AMENDMENT TO
RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 117–31
OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

Title VI of division D is amended to read as follows:

TITLE VI—PRIORITIZING THE
THREAT POSED BY THE PRC
Subtitle A—Ideological
Competition

SEC. 30601. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SOCIALISM.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) According to Merriam-Webster, socialism may be defined as “any of various economic and political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods”.

(2) At the core of socialist thought are the beliefs that property ultimately belongs to the state not the individual and that the individual is entitled to an equal share of resources, regardless of work ethic, skill, talent, or other merit or endowment.

(3) The People’s Republic of China is the world’s foremost socialist state and one of the few remaining Communist states.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) socialism is antithetical to the American way of life which emphasizes hard work, personal discipline, innovation, entrepreneurship, the family, the right to pass on one’s property to one’s descendants, and the right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labors; and

(2) a world dominated by a socialist power or powers would be inimical to American interests and values.

SEC. 30602. GENERAL SECRETARY ACT.

(a) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) condemn in the strongest possible terms the horrific human rights abuses being perpetuated and enabled by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP);

(2) urge all countries to do the same;

(3) recognize the deep friendship between the United States and the citizens of the People’s Republic of China, the first victims of their government’s cruelty; and

(4) honor the memory of all those who have died as a result of the callous rule of the CCP.
(b) Prohibition on Using Federal Funds to Refer to the Head of State of the People’s Republic of China as “President” on New United States Government Documents and Communications.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Government may not obligate or expend any funds for the creation and dissemination of United States Government documents and communications that refer to the head of state of the People’s Republic of China as anything other than “General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party”, or alternatively, as “General Secretary”.

Subtitle B—Countering Gray Zone Threats

SEC. 30611. GRAY ZONE DEFENSE ASSESSMENT ACT.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) Gray zone competition is a central and enduring aspect of great-power competition and the United States should elevate, as a central feature of its approach to great-power competition, effective responses to, and capabilities to conduct, gray zone campaigns.

(2) An effective, whole-of-government approach, and especially the coordination of efforts among the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
the Intelligence Community, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the
United States Agency for International Develop-
ment, is essential to meeting the gray zone chal-
lenges posed by competitors.

(3) Since gray zone activity takes place below
the threshold of major war and since narrative for-
mation is a critical aspect of gray zone campaigns,
the Department of State should take a preeminent
role in coordinating, within the National Security
Council process, the disparate means of national
power as the United States seeks to respond to ag-
gressive gray zone campaigns.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
United States—

(1) to seek effective responses, particularly at
the Department of State, to gray zone campaigns by
United States adversaries and to recognize the para-
mount importance of such responses to the national
interests of the United States;

(2) that upholding the international rule of law
and the rules-based international order, championed
by the United States since the Second World War,
is a core national security interest of the United
States and that United States gray zone campaigns
shall seek to uphold this core national security interest; and

(3) to call on United States allies and partners to employ sufficient national resources to equitably contribute to the response to shared security and gray zone challenges.

(e) Evaluation of National Capacities for Conducting Gray Zone Operations.—

(1) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a review and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the capabilities of the United States to conduct and respond to gray zone campaigns and proposed changes to enhance such capabilities.

(2) Elements.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall also include the following:

(A) A discussion of capacity and effectiveness of the interagency to routinely marshal disparate elements of national power to effectively respond in a coordinated manner to adversary gray zone campaigns against the United States or partner nations.

(B) A discussion of the interagency’s capacity to recognize adversary campaigns from
weak signals, including rivals’ intent, capability, impact, interactive effects, and impact on United States interests.

(C) A description of the process for determining the tolerance for adversary gray zone activity, including the methods and mechanisms for—

(i) determining which adversary gray zone activities are unacceptable;

(ii) communicating these positions to adversaries;

(iii) developing theories of deterrence; and

(iv) establishing and regularly reviewing protocols with allies and partners to respond to such activities.

(D) Recommendations for addressing gaps between agencies of the Federal Government as well as inadequacies and inefficiencies in the interagency coordination of such agencies and their elements, including—

(i) a discussion of how such recommendations will be sufficient to achieve United States gray zone objectives and to
counter adversary gray zone campaigns;
and
(ii) rough order-of-magnitude budget estimates for the implementations of the recommendations.

(E) A description of the institutional reforms undertaken or planned to be undertaken to address the gaps identified pursuant to subparagraph (D) to better enable effective gray zone campaigns.

(F) A description of any proposed institutional reform, including for which the President requires additional statutory authority and a justification for such additional authority.

(G) Any proposed necessary investments or legislative proposals for the creation or augmentation of institutions or authorities to significantly increase United States capability to mitigate gray zone threats, the rationale for each, and expected cost.

(H) A description of the process for determining political warfare tolerance, including—

(i) determining which adversary gray zone activities are unacceptable;
(ii) communicating these positions to
adversaries; and

(iii) establishing and regularly review-
ing protocols with allies and partners to re-
respond to such activities.

(3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified format and
may contain a classified annex.

