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dia-  
7 logue.

8 **SEC. 30674. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**  
9 **DEFINED.**

10 In this title, the term “appropriate Congressional  
11 Committees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
12 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-  
13 eign Relations of the Senate.

