

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 117-54

OFFERED BY MR. BERA OF CALIFORNIA

At the end of division E, add the following:

1 **TITLE LIX—TAIWAN PEACE AND**
2 **STABILITY ACT**

3 **SEC. 5901. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This title may be cited as the “Taiwan Peace and
5 Stability Act”.

6 **SEC. 5902. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
8 ings:

9 (1) The United States has consistently sought
10 to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a cen-
11 tral element of U.S. foreign policy toward the region.

12 (2) The Government of the People’s Republic of
13 China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai
14 Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-
15 paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-
16 cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to
17 erode U.S. policy and create a fait accompli on ques-
18 tions surrounding Taiwan’s future.

19 (3) In order to ensure the longevity of U.S. pol-
20 icy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan

1 to determine their future independently, it is nec-
2 essary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic,
3 and physical space.

4 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
5 United States to—

6 (1) maintain the position that peace and sta-
7 bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, se-
8 curity, and economic interests of the United States,
9 and are matters of international concern; and

10 (2) work with allies and partners to promote
11 peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter
12 military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that
13 would undermine regional stability.

14 **SEC. 5903. DEFINITIONS.**

15 In this title—

16 (1) the term “appropriate congressional com-
17 mittees” means—

18 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
19 the House of Representatives; and

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
21 the Senate;

22 (2) the term “international organization” in-
23 cludes United Nations funds, programs, specialized
24 agencies, entities, and bodies, and other organiza-
25 tions outside of the United Nations system, as the

1 Secretary of State or the Secretary's designee deems
2 appropriate, and in consultation with other Federal
3 departments and agencies;

4 (3) the term 'One-China Principle' means the
5 PRC's policy toward Taiwan;

6 (4) the term "civil society organizations" means
7 international civil society organizations that are crit-
8 ical to maintaining Taiwan's international space and
9 enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive
10 role in the global community; and

11 (5) the term "potential PLA campaigns"
12 means—

13 (A) a naval blockade of Taiwan;

14 (B) an amphibious assault and ground in-
15 vasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion de-
16 signed to accomplish a fiat accompli before
17 intervention is possible; and

18 (C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan's
19 outlying islands.

20 **Subtitle A—Supporting Taiwan's**
21 **Meaningful Participation in the**
22 **International Community**

23 **SEC. 5911. FINDINGS.**

24 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani-
2 tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases
3 such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever
4 in countries around the world. During the COVID-
5 19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of
6 personal protective equipment and COVID-19 tests
7 to countries in need.

8 (2) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and
9 Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
10 Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and
11 Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Tai-
12 wan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

13 (3) Taiwan was invited to participate in the
14 World Health Assembly, the decision-making body of
15 the World Health Organization (WHO), as an ob-
16 server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the
17 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has in-
18 creasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the
19 WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA
20 in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

21 (4) The Taipei Flight Information Region re-
22 portedly served 1.75 million flights and 68.9 million
23 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan
24 International airport, the eleventh busiest airport in
25 the world. Taiwan has been excluded from partici-

1 pating at the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
2 tion (ICAO) since 2013.

3 (5) United Nations (UN) General Assembly
4 Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of rep-
5 resentation of Taiwan and its people at the United
6 Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to rep-
7 resent the people of Taiwan.

8 **SEC. 5912. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL**
9 **PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL**
10 **COMMUNITY.**

11 It is the sense of Congress that—

12 (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous,
13 and is home to 23.5 million people. It is an impor-
14 tant contributor to the global community, as a model
15 for democracy, and by providing expertise in global
16 health, international aviation security, emerging
17 technology development, and with forward looking
18 environmental policies;

19 (2) multiple United States Government admin-
20 istrations of both political parties have taken impor-
21 tant steps to advance Taiwan's meaningful partici-
22 pation in international organizations;

23 (3) existing efforts to enhance U.S. cooperation
24 with Taiwan to provide global public goods, includ-
25 ing through development assistance, humanitarian

1 assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multi-
2 lateral fora is laudable and should continue;

3 (4) nonetheless, significant structural, policy,
4 and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's
5 meaningful participation in the international com-
6 munity; and

7 (5) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with
8 other parts of the global community could be further
9 enhanced through a systematic approach, along with
10 greater attention from Congress and the American
11 public to such efforts.