(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
propriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representa-
tives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, and the Committee on Homeland Se-
curity and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(d) DEPARTMENT OF STATE GRAY ZONE DEFENSE

ASSESSMENT.—

(1) REPORT ON GRAY ZONE CAPABILITIES OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report
discussing the capabilities of the Department of
State to contribute to the ability of the United
States to defend against and conduct gray zone
campaigns.

(B) ELEMENTS.—The report required by
subparagraph (A) shall also include the fol-
lowing:

(i) The capabilities, offices, and units
that are especially suited to gray zone op-
erations and a description of the cor-
responding roles to play.

(ii) A list of activities that are being
undertaken, as of the date of the submis-
sion of the report, to respond to adversary
gray zone campaigns.

(iii) An evaluation of the adequacy
and utility of established Department of
State definitions for understanding gray zone activity by adversaries and for operationalizing gray zone efforts.

(iv) Recommendations, including proposed necessary investments and the rationale and expected costs of such investments, for addressing gaps within the Department of State and its coordination with the interagency to effectively conduct gray zone operations.

(v) An identification of 25 priority countries at the front lines of adversary gray zone aggression and a discussion of the information described in clauses (i) through (iii) with respect to each such country, developed in consultation with relevant embassy country teams.

(2) CONTESTING THE INFORMATION BATTLESPACE.—

(A) FINDING.—Congress finds that the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the Department of State could be presumed to be responsible for coordinating all public relations components of gray zone campaigns, while in fact such responsibilities
are not so located nor are they effectively co-
ordinated.

(B) FOREIGN DISINFORMATION EFFORTS
REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of State, acting through the Under Secretary
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report summarizing United States
policy on foreign disinformation and propa-
ganda efforts in the global information contest,
that shall include—

(i) a list of all elements of current
United States policy relating to this issue;

(ii) a brief summary of the threats
faced to United States interests and the
nature of the United States response, in-
cluding—

(I) the broad objectives of United
States global information operations
and needed additional capabilities;

(II) which offices or entities with-
in the Department, and within the
broader United States Government,
are responsible for conducting information operations;

(III) a list of current activities and programs, within the Department and across the United States Government, that currently comprise United States efforts; and

(IV) a list of specific additional capabilities and investments required to improve United States effectiveness and order of magnitude cost estimates;

(iii) a description of the processes within the Department of State for vetting and accountability for Global Engagement Center grantees, to prevent misuse or mistargeting of information campaigns;

(iv) examples of the effective use of targeted international development and stabilization assistance as part of gray zone campaigns;

(v) an assessment of the manner and extent to which gray zone considerations have been included when planning invest-
ments in security cooperation and security-sector assistance; and

(vi) the adequacy of the Department of State’s public affairs elements, including the Global Engagement Center, for conducting and responding to information operations conducted as part of a gray zone campaign.

(C) REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WITH RESPECT TO MALIGN ACTIVITIES OF THE PRC.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the efforts of the Department of State with respect to research to determine which strategic communications techniques and methods are most useful at reaching populations that are targets of Chinese disinformation.

(3) GRAY ZONE THREATS AT MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS.—
(A) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs shall prioritize efforts to counter attempts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to control and coerce international organizations.

(B) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on threats to United States interests at international organizations.

(C) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subparagraph (B) shall also include each of the following:

(i) An assessment of the level of influence exerted by the PRC, and the vectors for such influence, at—

(I) each specialized organization or agency of the United Nations;

(II) the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization; and
(III) any other international organization the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary determines is substantially and illicitly influenced by the PRC.

(ii) The total annual Chinese financial contributions, total annual United States contributions, and total annual contributions of the top six donors to each organization assessed pursuant to clause (i).

(iii) An assessment of the multilateral organizations where enhanced United States efforts, support, or engagement would materially contribute to competitive advantage in the gray zone, including specific proposed activities and associated costs.

(4) FORM.—Each report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(5) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(6) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—
The Secretary of State is authorized to consolidate the reports required by this subsection.

(e) INDO-PACIFIC PRIORITY THEATER FOR GRAY ZONE RESPONSE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Among the gray zone campaigns the Department of State seeks to counter, the Secretary of State shall give particular priority to responding to campaigns conducted by the PRC (including its agents or instrumentalities), including by—

(A) requiring each diplomatic or consular post in the East-Asia Pacific and South and Central Asia regions to prominently include in their country strategies responses to Chinese gray zone activities and the building of gray zone deterrence capabilities; and

(B) ensuring sufficient staffing at diplomatic and consular posts throughout the Indo-Pacific to effectively counter Chinese gray zone campaigns.

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes a short summary of Indo-Pacific maritime gray zone threats and also includes—

(A) an outline of the United States position on primary maritime gray zone operations and associated territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific;

(B) specific gray zone actions undertaken by the PRC to gain gradual advantage with respect to its territorial claims;

(C) places where the norms of international and maritime law are most at risk of bring ignored or subverted;

(D) any proposed opportunities for the resolution of territorial disputes and potential United States contributions to such efforts; and

(E) the specific actions with respect to such maritime gray zone threats which, if undertaken by the PRC, would be considered unacceptable according to stated United States policy.
(3) **FORM.**—The report required to be submitted by this subsection shall be submitted in classified form with an unclassified summary.

