AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 116–57
OFFERED BY MS. TITUS OF NEVADA

At the end of subtitle G of title XII, add the following:

SEC. __. MATTERS RELATING TO COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TERRORISM.

(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to ensure—

(1) to the extent practicable, the agents, precursors, and materials needed to produce weapons of mass destruction are placed beyond the reach of terrorist organizations and other malicious non-state actors;

(2) the number of foreign states that possess weapons of mass destruction is declining; and

(3) the global quantity of weapons of mass destruction and related materials is reduced.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) diplomatic outreach, threat reduction and foreign capacity-building programs, export controls, and the promotion of international treaties and
norms are all essential elements of accomplishing the core national security mission of preventing, detecting, countering, and responding to threats of weapons of mass destruction terrorism; and

(2) the potentially devastating consequences of weapons of mass destruction terrorism pose a significant risk to United States national security.

(c) REPORT ON LINES OF EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT POLICIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on each line of effort to implement the policies described in subsection (a) and the budgets required to implement each such line of effort effectively.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by this subsection should include the following:

(A) An assessment of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism and foreign
state risks and other emerging risks facing the United States and its allies, including—

(i) the status of foreign state, state-affiliated, and non-state actors efforts to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and their intent to misuse weapons-related materials;

(ii) any actions by foreign state, state-affiliated, and non-state actors employing weapons of mass destruction;

(iii) an update on—

(I) the risk of biological threats, including the proliferation of biological weapons, weapons components, and weapons-related materials, technology, and expertise to non-state actors;

(II) the risk of accidental release of dangerous pathogens due to unsafe practices and facilities; and

(III) the risk of uncontrolled naturally occurring disease outbreaks that may pose a threat to the United States or its Armed Forces or allies; and
(iv) the status of national efforts to meet obligations to provide effective security and accounting for nuclear weapons and for all weapons-useable nuclear materials in foreign states that possess such weapons and materials.

(B) A strategy to reduce the risk of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism over the next five years, including—

(i) ensuring, to the extent practicable—

(I) the agents, precursors, and materials needed to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction are placed beyond the reach of terrorist organizations and other malicious non-state actors;

(II) the number of foreign states that possess weapons of mass destruction is declining; and

(III) the global quantity of weapons of mass destruction and related materials is reduced;

(ii) identifying and responding to technological trends that may enable ter-
rorist or state development, acquisition, or use of weapons of mass destruction;

(iii) a plan to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons, weapons components, and weapons-related materials, technology, and expertise, which shall include activities that facilitate detection and reporting of highly pathogenic diseases or other diseases that are associated with or that could be used as an early warning mechanism for disease outbreaks that could affect the United States or its Armed Forces or allies, regardless of whether such diseases are caused by biological weapons;

(iv) regional engagement to reduce nuclear, biological, and chemical risks;

(v) engagement with foreign states, where possible, on security for nuclear weapons and weapons-useable nuclear and radioactive material, including protection against insider threats, strengthening of security culture, and support for security performance testing; and
(vi) a recommendation to establish a joint Department of Defense and Department of Energy program—

(I) to assess the verification, security, and implementation requirements associated with potential future arms reduction or denuclearization accords,

(II) identify gaps in existing and planned capabilities; and

(III) provide recommendations for developing needed capabilities to fill those gaps.

(3) FORM.—The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAMS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States Government should expand and revitalize its international nuclear security programs, as necessary;

(2) such an expanded nuclear security effort should seek to be comprehensive and close, to the ex-
tent possible, any gaps that exist in United States nuclear security programs; and

(3) the Secretary of State should seek to cooperate with as many foreign states with nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, or significant nuclear facilities as possible to—

(A) ensure protection against the full spectrum of plausible threats, including support for evaluating nuclear security threats and measures to protect against such threats, exchanging unclassified threat information, holding workshops with experts from each country, and having teams review the adequacy of security against a range of threats;

(B) establish comprehensive, multilayered protections against insider threats, including in-depth exchanges on good practices in insider threat protection, workshops, help with appropriate vulnerability assessments, and peer review by expert teams;

(C) establish targeted programs to strengthen nuclear security culture;

(D) institute effective, regular vulnerability assessments and performance testing through workshops, peer observation of such activities in
the United States, training, and description of approaches that have been effective; and

(E) consolidate nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials to the minimum practical number of locations.

(e) **Assessment of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.**—

(1) **In General.**—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy, shall seek to enter into an arrangement with the National Academy of Sciences—

(A) to conduct an assessment of strategies of the United States for preventing, countering, and responding to nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism assess and make recommendations to improve such strategies; and

(B) submit to the Secretary of Defense a report that contains such assessment and recommendations.

(2) **Matters to be Included.**—The assessment and recommendations required by paragraph (1) shall address the adequacy of strategies described in such paragraph and identify technical, policy, and resource gaps with respect to—
(A) identifying national and international nuclear, biological, and chemical risks and critical emerging threats;

(B) preventing state-sponsored and non-state actors from acquiring or misusing the technologies, materials, and critical expertise needed to carry out nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks, including dual-use technologies, materials, and expertise;

(C) countering efforts by state-sponsored and non-state actors to carry out such attacks;

(D) responding to nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism incidents to attribute their origin and help manage their consequences;

(E) budgets likely to be required to implement effectively such strategies; and

(F) other important matters that are directly relevant to such strategies.

(3) REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of the report received by the Secretary under paragraph (1)(B).
(B) **FORM.**—The report required by this paragraph shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(4) **FUNDING.**—

(A) **INCREASE.**—Notwithstanding the amounts set forth in the funding tables in division D, the amount authorized to be appropriated in section 301 for research, development, test, and evaluation, as specified in the corresponding funding table in section 4301, for Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Line 10, is hereby increased by $1,000,000 to carry out this subsection.

(B) **OFFSET.**—Notwithstanding the amounts set forth in the funding tables in division D, the amount authorized to be appropriated in section 301 for operation and maintenance as specified in the corresponding funding table in section 4301, for operation and maintenance, Air Force, admin & servicewide activities, servicewide communications, line 440, is hereby reduced by $1,000,000.

(f) **REPORT ON COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS.**—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter at the same time that the President submits the budget to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

(A) the programs of each Federal agency that are intended to reduce threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons to the United States or its Armed Forces or allies;

(B) a description of the operations of such programs and how such programs advance the mission of reducing the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons to the United States or its Armed Forces or allies; and

(C) recommendations on how to evaluate the success of such programs, how to identify opportunities for collaboration between such programs, how to eliminate crucial gaps not filled by such programs, and how to ensure that such programs are complementary to other programs across the United States Government.
(2) FORM.—The report required by this paragraph shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Armed Services, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.