12 **SEC. 5913. STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL**
13 **PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-**
14 **ZATIONS.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
17 in consultation with other Federal departments and agen-
18 cies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate con-
19 gressional committees a strategy—

20 (1) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participa-
21 tion in a prioritized set of international organiza-
22 tions (IOs); and

23 (2) that responds to growing pressure from the
24 PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial ac-

1 tors, and civil society organizations to comply with
2 its “One-China Principle”, with respect to Taiwan.

3 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The strategy required in
5 paragraph (a) shall include:

6 (A) An assessment of the methods the
7 PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to
8 its “One-China Principle.” The methods shall
9 include those employed against governments,
10 IOs, and civil society organizations. The assess-
11 ment shall also include pressure on commercial
12 actors, to the extent it is relevant in the context
13 of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in IOs.

14 (B) An assessment of the policies of for-
15 eign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan,
16 to identify likeminded allies and partners who
17 might become public or private partners in the
18 strategy.

19 (C) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as
20 practicable, to identify IOs that best lend them-
21 selves to advancing Taiwan’s participation. The
22 analysis shall include, but is not limited to the
23 IOs’—

24 (i) policy on the requirements to ob-
25 tain membership and observer status, as

1 well as the foundational documents defin-
2 ing membership requirements and observer
3 status within the IO;

4 (ii) participation rules;

5 (iii) processes for developing member-
6 ship requirements and participation rules;

7 (iv) policies of current members re-
8 garding Taiwan's political status; and

9 (v) relative reliance on contributions
10 from the PRC and how it may affect inter-
11 nal decision making.

12 (D) An evaluation of the feasibility and ad-
13 visability of expanding economic, security, and
14 diplomatic engagement with nations that have
15 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-
16 graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns
17 with U.S. interests.

18 (E) A survey of IOs that have allowed Tai-
19 wan's meaningful participation, including an as-
20 sessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan's
21 engagement has occurred within those organiza-
22 tions and how Taiwan's participation has posi-
23 tively strengthened the capacity and activity of
24 these organizations, thereby providing positive

1 models for Taiwan's inclusion in other similar
2 forums.

3 (F) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which
4 the U.S. Government will prioritize for using its
5 voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan's
6 meaningful participation over the three-year pe-
7 riod following the date of enactment of this Act.
8 The list shall be derived from the IOs identified
9 in paragraph (1)(C).

10 (G) A description of the diplomatic strate-
11 gies and the coalitions the U.S. Government
12 plans to develop to implement paragraph
13 (b)(1)(F).

14 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in
15 subsection (a) shall be classified, but it may include an
16 unclassified summary, if the Secretary of State determines
17 it appropriate.

18 (d) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State or his
19 or her designee, shall consult with the appropriate con-
20 gressional committees—

21 (1) no later than 90 days after the date of en-
22 actment of this Act, on the list of IOs identified in
23 subsection (b)(1)(C); and

24 (2) 180 days after submitting the strategy re-
25 quired in subsection (a), and 180 days thereafter for

1 two years, regarding the development and implemen-
2 tation of the strategy.

3 **SEC. 5914. EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP-**
4 **MENT COOPERATION.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days following
6 the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of
7 the United States Agency for International Development
8 (USAID), in consultation with the U.S. International De-
9 velopment Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to
10 the appropriate congressional committees a report on co-
11 operation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral devel-
12 opment initiatives through the American Institute in Tai-
13 wan as appropriate.