(f) **REPORT ON STAFFING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report that discusses the relative numbers of United States and Chinese diplomatic, commercial, and military personnel in the Indo-Pacific region. The report shall also include—

(A) the disaggregated numbers of United States and Chinese diplomatic, commerce promotion, and military personnel stationed in each country in the region;

(B) an assessment of the relative capabilities of Chinese diplomatic missions in each such
country to influence private- and public-sector
decision making, compared to those of the
United States;

(C) an assessment of the strength of busi-
ness ties between the PRC and each such coun-
try; and

(D) a determination whether businesses or
other entities owned or controlled by the PRC
or by Chinese persons are serving as auxiliaries
for Chinese diplomatic missions to such coun-
try.

(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in classified form with an un-
classified summary.

SEC. 30612. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO THE

WUHAN INSTITUTE OF VIROLOGY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—No funds authorized or appro-
priated by Federal law may be made available for any pur-
pose to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

(b) GAO STUDY AND REPORT.—Not later than 2
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct
a study, and submit to Congress a report, on the amount
of Federal funds awarded or indirectly given to Wuhan
Institute of Virology or researchers affiliated with Wuhan
Institute of Virology, during the 15-year period preceding such date of enactment were provided, whether purposely or inadvertently, to the People’s Republic of China, Chinese Communist Party, or the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or any agency or instrumentality thereof.

Subtitle C—Human Rights

SEC. 30621. FALUN GONG PROTECTION ACT.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) killing a human being through involuntary organ extraction is an egregious violation of universal standards of medical ethics and is in direct contradiction of basic standards of human decency;

(2) the forced harvesting of organs violates Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”, and Article 4, which states that “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.”;

(3) the United Nations Human Rights Council should issue a formal condemnation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for its persecution of Falun Gong;

(4) any collaboration with or participation in the PRC’s organ transplant system by the United Nations should be condemned.
States Government or a United States person or organization presents serious ethical challenges that would jeopardize the integrity of the United States organ transplantation system; and

(5) the Chinese Communist Party’s state-sponsored persecution of Falun Gong must come to an immediate end.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) avoid any cooperation with the PRC in the organ transplantation field while the Chinese Communist Party remains in power;

(2) take appropriate measures, including using relevant sanctions authorities, to coerce the Chinese Communist Party to end any state-sponsored organ harvesting campaign; and

(3) work with allies, partners, and multilateral institutions to highlight China’s persecution of Falun Gong and coordinate closely with the international community on targeted sanctions and visa restrictions.

(c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FORCED ORGAN HARVESTING WITHIN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—
(1) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each foreign person included in the most recent list submitted pursuant to paragraph (2).

(2) LIST OF PERSONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of foreign persons, including senior government officials, military leaders, and other persons who the President determines are knowingly responsible for or complicit in, or have directly or indirectly engaged in, the involuntary harvesting of organs within the People’s Republic of China.

(B) UPDATES OF LISTS.—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under subparagraph (A)—

(i) as new information becomes available;

(ii) not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(iii) annually thereafter for five years.
(C) FORM.—The list required by subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this paragraph are the following:

   (A) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

   (B) INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.—

      (i) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—A foreign person included in the most recent list submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) is—
(I) inadmissible to the United States;

(II) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(III) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(ii) Current Visas Revoked.—A foreign person described in clause (i) is also subject to the following:

(I) Revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(II) A revocation under subclause (I) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the foreign person’s possession.

(C) Exception.—Sanctions under sub-paragraph (B) shall not apply to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United
States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States.

(4) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under paragraph (3)(A) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(5) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
violation of regulations promulgated to carry out paragraph (1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person who commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.

(6) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL SECURITY.—The following activities shall be exempt from sanctions under this subsection:

(A) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).

(B) Any authorized intelligence or law enforcement activities of the United States.

(d) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Director of the National Institutes of Health, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the organ transplant policies and practices of the People’s Republic of China.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a summary of de jure and de facto policies toward organ transplantation in the
PRC, including with respect to prisoners of conscience (including Falun Gong) and other prisoners;

(B)(i) the number of organ transplants that are known to occur or are estimated to occur on an annual basis in the PRC;

(ii) the number of known or estimated voluntary organ donors in the PRC;

(iii) an assessment of the sources of organs for transplant in the PRC; and

(iv) an assessment of the time, in days, that it takes to procure an organ for transplant within the Chinese medical system and an assessment of whether such timetable is possible based on the number of known or estimated organ donors in the PRC;

(C) a list of all United States grants over the past 10 years that have supported research on organ transplantation in the PRC or in collaboration between a Chinese and a United States entity; and

(D) a determination as to whether the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners within the People’s Republic of China constitutes an “atrocity” (as such term is defined in section 6
of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)).

(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 30622. AUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS FOR CHINESE REPATRIATION OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 104(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214; Public Law 114–122) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (M), by striking “or” after the semicolon;

(2) in subparagraph (N), by striking the period and inserting “; or”; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
paragraph:

“(O) knowingly, directly or indirectly, re-
patriating North Korean refugees to North
Korea.”.

(b) TECHNICAL CORRECTION.—Subparagraph (A) of
section 104(b)(2) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 is amended by striking
“205(c)” and inserting “205(d)”.

(c) .—Paragraph (2) of section 104(b) of the North
Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 is
amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking “and” at
the end;

(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period
at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(E) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTA-
TION OF GOODS.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding
any other provision of this section, the au-
uthority or a requirement to impose sanc-
tions under this section with respect to
persons described in paragraph (1)(O)
shall not include the authority or a re-
requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

“(ii) GOOD DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘good’ means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.”.

Subtitle D—Defending Our Economy From the PRC

SEC. 30631. DEFUND PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ACT.

(a) Prohibitions on CCP Companies Listed in Both the Section 1237 List and the Section 1260H List.—

(1) Prohibition on purchase or sale of certain securities.—Except as provided in paragraph (5) or paragraph (8)(B), a United States person is prohibited from purchasing or selling any—

(A) publicly traded security issued by a covered entity;

(B) publicly traded security that is derivative of a publicly traded security issued by a covered entity; and
(C) security that is designed to provide investment exposure to a publicly traded security issued by a covered entity.

(2) COVERED ENTITIES.—The term “covered entity” includes the following:

(A) Any person that is a Communist Chinese military company and included on the list maintained by the Department of Defense in accordance with section 1237(b) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) Any person that was designated as a Communist Chinese military company on June 2, 2021, in accordance with such section 1237(b).

(C) Any person that is a Chinese military company or a military-civil fusion contributor and included on the list maintained by the Department of Defense in accordance with section 1260H(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note) as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) APPLICABILITY.—
(A) Initial applicability.—If a person qualifies as covered entity on the date of the enactment of this Act, the prohibitions under this section shall apply to any purchase or sale that occurs at or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) Future additions.—If a person qualifies as covered entity after the date of the enactment of this Act, the prohibitions under this section shall apply to any purchase or sale that occurs at or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on the date that is 60 days after the date on which the person qualifies as a covered entity.

(4) Rule of application.—The prohibitions under this subsection shall apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in any regulation, order, directive, or license that may be issued pursuant to this section, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license granted before the date of enactment of this Act.

(5) Exception with respect to divestment.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the purchase or sale of publicly traded securities otherwise
prohibited by such paragraph that is made solely to
affect the divestment, in whole or in part, of such
securities by a United States person shall be per-
mitted until—

(A) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on
June 3, 2022, with respect to any person that
qualifies as a covered entity on the date of the
enactment of this Act; or

(B) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on
the date that is 1 year after the date on which
a person qualifies as a covered entity after the
date of the enactment of this Act.

(6) MAINTENANCE OF LISTS.—The Secretary of
Defense is authorized to make additions or deletions
to the lists described in paragraph (2) on an ongoing
basis based on the latest information available. The
Secretary of Defense shall, concurrently with the
publication of the lists in accordance with the appli-
cable provisions of law, transmit a copy of such lists
to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence.

(7) EVASION OF PROHIBITION.—The following
acts are prohibited:

(A) Any transactions by a United States
person or within the United States that evade
or avoid, or have the purpose of evading or
avoiding, cause a violation of, or attempt to vio-
late the prohibitions set forth in this section.

(B) Any conspiracy formed to violate any
of the prohibition set forth in this section.

(8) Authorization for Regulations and
Penalties.—

(A) In General.—The Secretary of the
Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director
of National Intelligence, and the heads of other
executive departments and agencies as deemed
appropriate by the Secretary of the Treasury, is
hereby authorized to take such actions, includ-
ing the promulgation of rules and regulations,
and to employ all powers granted to the Presi-
dent by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, to carry out the purposes of this
section.

(B) Regulations.—Rules and regulations
issued pursuant to this section may, among
other things, establish procedures to license
transactions otherwise prohibited pursuant to
this section if, prior to issuing any license
under this section, the Secretary of the Treas-

ury shall consult with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence.

(C) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) with respect to a person that knowingly violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations promulgated under this paragraph or commits any acts described in paragraph (6) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that knowingly commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.

(D) Exception relating to importation goods.—

(i) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions under this subsection shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(ii) Good defined.—In this subparagraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material,
supply, or manufactured product, including
inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(b) LIMITATION ON JUDICIAL REVIEW.—

(1) DECISIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—
The decision of the Secretary of Defense as to any question regarding the inclusion of a Communist Chinese military company, a Chinese military company, or a military-civil fusion contributor on either of the lists described in subsection (a)(2) may not be reviewed by any official or by any court, whether by action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.

(2) RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.—The rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury under subsection (a)(8) shall be final and not subject to any further agency review or to judicial review by any court (including under chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code).

SEC. 30632. CODIFYING THE DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES AND RELATED PROVISIONS UNDER TITLE 15, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) denial orders are an important foreign policy tool to use against foreign entities and individuals, especially Chinese persons, with a pattern of violating United States laws, especially laws relating to intellectual property; and

(2) the Department of Commerce should vigorously utilize denial orders to hold such persons accountable.

(b) STRATEGY.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, and Attorney General, shall submit to Congress a strategy regarding how denial orders issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce to deny the export privileges of foreign entities and individuals, especially entities and individuals located in China, can be better utilized as part of a holistic approach to hold such entities and individuals accountable for theft of United States intellectual property.