14 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
15 quired by subsection (a) shall include:

16 (1) A comprehensive review of existing coopera-
17 tion mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or
18 DFC, and relevant departments and agencies in Tai-
19 wan, including, but not limited to Taiwan's Inter-
20 national Cooperation and Development Fund
21 (ICDF).

22 (2) An assessment of how USAID and DFC de-
23 velopment cooperation with relevant departments
24 and agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable co-

1 operation with partners of similar economic size and
2 foreign assistance capacity.

3 (3) An analysis of the opportunities and chal-
4 lenges the cooperation reviewed in paragraph (1) has
5 offered to date. The analysis shall include, but is not
6 limited to—

7 (A) opportunities collaboration has offered
8 to expand USAID's and DFC's ability to de-
9 liver assistance into a wider range communities;

10 (B) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF,
11 other relevant agencies and departments in Tai-
12 wan, or the organizations' implementing part-
13 ners have a comparative advantage in providing
14 assistance;

15 (C) opportunities to transition virtual ca-
16 pacity building events with relevant depart-
17 ments and agencies in Taiwan, through the
18 Global Cooperation and Training Framework
19 (GCTF) as well as other forums, into in-person,
20 enduring forms of development cooperation.

21 (4) An assessment of any legal, policy,
22 logistical, financial, or administrative barriers to ex-
23 panding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral de-
24 velopment. The analysis shall include, but is not lim-
25 ited to—

1 (A) availability of personnel at the Amer-
2 ican Institute in Taiwan (AIT) responsible for
3 coordinating development assistance coopera-
4 tion;

5 (B) volume of current cooperation initia-
6 tives and barriers to expanding it;

7 (C) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers fac-
8 ing the United States or other partners to in-
9 cluding Taiwan in formal and informal multilat-
10 eral development cooperation mechanisms;

11 (D) resource or capacity barriers to ex-
12 panding cooperation facing the United States or
13 Taiwan; and

14 (E) geopolitical barriers that complicate
15 U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in third countries.

16 (5) Recommendations to address the challenges
17 identified in paragraph (b)(4).

18 (6) A description of any additional resources or
19 authorities that expanding cooperation might re-
20 quire.

21 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in
22 subsection (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a
23 classified annex if the Administrator of USAID deter-
24 mines it appropriate.

1 **Subtitle B—Advancing Taiwan’s**
2 **Economic Space**

3 **SEC. 5921. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING U.S. ECO-**
4 **NOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.**

5 It is the sense of the Congress that—

6 (1) expanding U.S. economic relations with Tai-
7 wan has benefited the people of both the United
8 States and Taiwan. Taiwan is now the United States
9 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest ex-
10 port market, 13th largest source of imports, and a
11 key destination for U.S. agricultural exports;

12 (2) further integration, consistent with robust
13 environmental standard and labor rights, would ben-
14 efit both peoples and is in the strategic and diplo-
15 matic interests of the United States; and

16 (3) the United States should explore opportuni-
17 ties to expand economic agreements between Taiwan
18 and the United States, through dialogue, and by de-
19 veloping the legal templates required to support po-
20 tential future agreements.

21 **Subtitle C—Enhancing Deterrence**
22 **Over Taiwan**

23 **SEC. 5931. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY**
24 **IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.**

25 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, includ-
2 ing through high rates of PRC sorties into air space
3 near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises
4 near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing U.S. po-
5 sition that differences in cross-Strait relations must
6 be resolved peacefully;

7 (2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict
8 to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any in-
9 crease in the risk of conflict demands attention and
10 obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most
11 viable means to prevent war;

12 (3) Taiwan should continue to implement its
13 asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in
14 cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also
15 strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve
16 and civil defense forces, and those capabilities in-
17 clude coastal defense cruise missiles; and

18 (4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essen-
19 tial to maintain open and effective crisis communica-
20 tion and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to
21 reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately,
22 conflict.