(c) CODIFICATION OF DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES AND RELATED PROVISIONS UNDER TITLE 15, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.—The provisions of part 730 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, relating to general information, and section 766.25 of such title,
relating to administrative action denying export privileges,
are hereby enacted into law.

SEC. 30633. CHINA TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTROL ACT
OF 2021.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CHINESE PERSON.—The term “Chinese
person” means—

(A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
tional of the People’s Republic of China; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of
the People’s Republic of China or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of
the People’s Republic of China.

(2) COVERED NATIONAL INTEREST TECH-
NOLOGY OR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The term
“covered national interest technology or intellectual
property” includes the following:

(A) Technology or intellectual property
that would make a significant contribution to
the military potential of the People’s Republic
of China that would prove detrimental to the
national security of the United States.

(B) Technology or intellectual property
that is a component of the production of prod-
ucts included in the most recent list required
under subsection (e)(1).

(C) Technology used by the Government of
the People’s Republic of China to carry out vio-
lations of human rights or religious liberties.

(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
son” means any person that is not a United States
person.

(4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with
respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
means that a person has actual knowledge, or should
have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the
result.

(5) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The term “in-
tellectual property” means—

(A) any work protected by a copyright
under title 17, United States Code;

(B) any property protected by a patent
granted by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office under title 35, United States
Code;

(C) any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, that is registered as a
trademark with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office under the Act entitled “An
Act to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes”, approved July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the “Lanham Act” or the “Trademark Act of 1946”) (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.);

(D) a trade secret (as defined in section 1839 of title 18, United States Code); or

(E) any other form of intellectual property.

(6) TECHNOLOGY.—The term “technology” includes goods or services relating to information systems, internet-based services, production-enhancing logistics, robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, or computing.

(7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) while the United States is committed to promoting cultural and technological exchange with other countries, it is our responsibility to protect the United States when channels for such exchange are exploited by adversaries; and

(2) the People’s Republic of China consistently seeks to exploit those channels, not only in its theft of intellectual property but also in its manipulation of lawful transfer and uses of technology in ways that directly support its military objectives and threaten the United States.

(e) Control of Export of Covered National Interest Technology and Intellectual Property to People’s Republic of China.—

(1) In general.—On and after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall control the export or re-export to, or transfer in, the People’s Republic of China of any covered national interest technology or intellectual property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any United States person.
(2) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall jointly submit to Congress a report assessing whether covered national interest technology or intellectual property should be controlled as required by paragraph (1) under—

(A) the International Traffic in Arms Regulations under subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations; or

(B) the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

(3) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out paragraph (1).

(d) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PROVISION TO OR PURCHASE FROM PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF COVERED NATIONAL INTEREST TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in prop-
erty of a person described in paragraph (2) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described in this paragraph is—

(A) a foreign person that, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly sells or otherwise provides to, or knowingly purchases from, the People’s Republic of China any covered national interest technology or intellectual property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; or

(B) a Chinese person that, on or after such date of enactment, knowingly uses covered national interest technology or intellectual property provided to the Chinese person in violation of subsection (c) or any other export control law of the United States.

(3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under paragraph
(1) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(B) Good Defined.—In this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(4) Waiver.—The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) with respect to a person if the President determines and reports to Congress that the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(5) Implementation; Penalties.—

(A) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this subsection.

(B) Penalties.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that paragraph shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as
a person that commits an unlawful act de-
described in subsection (a) of that section.

(C) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER-
GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements of
section 202 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall
not apply for purposes of this subsection.

(e) ESTABLISHMENT OF LIST OF CERTAIN PROD-
UCTS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT OF PEOP-
LE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OR USED BY THAT GOVERN-
MENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
nually thereafter, the Secretary of Commerce shall
set forth a list of products manufactured or pro-
duced in, or exported from, the People’s Republic of
China that are determined by—

(A) the Secretary—

(i) to receive support from the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China
pursuant to the Made in China 2025 In-
dustrial policy of that Government; or

(ii) to otherwise receive support from
that Government and that have or will in
the future displace net exports of like products by the United States; or

(B) the Secretary of State to be used by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to carry out violations of human rights or religious liberties.

(2) IDENTIFICATION OF PRODUCTS RECEIVING SUPPORT PURSUANT TO MADE IN CHINA 2025 POLICY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Commerce shall include in the list under paragraph (1)(A)(i) any product specified in the following documents set forth by the Government of the People’s Republic of China:

(i) Notice on Issuing Made in China 2025.

(ii) China Manufacturing 2025.

(iii) Notice on Issuing the 13th Five-year National Strategic Emerging Industries Development Plan.

(iv) Guiding Opinion on Promoting International Industrial Capacity and Equipment Manufacturing Cooperation.

(v) Any other document that expresses a national strategy or stated goal
in connection with the Made in China 2025 industrial policy set forth by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party of China, or another entity or individual capable of impacting the national strategy of the People’s Republic of China.

(B) Included products.—In addition to such products as the Trade Representative shall include pursuant to subparagraph (A) in the list under paragraph (1)(A)(i), the Trade Representative shall include products in the following industries:

(i) Civil aircraft.

(ii) Turbine engines.

(iii) Motor car and vehicle.

(iv) Advanced medical equipment.

(v) Advanced construction equipment.

(vi) Agricultural machinery.

(vii) Railway equipment.

(viii) Diesel locomotive.

(ix) Moving freight.

(x) Semiconductor.

(xi) Lithium battery manufacturing.

(xii) Artificial intelligence.
(xiii) High-capacity computing.

(xiv) Quantum computing.

(xv) Robotics.

(xvi) Biotechnology.

SEC. 30634. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF TIKTOK ON FEDERAL SYSTEMS.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1) the term “covered application” means the social networking service TikTok or any successor application or service developed or provided by ByteDance Limited or an entity owned by ByteDance Limited;

(2) the term “executive agency” has the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code; and

(3) the term “information technology” has the meaning given that term in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code.

(b) PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF TIKTOK.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Administrator of General Services, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, and the Secretary of Defense, and consistent
with the information security requirements under
subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 44, United
States Code, shall develop standards and guidelines
for executive agencies requiring the removal of any
covered application from information technology.

(2) NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH EX-
CEPTIONS.—The standards and guidelines developed
under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) exceptions for law enforcement activi-
ties, national security interests and activities,
and security researchers; and

(B) for any authorized use of a covered ap-
plication under an exception, requirements for
agencies to develop and document risk mitiga-
tion actions for such use.

SEC. 30635. PROHIBITION ON DISCLOSING GENETIC INFOR-
MATION TO CHINA.

(a) PROHIBITION.—A commercial DNA testing serv-
ice may not disclose the genetic information of any indi-
vidual, or any aggregate of such information, to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, or to any entity under the influ-
ence, control, or ownership of the People’s Republic of
China.
(b) Enforcement by Federal Trade Commission.—

(1) Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices.—A violation of this section or a regulation promulgated under this section shall be treated as a violation of a regulation under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)) regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

(2) Powers of Commission.—The Federal Trade Commission shall enforce this section and the regulations promulgated under this section in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made part of this section. Any person who violates this section or a regulation promulgated under this section shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Commercial DNA Testing Service.—The term “commercial DNA testing service” means any
person that provides genealogical or ancestry-related information based on an individual’s DNA.

(2) GENETIC INFORMATION.—The term “genetic information” means, with respect to any individual, information about such individual’s genetic tests.

(3) GENETIC TEST.—The term “genetic test” has the meaning given such term by section 201 of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–233; 42 U.S.C. 2000ff).

Subtitle E—Strengthening Our Partnerships With Taiwan

PART 1—PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

SEC. 30641. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The World Health Organization (WHO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations, charged with coordinating health efforts within the United Nations system. The World Health Assembly (WHA) is the decision-making body of the WHO, which convenes annually in May to set the policies and priorities of the organization. Statehood is not
a requirement for attendance at the WHA, and numerous observers, including nonmembers and nongovernmental organizations, attended the most recent virtual WHA in May 2020.

(2) Taiwan began seeking to participate in the WHO as an observer in 1997. In 2009, with strong support from successive United States Administrations, Congress, and like-minded WHO Member States, and during a period of improved Cross-Strait relations, Taiwan received an invitation to attend the WHA as an observer under the name “Chinese Taipei”. Taiwan received the same invitation each year until 2016, when following the election of President Tsai-Ing Wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan’s engagement in the international community began facing increased resistance from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan’s invitation to the 2016 WHA was received late and included new language conditioning Taiwan’s participation on the PRC’s “one China principle”. The WHO did not invite Taiwan to attend the WHA as an observer in 2017, 2018, 2019, or 2020.

(3) Taiwan remains a model contributor to world health, having provided financial and technical assistance to respond to numerous global health
challenges. Taiwan has invested over $6 billion in international medical and humanitarian aid efforts impacting over 80 countries since 1996. In 2014, Taiwan responded to the Ebola crisis by donating $1 million and providing 100,000 sets of personal protective equipment. Through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework – which partners Taiwan with the United States and Japan as a platform for sharing Taiwan’s expertise in a variety of crucial fields – the United States and Taiwan have jointly conducted training programs for technical health experts to combat MERS, Dengue Fever, and Zika. In 2020, after successfully containing the spread of the novel coronavirus within its borders while upholding democratic principles, Taiwan generously donated millions of pieces of personal protective equipment and COVID-19 tests to countries in need. These diseases know no borders, and Taiwan’s needless exclusion from global health cooperation increases the dangers presented by global pandemics.

(4) Taiwan’s international engagement has faced increased resistance from the PRC. Taiwan was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest at the organization’s prior
summit in 2013. Taiwan’s requests to participate in the General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) have also been rejected. In May 2017, PRC delegates disrupted a meeting of the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds held in Perth, Australia, until delegates from Taiwan were asked to leave. Since 2016, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, the Republic of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and the Republic of Kiribati have terminated longstanding diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC.