1 **SEC. 5932. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A**
2 **CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after the
4 date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
5 to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-
6 government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-
7 Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

8 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy shall
9 include:

10 (1) A comprehensive review of existing diplo-
11 matic, economic, and military tools to establish de-
12 terrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an assess-
13 ment of their efficacy.

14 (2) An examination of the present and future
15 capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to re-
16 spond to the potential PLA campaigns against Tai-
17 wan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The analysis shall in-
18 clude an assessment of the progress Taiwan has
19 made in developing the cost-effective and resilient
20 capabilities needed to respond to its strategic envi-
21 ronment, as well as any additional personnel, pro-
22 curement, or training reforms required.

23 (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding
24 coordination with U.S. allies and partners to en-
25 hance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. The re-

1 view shall include, but is not limited to, a review of
2 the following matters:

3 (A) Expanding coordination of public or
4 private messaging on deterrence vis-à-vis Tai-
5 wan.

6 (B) Coordinating use of economic tools to
7 raise the costs of PRC military action that
8 could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict.

9 (C) Enhancing co-development and co-de-
10 ployment of military capabilities related to de-
11 terrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or enhanc-
12 ing coordinated training of Taiwan's military
13 forces.

14 (4) Recommendations on significant additional
15 diplomatic, economic, and military steps available to
16 the U.S. Government, unilaterally and in concert
17 with U.S. allies and partners, to enhance the clarity
18 and credibility of deterrence over a cross-Strait con-
19 flict.

20 (5) A description of any additional resources or
21 authorities needed to implement the recommenda-
22 tions identified in paragraph (5).

23 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in
24 subsection (b) shall be classified, but it may include an

1 unclassified annex, if determined appropriate by the Presi-
2 dent.

3 (d) CONSULTATION.—No later than 90 days after the
4 date of enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than
5 every 180 days thereafter for seven years, the President
6 or his or her designee, as well as representatives from the
7 agencies and departments involved in developing the strat-
8 egy required in paragraph (a) shall consult with the appro-
9 priate congressional committees regarding the develop-
10 ment and implementation of the strategy required in this
11 section. The representatives shall be at the Undersecretary
12 level or above.

13 **SEC. 5933. STRENGTHENING TAIWAN'S CIVILIAN DEFENSE**
14 **PROFESSIONALS.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days following
16 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consulta-
17 tion with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to the
18 appropriate congressional committees a plan for strength-
19 ening the community of civilian defense professionals in
20 Taiwan, facilitated through the American Institute in Tai-
21 wan as appropriate.

22 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall
23 include the following:

24 (1) A comprehensive review of existing U.S.
25 Government and non-U.S. Government program-

1 matic and funding modalities to support Taiwan’s
2 civilian defense professionals in pursuing profes-
3 sional development, educational, and cultural ex-
4 changes in the United States. The review shall in-
5 clude, but is not limited to—

6 (A) opportunities through U.S. Depart-
7 ment of State-supported programs, such as the
8 International Visitor Leaders Program; and

9 (B) opportunities offered through non-gov-
10 ernmental institutions, such as think tanks, to
11 the extent the review can practicably make such
12 an assessment.

13 (2) A description of the frequency that civilian
14 defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are se-
15 lected for the programs reviewed in paragraph (1).

16 (3) An analysis of any funding, policy, adminis-
17 trative, or other barriers preventing greater partici-
18 pation from Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals
19 in the opportunities identified in paragraph (1).

20 (4) An evaluation of the value expanding the
21 opportunities reviewed in paragraph (1) would offer
22 for strengthening Taiwan’s existing civilian defense
23 community, and for increasing the perceived value of
24 the field for young professionals in Taiwan.

1 (5) An assessment of options the United States
2 Government could take individually, with partners in
3 Taiwan, or with foreign governments or non-govern-
4 mental partners, to expand the opportunities re-
5 viewed in paragraph (1).

6 (6) A description of additional resources and
7 authorities that may be required to execute the op-
8 tions in paragraph (5).

9 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-
10 section (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a clas-
11 sified annex, if determined appropriate.