(5) Congress has established a policy of support for Taiwan’s participation in international bodies that address shared transnational challenges, particularly in the WHO. Congress has passed multiple measures to direct the Secretary of State to establish a strategy for, and to report annually to Congress on, efforts to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the WHA. Congress also passed legislation directing the Secretary to report on a strategy to gain observer status for Taiwan at the ICAO Assembly, and to report on a strategy to gain observer status for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly. How-
ever, since 2016 Taiwan has not received an invitation to attend any of these events as an observer.

(b) AUGMENTATION OF REPORT CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 (118 Stat. 656) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) An account of the changes and improvements the Secretary of State has made to the United States plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Assembly, following any annual meetings of the World Health Assembly at which Taiwan did not obtain observer status.”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect and apply beginning with the first report required under subsection (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 that is submitted after the date of the enactment of this Act.
PART 2—TAIWAN RELATIONS MODERNIZATION

ACT

Subpart A—U.S.-Taiwan Relations

SEC. 30651. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as key elements for the continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security interest of the United States;

(3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8) and the “Six Assurances”;

(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy;

(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy;

(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense,
undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, into its military forces;

(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate;

(8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on Cancer;

(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;

(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially through new agreements or resumption of talks related to a possible Trade and Investment Framework Agreement;

(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

(12) to expand bilateral economic and technological cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
(13) to support United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and

(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.

SEC. 30652. REAUTHORIZATION OF TAIWAN ASSURANCE ACT.

Section 315 of subtitle B of division FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116–260; commonly referred to as the Taiwan Assurance Act) is amended adding at the end the following:

“(d) Periodic Review – For as long as the guidance described in subsection (a) remains in effect, the Secretary shall conduct periodic reviews as described in subsection (a) and submit updated reports as described in subsection (c) not less frequently than every two years following the submission of the initial report described in subsection (c).”.

SEC. 30653. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction, section of the Foreign Affairs Manual or Foreign Affairs Handbook, related guidance, or related policies that, ex-
licitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limitations on activities of United States personnel, limits the ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and government representatives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) to display for official purposes symbols of Republic of China sovereignty, including—

(1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan);

and

(2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of military units.

(b) OFFICIAL PURPOSES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “official purposes” means—

(1) the wearing of official uniforms;

(2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies or functions; and

(3) appearances on Department of State social media accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan.

(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government’s position on Taiwan’s international status.
SEC. 30654. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this Act or any other provision of law may be construed to require the United States Government to refer to the democratically elected government of Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities,” or preclude referring to the democratically elected government of Taiwan as a “government.”

(b) ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.—The Department of State and other United States Government departments and agencies shall engage with the democratically elected government of Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan and end the outdated practice of referring to the Government of Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities”. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State and other United States Government departments and agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or
altering the United States Government’s position on Taiwan’s international status.

SEC. 30655. REPRESENTATIVE TITLE FOR DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN’S TAIPEI OFFICE.

The position of Director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office shall have the title of Representative.

SEC. 30656. AUTHORIZATION OF GLOBAL COOPERATION AND TRAINING FRAMEWORK.

(a) GLOBAL COOPERATION AND TRAINING FRAMEWORK.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to conduct training programs, workshops, and other activities with the government of Taiwan pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Taiwan signed in 2015 on the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.

(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that Global Cooperation and Training Framework activities that promote ties between the United States, Taiwan, and other democratic partners, or that undergird Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships, or that counter malign authoritarian activities, are particularly beneficial to our shared inter-
ests, and that examples of such activities in 2019 in-
clude:

(A) the “Good Energy Governance in the
Indo-Pacific” workshop, co-hosted by Japan, and Australia;

(B) the “International Austronesian Lan-
guages Revitalization Forum,” co-hosted with Japan and held in Palau, a nation that main-
tains diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and

(C) the “Defending Democracy through
Media Literacy II” workshop, which focused on addressing and countering disinformation in democratic elections and was co-hosted by Japan and Sweden.

(D) the “Anti-Corruption in the Public and Private Sections” workshop, which focused on promoting clean governance, preventing corporate governance, and preserving competitiveness through trade secret protection, and co-hosted by Japan.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated $3,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2026 through 2026 for the Global Co-
operation and Training Framework.
Subpart B—U.S.-Taiwan Defense and Security

Cooperation

SEC. 30661. BOLSTERING THE UNITED STATES SECURITY PARTNERSHIP WITH TAIWAN.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster United States security partnership in the Indo-Pacific must include encouraging and facilitating Taiwan’s accelerated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion, including long-range precision fires, munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and resilient command and control capabilities, and increasing the conduct of relevant and practical training and exercises with Taiwan’s defense forces;

(b) Statement of Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to strenuously oppose any action by the People’s Republic of China to use force to change the status quo on Taiwan; and

(2) that, in order to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change the status quo on Taiwan, the United States should coordinate with allies and partners to identify and develop sig-
nificant economic, diplomatic, and other measures to
deter and impose costs on any such action by the
People’s Republic of China, and to bolster deterrence
by articulating such policies publicly, as appropriate
and in alignment with United States interests.

SEC. 30662. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OP-
ERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to
sharp power operations and the united front campaign
supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed
toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) Development of a response to PRC propa-
ganda and disinformation campaigns and cyber-in-
trusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of
the Taiwan government and private-sector enti-
ties to document and expose propaganda and
disinformation supported by the Government of
the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese
Communist Party, or affiliated entities;
65

(B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan government’s ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns.

(2) Development of a response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities.

(3) Support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations.

(4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded governments to share data and best practices with the Government of Taiwan on ways to address sharp power operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party.
SEC. 30663. REPORT.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees a report on the feasibility of enhancing the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan through the Foreign Military Financing program of the Department of State.

SEC. 30664. BRIEFING ON TAIWAN SECURITY COOPERATION.

Section 1260A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) is amended—

(1) by striking the heading and inserting “ANNUAL BRIEFING ON TAIWAN SECURITY COOPERATION”; and

(2) by adding at the appropriate place in subsection (b) the following new paragraph:

“(4) A description of United States efforts to help Taiwan deter and defeat any military aggression, including bilateral and multilateral—

“(A) individual- and unit-level training;

and

“(B) operational exercise programs that build combined readiness, interoperability,
lethality, survivability, joint planning capability, and shared warfighting situational awareness.”

SEC. 30665. TAIWAN STATUS REGARDING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.

Taiwan shall receive the same benefits conferred for the purposes of transfers pursuant to section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

Subpart C—U.S.-Taiwan Technology & Economic Cooperation and Harmonization Act

SEC. 30671. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Taiwan is the United States’ tenth largest partner for bilateral trade in goods, with total trade of $86 billion, and the United States’ fifteenth largest export market, a destination for $31.8 billion in U.S. exports in 2019.

(2) Bilateral trade data dramatically understates Taiwan’s importance to the United States’ economy. The trade data does not include the IP licensing and contracted manufacturing relationships between the United States and Taiwan and does not include the overseas production of Taiwan companies for export to the United States. In 2018, Taiwan firms received $146 billion in U.S. export orders
compared with official U.S. data that showed $46 billion in Taiwan merchandise exports to the United States.

(3) Advanced technology supply chains are of particular importance to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and companies from the United States and Taiwan share mutually beneficial links that have allowed them to collectively establish a dominant position in the global manufacture of advanced microelectronics, a strategic industry of existential importance for the United States’ national security and economic prosperity. For example, 60% of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation’s revenue derived from North American customers in 2019. In 2018, Taiwan was the third largest importer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced in the United States.

(4) U.S.-Taiwan advanced technology supply chains, especially microelectronics supply chains, face significant external threats from malign industrial policies that pose both military and economic risks.
SEC. 30672. U.S.-TAIWAN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY STRATEGY.

(a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of four years, the Secretary of State, following interagency consultation as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate Congressional Committees a strategy to deepen U.S.-Taiwan economic relations and strengthen supply chain security in critical technologies.

(b) Subject Matter.—The strategy specified in subsection (a) shall include:

(1) a description of the full range of U.S. interests in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations;

(2) an identification of requests the government of Taiwan has made to the United States relating to our shared economic relations that remain outstanding;

(3) an identification of requests the United States has made to the government of Taiwan relating to our shared economic relations that remain outstanding;

(4) a description of specific steps the administration plans to take to address each such unresolved issue;

(5) an identification of critical technology supply chains of particular importance to the U.S.-Tai-
wan economic relationship, U.S.-Taiwan interactions regarding such supply chains, and specific steps the administration plans to take to enhance the security and harmonize the regulation of such supply chains; and

(6) a description of government-to-government interactions between the United States and Taiwan that have or will be conducted to address the matters described in paragraphs (1) through (5).

(c) Form.—The report specified in subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

**SEC. 30673. U.S.-TAIWAN ECONOMIC PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP DIALOGUE.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, or their designee at no lower than the rank of Undersecretary, with interagency consultation and participation as appropriate, shall convene an Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue with the government of Taiwan.

(b) FREQUENCY AND LOCATION.—The Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue shall be convened annually and shall be held in an alternating basis in Washington, D.C., and Taipei.

(c) SUBJECT MATTER OF DIALOGUE.—The subject matter of the dialogue shall include:
(1) The matters included in the U.S. Taiwan Technology and Economic Security Strategy.

(2) Efforts to align and harmonize export controls rules and licensing policies, the definition of critical technologies, and the administration and enforcement of export controls for critical technologies, including deemed exports.

(3) The advancement of mutual economic security priorities of the United States and Taiwan, such as joint efforts to secure technology supply chains, invest in secure production, and reduce dependencies on adversarial countries for a significant source of revenues.

(4) Cooperation to respond to shared threats to economic security and technology supply chains, such as malign industrial policies that seek to extract technological talent, know-how, and expertise from such supply chains in Taiwan and the United States, specifically including human capital.

(5) U.S.-Taiwan research collaboration, educational exchange, and strategic investment and R&D for critical technologies.

(d) WORKING LEVEL ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary shall conduct continuing engagements and consultations with the Government of Taiwan at the working level as
necessary to advance the U.S.-Taiwan Technology and Economic Security Strategy.

(c) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION.—The Secretary or their designee shall consult with the appropriate Congressional Committees prior to and after convening each U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue.

SEC. 30674. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

In this title, the term “appropriate Congressional Committees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.